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CHRISTIANITY AND "WOMAN'S RIGHTS"

By the Rev. Joseph Keating, S.J.

It will be clear, I hope, to all readers of this paper that no question which touches human rights and wrongs can be adequately discussed or properly determined without at least implicit reference to the fact that the human race is the actual creation of an Infinite Being, on whom it is physically dependent, to whom it is morally responsible. If we consider merely the needs of this world or only the temporal interests of humanity, we are reckoning, in a very literal sense, without our host. Before deciding, then, on the merits of this or that project for human betterment, we have to ask how it fits into the complete divine plan. For the revelation of God's purposes is meant to furnish the Christian with something like what the architect furnishes the builder, viz. "elevations," enabling him to judge what is really best for man as a whole and in the long run—as a whole, taking soul as well as body; in the long run, a run which will occupy eternity.

This explains why in a non-Catholic community there arise, side by side with philanthropic societies originating outside the Church, other similar societies claiming the title of Catholic. They are a natural consequence of our position and claims, for no Catholic can honestly

countenance plans for moral or social reform which reject or ignore or seriously mutilate the Christian ideal embodied in the Church's teaching. Hence we have Catholic Temperance Societies, because elsewhere that excellent cause is tainted with Manichæism or joined to false worship; there is a Catholic Social Guild, because other associations for civic improvement are not free from materialistic or socialistic theories; there is a Catholic Peace Association, since peace is often advocated in other bodies on irrational principles; and, finally, there was inaugurated in London, on 10th June 1911, a Catholic Women's Suffrage Society, a fact which touches our present subject, as seeming to show that some people find, in that particular department of the Feminist movement, a spirit at work which is not in accord with Christian teaching.

It may therefore be of service, taking occasion of this last event, to inquire what Christianity has to say about the whole Woman Question, of which the agitation for the political suffrage is such a marked symptom. We shall find, it is true, in accredited Catholic teaching, no formal decisions on what are quite modern developments of the subject, but it will be easy to conjecture—from the revelation the Church guards, from the moral principles she asserts, and from her traditional application of both—the general lines on which her judgements would be formed.

The "Feminist Movement," as a phrase, may be taken to cover the whole ideal which consciously or unconsciously is inspiring the sex in many lands to shake off a multitude of traditional laws and conventions which have hampered its freedom of action, as compared with man's, from the beginning of history. The student of the movement has therefore to determine whether and to what extent woman has hitherto been deprived of her rights. The question is essentially one of justice, involving the mutual relations of the

sexes; for if woman has been wronged, it has largely been through the act or connivance of man. Of course, if her claims are genuine, then Christianity must recognize them, as it recognizes all rights founded in justice. If they are not genuine, Christianity must oppose them, as it must oppose everything untrue and unjust. And if partly real and partly ill-founded, then Christian principles will serve as a test to distinguish the false from the true.

It may be well to begin by pointing out that, whilst upholding all real rights, the Church, according to her mission, is careful to teach that all rights are not of equal importance and that their relative value is gauged by the various goods they secure or to which they give access. It would be a pity if an over-vehement advocacy of the claims of woman should tend to obscure the fact that, granting that one is wholly unimpeded in the pursuit of one's final destiny and has the means of developing the life of the spirit to the full measure of grace accorded, all other restrictions, whether imposed by sex or birth, or condition or custom, or positive law, even though unjustifiable, are *comparatively* unimportant A hearty recognition of this fact, which Christianity exists to emphasize, would serve, in many cases, to set things in their true perspective.

This first important principle of Christianity brings us already some way to a conception of its general attitude towards the Woman Question. The Church is concerned primarily with the soul; now the practical question for every woman (as indeed for every man) is to save her soul, and if she succeeds in doing that, it matters little for *her* as an individual that during life she has been the victim of male tyranny; in fact, the injustice she endured may have made her salvation better worth having and more secure. But, whilst keeping this truth ever in mind, the Christian woman,

by virtue of her creed, is also bound to aim at furthering on earth the kingdom of God and His justice around her as well as within. As a member of society she has duties towards others as well as towards herself; and although on occasion she may praiseworthily forgo her individual rights in the spirit of our Lord's counsel, that divine doctrine does not justify such non-resistance to evil as would be a stimulus to wrong-doing, and so injure the community. Acquiescence in the denial of rights to a whole class is not a point of Christian perfection. If, then, there is any injustice in the present status of womankind, Christian women should be keen to remedy it.

That being so, can we truly say, in the face of historical records, that the Church has always encouraged women to claim their just rights? No impartial observer who regards the status of women in the civilization inspired by Christianity, can deny that in many most important points it is immensely superior to that which she held or holds outside such civilization.[1] But from the mere fact that there are still wrongs calling for redress, must we not own that the Church has given tacit approval to many injustices inflicted upon the sex during the whole course of Christian history? The answer to that question will be perhaps clearer and more satisfactory if, for a moment, the divine ideal of the Church is recalled.

By the abiding presence of the Spirit of Truth, the Church is guaranteed against formally teaching or countenancing errors in faith or morals, but outside whatever is needed effectively to secure this end Divine Providence does not seem to interfere. Hence, the Church's knowledge of physical science is simply that of her time, and similarly her view on merely social or political questions cannot claim to be super-

[1] See *What Christianity has done for Women*, by G. d'Azambuja, translated by Mrs Philip Gibbs. C.T.S. 3d.

naturally enlightened. Governed in each age by men of the age, the mentality of the age on matters morally indifferent or morally obscure is reflected in the writings of her doctors. Thus, although in her teaching from the beginning is to be found the repudiation of every injustice, the full implication of that teaching, in morals no less than in faith, has not always been realized from the beginning, and in some instances may not be altogether realized yet.[1] History often enables us to trace the workings of the providential scheme in these matters, from the first statement of the new idea to its ultimate acceptance by the general consciousness. In the first ages, for instance, Christianity was content to repudiate explicitly only such current theories or practices as were plainly contrary to God's law. It condemned unequivocally the prevalent idolatry and sexual vice; it tolerated the prevalent slavery. Yet, though the process was slow and suffered many a check, we know that the coming of Christianity meant the final emancipation of the slave.

To the objection, then, that the mind of the Church, as reflected in Christian literature as a whole, does not recognize the rightful claims of women, and even approves unworthy estimates of the sex, and that these views were borne out by Christian practice, the following general replies may be made:—

First, as a mere matter of grammatical convenience, to avoid the doubling of pronouns, the duties, privileges, rights, etc., of the male sex are often mentioned exclusively when both sexes are referred to. This is a usage consecrated from time immemorial; and with that prescription behind it, it is not likely to be

[1] That great personal holiness may coexist in the same individual with what we should call an imperfect ethical development is strikingly illustrated in the characters of many Old Testament saints. Sanctity does not consist in perfection of knowledge, but in perfect fulfilment of what we know.

altered until and unless the relative position of the sexes is reversed.[1]

Secondly, Christian teachers were inevitably influenced by what they saw around them in their day. Uneducated, kept under guardianship, hampered by a thousand traditional restrictions in her due development, woman for long ages was bound to be regarded as something inferior, for people then did not think of inquiring, as we do now, whether her *de facto* deficiencies were innate or due to her circumstances. And as women generally seemed to acquiesce in their position, and had no thought or no opportunity of making an effective protest, the state of affairs might have been beyond remedy but for the force of certain Christian ideas beginning to energize, but not yet grown to maturity.

Thirdly, at her institution, and for many centuries after, the Church had to live in a society dominated by the conceptions of the old Roman Law, which treated woman as an inferior being by nature, and although Christian principles modified those conceptions from the start, the process could not but be gradual.

Fourthly, as we have implied above, Christian teachers *ex professo* took a supernatural view of things, and laid most stress upon those rights which most concern our future destiny, viz. the rights of conscience. They were mainly insistent that people should be free to serve God, should be under no such bondage, within or without, as would impede the chief end of their existence. In comparison with this degree of freedom, they thought little of infringements in other matters. Hence we find St. Paul

[1] The pen, no less than the sword, was at first an exclusively male implement, and hence all early literature, even what is inspired, has a predominantly male cast. To judge from the actual words, St. John (Apoc. xiv. 4) seems to exclude women from the company of virgins following the Lamb, but what misogynist would venture to assert that as the Apostle's intention?

much more anxious that slaves should be good Christians than that they should become free men.[1] Believing and preaching an endless life of happiness after this, what wonder that the Church looks with a certain equanimity at the startling inequality of human lots, knowing that a greater share of temporal good things, whether of power, or freedom, or wealth, or health, does nothing to guarantee, but may rather put in jeopardy, the attainment of goods everlasting. Minds bounded by merely earthly interests will not easily take this view; yet it is necessary for a sound appreciation of temporal matters. When the thought of the next world has grown dim and uncertain, human affairs, whether good or evil, cannot be judged aright. It is only when viewed, as the Church counsels, *sub specie æternitatis*, that earthly projects retain or regain their proper proportions.

Lastly, there is a further development of this point which is worthy of special mention, and that is that much Christian literature is *ascetic* in character, devoted to a development of the counsels, those voluntary abdications of legitimate rights which mark the closer following of our Saviour. Accordingly, when a celibate is addressing, to celibates under vow, warnings on the subject of womankind, it is not to be expected that he should expatiate upon their excellent qualities; rather is it his business to select those which make them a danger to his special audience. Such language cannot fairly be quoted as the general teaching of the Church.[2]

Recollecting, then, that the Church, though a spiritual society existing for a supernatural end,

[1] 1 Cor. vii. 20, 21.

[2] Of course it is so quoted by unscrupulous controversialists. At the same time, it cannot be denied that not a little spice of Oriental Manichæism is discernible in certain ascetical writings about women. We are familiar with a similar style of exaggeration in the manner in which some teetotallers denounce wine, "that good familiar creature, *if it be well used*," as Iago, for once a sound moralist, styles it.

has always been officered by human beings not necessarily in advance of their age in their understanding of current social problems, we are now in a better position to discriminate between what is accidental and what is permanent in her views of the status of womankind. I have said that it may be seen rather in principles than in formal pronouncements, and, on this account, it is easier of statement, for principles can always be detached from their more or less imperfect applications.

The first principle is one that puts the matter in its proper setting: it is a special application of the general rule concerning human destinies, expressed by St. Paul's blunt question—"Hath not the potter power over the clay?"[1] Whatever be the final and absolute fact regarding the comparative status of man and woman, no creature can arraign its Creator of injustice. Even if it turned out that woman as a whole could be shown to be *naturally* inferior to man she would have no more reasonable ground of complaint than human beings have that they are not angels. There are, in fact, often greater and more galling differences between man and man, or between woman and woman, than there are between the sexes themselves. To say that God, if He makes creatures of a certain type, is bound in justice to make them all exact and perfect copies of that type, and set them all in equally favourable circumstances, would be to place a singularly foolish limit to the divine freedom. Yet that is what they, for instance, do who nourish a sense of resentment against God because they are women instead of men. It is commonly supposed that the black races are naturally incapable of attaining such a level of moral or mental development as the white. Is God then unjust to the soul He puts in a black body? As no one can claim existence itself as a right, so no one has the right to this or that form of

[1] Rom. ix. 21.

existence. Once created, he has a right, as regards his fellows, to free scope for the exercise of his talents in God's service, be they five or two or one; and he has a right, founded on God's fidelity, to a reward proportioned to his works. But it is for God to determine the essential circumstances of the creature's service, and God varies those circumstances for each. A happy environment forms no certain indication of His final purpose. His justice is concerned only with rendering to every one, not according to his talents, but according to his use of them. "Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, 'Why hast thou made me thus?'" The true Christian, so far from feeling aggrieved at less favourable earthly conditions, freely owns, if he has any adequate conception of his privileges, that the supernatural benefits open to the baptized, especially that root and source of all the rest, their elevation to the state of grace, reduces all merely natural differences to insignificance. Resentment, therefore, against Almighty God on the score of sex disabilities, which is childish folly in any case, becomes impiety in the believer.

It is not superfluous to state these elementary truths: it may be that some of the bitterness imported into the Woman Question on the alleged grounds of the tyranny of man will be found, on analysis, a rebellious uprising of human pride against the just ordinances of God.

The second principle is an immediate consequence of the first. Christianity, recognizing that God has expressed His ideal of humanity not wholly in one type but by sharing it between two, regards all that is necessarily connected with the physiological distinction of sex as part of the original divine purpose. "Male and female created He them,"[1] and male and female He means them to remain. That there are certain groups of qualities in the genus

[1] Gen. i. 27, emphatically reasserted by our Lord in Matt. xix. 4.

Homo, not merely physical, but mental and moral as well, which constitute severally manliness and womanliness, is a matter of common recognition, although the extreme Feminist will contend that mental and moral differences, at any rate, are the artificial product of difference in training. The Christian does not deny the possibility of some of these differences being due to tradition and education, but he stands for two things as certain—1st, that on permanent diversity of function and structure are based certain distinctions of mind and character which cannot be obliterated, and the development of which is demanded in the interests of the race; 2nd, that these distinctions in themselves do not constitute superiority and inferiority: they produce aptitudes for different things, but things which are equally essential for the welfare of humanity. Both man and woman are by nature imperfect without one another. Tennyson's oft-quoted lines,

> "For woman is not undevelopt man
> But diverse,"

express the teaching alike of reason, experience, and revelation.

In the third place, then, whilst maintaining the essential manliness of man and womanliness of woman, the Church is still more emphatic in asserting their complete equality as spiritual entities, and this for the soundest and weightiest of reasons, viz. that exactly the same moral and religious duties are exacted from both. When the God of Justice imposes equality of obligation He presupposes equality of powers. And He has set before man and woman alike the selfsame standard of conduct, He enjoins on both the same commandments, He proposes the same counsels; there is no special height marked out for the supposed strength of the man; there is no concession made for the presumed weakness of woman. The

end of the journey is the same for both, and exactly the same is the route to be traversed. In this great doctrine, then, of the complete spiritual equality of the sexes we may see the charter of woman's rights, the root and the support of all her lawful claims. This was the leaven originally set in the mass of pre-Christian injustice, and it is still fermenting to-day. St. Paul is the Church's spokesman in this matter. Speaking of the new race of Christians he cries: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, *there is neither male nor female*: for you are all one in Christ Jesus,"[1]—words of power which have destroyed the narrow nationalism of the old dispensation, have struck the fetters from the slave, and have established the full spiritual rights, the complete personality, of womankind. By this pronouncement, accordingly, any code or custom, be it never so inveterate, which assigns to woman, as such, an inferior position in the eyes of God, is utterly annulled. The Church, in her estimates of moral worth, has, so to say, ignored sex, or, as in the case of female saints, used it only to enhance merit. These latter are not admitted to her altars on easier terms than men; nor, on the other hand, does she exact from them a stricter standard of observance. Still less, as regards ordinary humanity, is she a party to that abominable perversion of justice, one of the worst fruits of the unregenerate male mind, by which man's lapses from purity are regarded as natural and venial, whilst erring woman, often the less guilty, is stoned without remorse. I am not blaming man for exacting spotless integrity from the other sex as a condition of reverence, but only for condoning, without any warrant except corrupt human opinion, a lower standard in his own.

And now we come to two further principles of

[1] Gal. iii. 28. See also Coloss. iii. 11, where is made a similar eloquent assertion of Christian liberty, equality, and fraternity.

Christianity which seem to contradict what has already been proved about the essential equality before God of the sexes. Their bearing may be stated in the form of questions. How can we justify on Christian grounds the total exclusion of the "devout sex" from the sanctuary? How, again, justify the position of head of the family, assigned by Christian teaching solely to the man? Do not these two points imply that, in the real mind of the Church, woman is regarded as inferior to man?

These questions brings us to the true crux of Feminism, and according as they are answered we can tell whether any given Feminist has or has not ceased to accept the Christian ideal. But an intelligible answer is hardly possible until it is determined what is meant in this connection by inferiority and superiority—definitions which are much neglected in this great controversy, to the manifest and manifold confusion of thought.

If the relative merits of two species of beings of different nature are to be estimated, the simplest and surest plan is to compare them with some absolute standard of perfection with which they both have something in common. The nearer to that standard must be reckoned the more perfect. Thus we determine that, amongst spiritual beings, angels are more perfect than men, because being pure spirits they bear a closer resemblance to their Creator. Similarly, in the animate creation, man is higher than the irrational animals on account of his Godlike endowment of intelligence and will. But to compare the merits of two classes of beings of the same nature an outside standard is of little use. As their natural qualities are alike, it is only as individuals, not as classes, that they can differ. As classes they can be contrasted only by reference to some ideal which perfectly fulfils the natural type, and is therefore common to both. Now, in the case of man and woman, can we find such

an ideal? It would seem not: the physiological distinction of sex is so fundamental in itself and so deeply reflected in both mind and character that we cannot construct a common standard. There must then be a separate ideal for either sex. Hence, the question of relative superiority does not really arise, unless either strives to enter upon the other's peculiar domain. For consider the usual grounds for claiming superiority. That claim clearly cannot be grounded on physical strength alone, or else the elephant were worthier than his driver. Nor again on intellectual qualities. The male mind, as things are, is commonly held to be more purely rational than the female, less exposed to emotional bias, more capable of logical argument and breadth of view; but, even granting that this is wholly due to sex and is not the result of centuries of special training, it still is no mark of higher perfection, apart from its reference to some particular end. Nay, it may even be plausibly urged that, since angels do not reason but reach truth by direct intuition, the woman's mind is the more angelic. Finally, as regards moral characteristics, in matters of conduct and discipline of the will, it is generally granted that women have greater aptitude than men for patience, charity, unselfishness, devotion,—virtues which enter prominently into the Christian ideal,—and that in practice, as far as comparison is possible, they carry those virtues to a much greater height.

It seems, then, practically impossible to strike a balance between dispositions so dissimilar; so that, if one sex claims in any respect pre-eminence over the other, it must be on grounds outside natural qualities. It is otherwise, doubtless, amongst uncivilized communities, ruled by physical force rather than by law: there the stronger sex may justly expect obedience in exchange for protection. But in law-abiding societies it cannot, I think, be shown that the intellectual or moral differences between the sexes

are such as, *ipso facto*, to invest the male with the title to rule. Accordingly, we must ascribe the reason for the doctrine of Christianity regarding man's privileged position in Church government and in the family to the express ordinance of the only Being who has a right to impose His will upon His creatures, viz. Almighty God.

Here we enter the region of positive historical facts, which cannot be ignored or disputed without throwing the whole question into confusion. It was doubtless open to Almighty God, absolutely speaking, to create Eve first and then Adam to be her helpmeet, but as a matter of fact He assigned, in the first and typical human family, priority to the male. Similarly our Lord, had He thought fit, might have established His Church upon twelve female Apostles with His incomparably holy Mother as their head. But we know that He passed her over and the devoted women who followed Him with more than manly courage, and chose instead the men who had proved so weak; and under the guidance of His Spirit the same principles have always prevailed in the Church.[1] Now, we cannot suppose that Infinite Wisdom acted arbitrarily in these matters, that it did not matter for this purpose whether man or woman was so employed. On the contrary, if on man is bestowed the headship of the family, if to him alone are entrusted the government of the Church and the administration of the means of grace, it must be because there is something in human conditions which make male faculties better fitted for such particular work than female. Here, then, we have that reference to some extrinsic

[1] I may be reminded that in the Early Church women were admitted, under the title of deaconesses, to a sort of ecclesiastical office, and were even ordained to it by the Bishop, but there is no evidence to show that the Church sanctioned more than their administration of Baptism (by immersion) to their own sex (a sacrament which requires no sacerdotal powers), together with the distribution of charity and other works now performed by our "active" orders of nuns.

end which makes it possible to discriminate between the aptitudes of the sexes. We cannot say absolutely whether a pat of butter is better than a knife, but there is no doubt which is superior when there is question, say, of cutting wood. Thus—a distinction which should have an important effect in allaying sex rivalry—the authority assigned by Christian teaching in these two instances to the male sex is not *personal* but *official.* It is not man as man that enters the sanctuary, but man as God's elected minister; it is not man as man that claims, within definite limits, the obedience of his wife, but man as God-appointed head of the family. There is no question of greater individual perfection involved in this assignment of authority: it is God's positive provision for the welfare of the race. And, of course, there is no personal degradation in submission to lawfully-constituted authority in its own sphere. The duke obeys the policeman controlling the traffic just as the dustman does, and feels not a whit less ducal.

As these two points will always—so long, at least, as the Christian ideal is followed—be a bar to the complete *social* equality of the two sections of the race, it is worth while to examine more closely the reasons that support them. First, as to the functions of the Christian priesthood. Considered as a whole they will be seen to call for certain natural aptitudes generally associated with man as we find him,—breadth of mind, logical faculty, self-control, power of sustained work, personal activity. It would be vain to inquire whether, by generations of education, women could not become similarly endowed. Inevitable human conditions do not give her the opportunity, nor is it desirable, for she has gifts of her own equally necessary which would perhaps be lost in the quest for others. Moreover, a ministry wholly of women would only transfer the grievance, if such it is, to the other side, to say nothing of the

grave dangers to morality and discipline which would certainly result—which did, indeed, result in the corrupt religions of the pagan East, with their female priesthoods. Finally, a ministry shared by both sexes would be even more open to the same objections. From all this, be it repeated, nothing can be concluded to the detriment of the dignity of woman,[1] whose superior aptitude for spiritual things has always been recognized by the Church, and is shown by the fact that more women than men in proportion embrace the hardships and self-denial of the religious life.

The second point is a more practical one, and more far-reaching in its effects: Why does the Church insist that the head of the family should be man?

The answer is that the family is a society, and no society can, in the nature of things, subsist without a final authority and corresponding subordination. To be stable, it must contain within itself the means of ending the possible conflict of its members' wills. Some ultimate authority is necessary for progress and peace. But why should the man lead rather than the woman? I answer, as in the former case, that God Himself arranged it so: one of the two had to be chosen, and, having in view the object of the institution of marriage, the conditions of human existence made man fittest to lead. This argument would not hold if marriage were not a society, but only a free bilateral contract between two naturally equal beings, entered into on terms fixed by themselves and dissoluble at will. Marriage is, indeed, a free contract, but it is something vastly more. A third will enters into it, that of the Creator, who has decreed every such contract to be indissoluble except by death, and, whilst it endures, to be a bar to any similar relation.

[1] The advanced Feminists, however, are beginning to think so. Mrs Annie Besant demands the admission of women to the pulpit, and Miss Hetty Baker, in a pamphlet *Woman in the Ministry*, urges the same plea; of course with these women the pulpit *is* the ministry.

When Christ our Lord took this solemn marriage-contract, and made it one of the mystic grace-conferring rites of the Christian Church, He proclaimed anew its unity and permanence. It is, therefore, a true society, though the smallest possible, and demands, as all social organisms must do, a head and a body.

Round this one point, as I have implied above, the whole of the woman question turns — Is the Christian ideal of marriage to prevail, or shall a mere contract system take its place? Here, at any rate, Christian teaching is decisive; whatever development really endangers the essence or integrity of the family is, *ipso facto*, condemned. If the "emancipation" of woman makes her a worse wife and mother, still more if it inhabilitates her for those sacred functions altogether, it is proceeding on wholly false lines and must end in disaster. The two branches of the human race are not meant to live apart or pursue independent interests. Their mutual perfection is to be found in union, and the peace and permanence of that union, as things are, is bound up with the ultimate predominance of the male partner. This does not imply that the man is always ruling and the wife obeying. The occasions for a lawful exercise of his power may be very infrequent, for no constitutional monarch is so rigidly kept within limits as the husband. He cannot flatter himself that his right is due to his personal qualities; it is based, not upon superior force or on mental or spiritual excellence, but solely on the will of his Maker, who, by the institution of marriage, has wished to make provision for the welfare of the race, not for merely individual interests. Furthermore, his authority is confined to matters of graver concern, and those only which the higher law of conscience has not already determined; it is not arbitrary and enforced by fear, as on a servant, but reasonable and accepted through love by

a companion. There are many matters in which the wife's opinion should prevail as of right, many in which the husband should wait her free consent. On the part of the wife, her submission is a voluntary restriction of liberty for the sake of a higher good, such as made by all law-abiding citizens in regard to the good of society at large. I am speaking of what should be. Were it not that the Christian ideal has become so obscured and forgotten in practice, the limitations of freedom incurred by marriage could be found burdensome by no reasonable woman.

St. Paul, who is so emphatic on the duty of wifely submission in its proper sphere, insists with as much emphasis on the husband's duty of loving and cherishing his wife. Surely, if ever obedience came recommended by ease and reasonableness, and sweetened by religious considerations and saintly example—for the Mother of God herself was subject to St. Joseph —it is that which forms the gentle yoke of Christian marriage. To reject it as a degradation is, in essence, to repudiate all authority save what is self-chosen for mere self-interest; it is the eternal protest of human pride against the pressure of a higher will. The Feminism, as I have said, which is tainted with this revolt can meet with no support from Christian teaching, because it is itself a denial of the Church's right to teach, and in particular of the Church's conception of the sacrament of marriage.

This ideal gives us a convenient means of testing the ethical character of other phases of the Woman Question. By their relation to the family they stand or fall. With Divorce Laws, which purport to dissolve the bond of matrimony, the Christian, of course, has nothing to do; they are express violations of the positive law of God. The Married Women's Property Act of 1882—an effective measure for remedying what was often felt as a great hardship under Common Law, viz. the spoliation of his wife by an idle, spendthrift

husband—would obviously not be needed if marriage were what it ought to be; but, although making more difficult that complete fusion of interests which should mark the perfect union, it must be regarded as a relief of the greatest magnitude, especially to the poor. And, taking human nature as we find it, there is much still in the law of husband and wife which goes far beyond the requirements of the Christian marriage relation, for, as wife and as mother and as widow, the woman is often discriminated against with legal injustice. And a sense of injustice is one of the surest solvents of unity. Only very gradually is the Christian conscience shaking itself free from the prejudices of Roman paganism, embodied in the codes of Europe.

The more general questions of woman's entrance into the field of industry, woman's struggle for higher education, woman's claim to Parliamentary suffrage, are susceptible of the same universal test. There is nothing in itself blameworthy in woman competing with man in industries and professions suited to her strength and peculiar talents. Although her providential place is the kingdom of home, and her normal function the propagation and training of the younger generation, still, her excess in numbers over men, which debars many from matrimony, and the hard economic conditions in which she finds herself, married or single, make it often necessary for her to engage in work on her own account. But if, as often happens, the tasks she is compelled to undertake involve the risk of physical or moral degradation, that necessity is surely to be deplored. In the interests of the race itself, woman should not be so overburdened with the task of breadwinning as to prevent her devoting herself to what she alone can do. She has her own heavy share in the primal curse; it is hard that she should be forced to add to it that of Adam as well. So the Church would counsel her to avoid, when possible,

whatever occupation gives a distaste for home-life and the domestic virtues, whatever tends to obliterate sex-distinctions or provoke sex-rivalry, whatever is destructive of her natural refinement and modesty. Economic independence is doubtless a good and desirable thing; but it is dearly purchased by the loss of true womanliness, and the possibility of that complete fusion of two lives and interests which results from Christian marriage.

It is hardly necessary to say that the Church, regarding education as the development on sound lines of all the mental and moral powers, favours the highest possible education for women. Christianity has no liking for lop-sided or stunted personalities. But here again the primary duty of the sex intervenes to direct and to urge concentration. Woman must have a special training for her special functions, the creation and rule of the home, and this special training will to some extent limit her opportunities for culture and development in other directions. Still, the old notion that it matters little whether a wife is well educated or not, provided she can manage a household, has no countenance in Christian teaching, which insists on the proper use of all talents. As she, too, is human, nothing that concerns the race should be indifferent to her. But she should develop especially her own peculiar qualities, and become, as a result, a more perfect woman than she was. Thus the Church condemns the plan of giving boys and girls exactly the same training, because that plan ignores the essentially different rôles the sexes have to fulfil.

Finally, what should the Christian think on Christian principles of the agitation to win for women the Parliamentary vote? The Christian thinks, of course, that, if the claim is a right and just one, it should be granted. How shall it be proved to be just? To be just it must be in harmony with God's known purposes, and, specifically, in accord with the well-

being of His sacred institution, the family. Will the wife's right to vote for Members of Parliament inflict any real or permanent injury on family life? It is impossible to see any reason why it should. It is no part of the husband's prerogative to dictate his wife's opinions on politics. The actual voting would occupy an hour or so every four or five years: most wives and mothers could manage to spare that amount of time without neglecting family duties. As it is, the political preferences which settle the vote may be entertained and expressed in daily intercourse; no new element of potential discord is introduced by the right to express them through the ballot-box. As far as the family is concerned, the Church—and her mind has been expressed by not a few eminent churchmen—gives the suffragist a free hand. But the Church is concerned with the interests of the State also, in so far as she desires justice to prevail everywhere. The Church, then, recognizes the right of the State to restrict the franchise for reasons of State. She does not quarrel with the disfranchisement of the Army and Navy, or of minors, or of prisoners, or of persons not possessing a certain property qualification. She presumes that there are good State reasons for such restriction. The question, then, finally comes to this—Does the Church support the State in maintaining the disfranchisement of women? In these other cases disability is based on qualities which are external and removable: in this on a quality which is inherent and permanent. Can this discrimination be justified on Christian principles? Personally, I do not think it can. Then why does not the Church, in the name of Christianity, condemn this State-made sex disqualification, as she condemned of old the disfranchisement of Catholics on religious grounds, or as she condemns to-day the un-Christian State regulation of divorce? Because in this matter, as in many other complex questions, the dictates of

justice are not so clear as to be unmistakable. The Church is not immediately concerned with the details of civil politics. It is no part of her creed that every one should have a vote: justice only demands that no possessor of a vote should be deprived of it without good cause, and that the extension or restriction of the franchise should be determined solely by considerations of political competence. What constitutes political competence it is not for the Church to decide, but once the refusal of the vote to women can be shown to issue in manifest injustice, then we may be sure that the Church will denounce it.

I shall be told by suffragists that the whole of history is resonant with crying injustices which the grant of the suffrage would have prevented or removed, that women have been left ignorant and undeveloped and kept in suppression for ages by reason of man-made laws, that low and unworthy ideas of the female character have been reflected in male legislation, that the family and home, woman's own domain, have been injured or neglected, that the already iniquitous Divorce Law is made still more unfair by discriminations against the weaker sex. The indictment in general cannot be denied; women have been treated with much injustice in the past: but that was not owing to the Church's neglect of her duty. For long centuries the Church was alone in upholding the essential rights of woman, and now that woman is herself combining to claim what she regards as still due to her and as necessary for her full development, she may count upon the Church's support and sympathy. Only she must not expect the Church to take the lead in a movement which is largely concerned with the affairs of this world, and especially in a phase of it which is mainly the business of the civil ruler. So long as it is still generally disputed whether the exercise of the franchise by woman in the past would have benefited either herself or the

commonwealth, and whether her possession of it now would hasten her due emancipation, so long the Church has no claim to interfere. Even in her own sphere she does not speak until the times are ripe, much less can she be expected to go ahead of the ideas of the age in matters social and political. It must be remembered that this question is still very modern; the demand for the vote is even yet not general, although undoubtedly it is spreading; injustice to women has to a large extent been removed by "man-made laws," and the process may be counted on to continue. These considerations are enough to free the Church from the charge of conniving at the oppression of the sex, whether now or formerly.

But, it will be asked, is not taxation without representation unjust, and should not those who are called upon to obey the laws have, in justice, some share in making them? And on those grounds, apart from all consequences, should not woman be enfranchised? I can only reply that Christian teaching assents to neither of the above two questions without much qualification. The Church does not base authority on the consent of the governed: she does not discover injustice in taxation which bears a fair proportion to means, and is expended for the general welfare, even though the person taxed has no voice in the imposition or distribution; and, furthermore, her conception of human law, as deriving its final sanction from God, does not tolerate disobedience to civil ordinances which are not in themselves bad.

In this matter of the suffrage, then, neither opponents nor advocates can at the present stage claim the Church on their side. She forbids neither advocacy nor opposition, which is a sign, not that the subject is morally indifferent, but that its moral bearing is not completely manifest. Her positive contribution to the solution of the whole Woman Question is, so far, rather a general one, and may

perhaps be summed up in the following four propositions:—

1. Christianity does not discriminate between the sexes in the religious sphere on any natural grounds —"You are all one in Christ Jesus."

2. Christianity holds that the sexes are complementary, whence it follows that there is no single standard by which to determine their relative excellence.

3. Christianity, upholding the family group as ordained by God and as the unit of human society, assigns to the father the official headship, on the strength of God's revelation.

4. Christianity favours every development of woman's personality, intellectual and moral, social and political, which can be shown to leave proper scope for her functions in the family.

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MODERN PROBLEMS AND CATHOLIC PRINCIPLES

By the Rev. JOSEPH KEATING, S.J.

"Why should [the Church] seek to control his [the Catholic's] action outside the sphere of religion? There are Catholic politicians who call themselves Tories or Liberals. Why should not a working-man be a Catholic Socialist if he sees his advantage in Socialism . . . ? Like friction not unfrequently is set up elsewhere. One person is smitten by the new science of Eugenics. Another cannot understand the prohibition of Cremation. Some venture too far even in the good cause of Temperance. Philanthropy itself is not free from snares for the unwary. . . . An obvious reply is to point out that human life is moral from end to end: that the Church is the arbiter of morals: and that she cannot alter or lower her standard of morality to meet difficulties created by a Protestant or materialistic environment."—*From the Advent Pastoral* (1910) *of the Bishop of Northampton.*

Everybody being presumed to desire what is true and good, a perfect knowledge of truth and goodness would put an end to all sects and parties, for the true cannot but be good and the good must be true. There would no longer be any "questions" or "problems" to be solved, because the one true answer to each would be known to all. But as things are, the endless differences of human minds in point of ability, information and training, lead to widely-differing solutions of the ethical difficulties, theoretical and practical, which are

constantly met with, and, were it not for two causes of a unifying tendency permanently at work in the world, the multiplication of parties would know hardly any limit. These causes or forces are (1) the individual conscience which reflects the divine law, and (2) the teaching Church which guarantees and interprets it.

Since the Reformation, the latter force has been shorn of much of its efficacy amongst non-Catholic communities, and the former, deprived of necessary guidance, often acts amiss; witness the chaos which to-day exists in this country in our moral and intellectual surroundings.

To the existence of this disorder the Catholic Social Guild looks for justification in its efforts, under Papal and Episcopal encouragement, to apply the principles for which Catholicity stands to certain social problems that perplex the modern world. The effort is not uncalled-for, even if only members of the Church are held in view, for we find ignorance and misapprehension of revealed truth, and consequently erroneous views of conduct, inside the Church as well as without: what Catholics believe does not always represent Catholic belief. It is true that not every project of social betterment, nor every debated question of political action, directly involves Catholic principles, yet full investigation will always show that such principles lie at the basis of all sound progress. Accordingly, it may serve a useful purpose to examine, by the light of Catholic principles of morality, certain questions of conduct and certain practical issues, social and economic, affecting the individual, the family, and the State,[1] concerning the ethical bearing of which there is much uncertainty in the modern mind.

[1] The general interests of the three entities cannot of course be separated, but must be promoted together.

It will be clear, I hope, that in the following very concise statements of the Christian position much has had to be omitted in the way of explanation which would tend to make that position still more evidently reasonable.

1. Betting and Gambling.

General Definition.—The risking of something of value on some uncertain issue, or as the emphatic assertion of some personal view, in the hope of gain if the issue be favourable or the view prove correct.

Moral Aspect.—A contract, lawful in itself, but very liable to abuse. It is lawful because, as he who owns a thing may give it away freely or for less than its value to another, so also he may risk the loss of it on the chance of gaining something in return. How easily the practice may be abused all human experience shows.

Conditions for Lawfulness.—

(*a*) The thing staked must really in all the circumstances be at the free disposal of him who stakes it; (*b*) this act must be voluntary; (*c*) there must be no fraud or undue advantage on either side.

Dangers of the Practice.—It readily excites the passion of avarice, the desire for gain disproportionate to need or to effort, and it lends itself to every sort of trickery. These abuses are so likely to occur and are actually so prevalent that, in the interests of public order, the State rightly restricts opportunities for gambling. In view of the great evil it causes, the State would be justified in going further, by prohibiting, for instance, the publication of betting news.

Remedies.—

(*a*) Clear recognition of the permissible limits of the practice; (*b*) avoidance of wrong views which defeat their end by confusing the moral sense, *e.g.*, the classify-

ing of betting and gambling as not less evil than lying and theft; (*c*) obedience to the civil law; (*d*) obedience to the Christian law which teaches moderation in the desire for wealth.

2. The Drink Problem.

Definition.—How to stop the terrible social evil of excessive drinking without infringing justice or proper liberty.

Moral Aspect.—Christianity *enjoins* moderation in the use of intoxicating liquor under pain of the sin of gluttony, and *encourages* total abstinence as a special application of the general ascetic principle—Deny thyself. The command affects all, the counsel only those who are inspired to make that particular act of self-sacrifice; an act which of course may be dictated not by religious but by merely prudential motives. As the moderate use of strong drink is lawful, so the manufacture and sale of it for use in moderation are also lawful. What amount of it can be considered moderate must be determined for the individual by various circumstances—the claims of health, moral and physical, his duties towards others, the work entrusted to him, even the state of his purse—none of which can be left out of sight in making the estimate.

Dangers.—All history shows that the habit of drinking to excess is one which can be contracted with comparative ease, in spite of the manifest evils it brings in its train, because the consumption of intoxicants has always been a feature of convivial meetings and is a conventional sign of hospitality and goodwill. It is still disputed amongst medical men whether alcohol in moderation is injurious to health, but all agree that moderation is easily and frequently exceeded, to the harm of the individual and the State.

Remedies and Safeguards.—The State attempts to check the social evils attendant on this practice by restrictive legislation tending to make intoxicants dearer and less accessible. The difficulties which confront it, *i.e.* how to protect the weak without injuring those who do not need protection, how to control the monopoly its licences create, and how to find an equivalent for the revenue which the prevalence of the drink-traffic brings in, will always render its efforts ineffective, unless the public conscience supports them. The public conscience is formed by the consciences of individuals, and so it is ultimately in voluntary effort that the remedy lies. The Church in her Temperance Associations organizes that voluntary effort on sound lines, *sc.* by putting forward the most powerful and permanent motives, those drawn from religion, for the practice of Total Abstinence, as well as by condemning the errors which, in spheres outside her influence, are apt to vitiate that practice.

Errors.—

(*a*) To say that alcohol is intrinsically evil, which is Manichæism. (*b*) To insist on Total Abstinence as a necessary mark of a good Christian, thus violating Christian liberty. (*c*) To condemn the Drink-Traffic, because of its abuses, as inherently wrong. (*d*) To put on the same level the abuse of strong drink, which injures the community as well as the individual, and the abuse of tobacco, the effects of which are less harmful and merely personal. (*e*) To look on moderation as the "golden mean" between the vicious extremes of drunkenness and total abstinence. The other extreme to "taking too much" is "taking too little." Abstinence is not taking too little, just because there is no need to take any. If abstinence from alcohol necessarily injured health, then it might be blame-

worthy as an "extreme." But the contrary is generally the case.

3. Suicide.

Definition.—The act of the individual by which he directly and voluntarily compasses his own death.

Moral Aspect.—If murder is wrong, suicide is wrong also, as both acts violate the command of God—"Thou shalt not kill." Deliberate self-destruction, therefore, is either an assertion of entire independence of any higher power, and so an implicit denial of God's existence, or an unwarranted presumption of God's permission. Speaking generally, it is directly opposed to proper self-regard, for every living nature desires and is equipped for its own preservation, and if, in particular cases, self-regard would seem to prompt self-destruction, a further reason against the act must be sought in the evil and inevitable consequences of allowing exceptions in a prohibition of such gravity. We may freely grant that, as Ecclesiasticus says (xxx. 17): "Better is death than a bitter life," but that does not justify us in seeking death by our own hand. There are many other most desirable things, to which the law of God forbids the individual lawful access.

However, the only reason against suicide which can always securely withstand the attacks of casuistry is the fact that the Almighty *has* fixed His canon 'gainst self-slaughter. God is the Lord of life and death; to destroy oneself is to usurp His dominion, for only the full owner may lawfully destroy. Even of the inanimate and irrational creation man has not entire control, but must use such things in accord with the divine law; still less may he dispose at will of his own personal self. Deliberately to depart this life by one's own act is to treat the Almighty with defiance or disbelief and,

short of a clear commission from God, can never be right.

God having conferred on the Civil State all that is necessary for its well-being and having thereby authorized it to remove by death those of its members whose offences are gravely injurious to it, one may inquire whether a criminal, lawfully condemned to death, may, at the command of the supreme authority, compass his own destruction. The intrinsic unlawfulness of such an act is not evident beyond dispute, but it is universally agreed that no one is morally bound to obey a command of this sort.

Self-mutilation is prohibited on the same grounds as self-destruction. His limbs and faculties are no more in man's absolute ownership than his life itself. Still, as the parts exist for the sake of the whole, the sacrifice of a part *for the preservation of the whole* (not for any extrinsic reason) is always lawful. On the other hand, serious self-mutilation to escape military service, or to make money, or even to avoid danger of sin is unlawful as being an infringement of God's absolute rights over His creatures. The Church has always condemned the literal interpretation and application of our Lord's vigorous metaphor in the Sermon on the Mount, about dealing with the causes of scandal.

Deductions.—

(*a*) The decay of Faith is necessarily marked by an increase of suicide. If man is his own master, and if there is no future life to restore the balance of this, human misery must often be found literally intolerable. (*b*) To give one's life for others—the noblest act of Christian charity—is not suicide, as in such a case the direct and immediate object of one's will is not one's death, but some service of the neighbour or the State, proportionate to the sacrifice. (*c*) To

admit that hopeless and agonizing illness justifies a person in causing or hastening his own death would justify others in thus acting for him, and so would open the door to the murder of all sorts of creatures in like case—deformed children, helpless old folk, &c. The life of the innocent may never be taken for whatever cause, even on public authority. The pernicious and pagan doctrine, to which its advocates give the specious name of Euthanasia, is utterly condemned by Christianity.

4. The Marriage State.

Definition.—Christian marriage is a sacramental contract, lawfully entered upon by man and woman for the procreation and education of children and for mutual companionship.

Moral Aspect.—The contract must be freely undertaken, but the object of the contract and the means to fulfil it are already determined by God's ordinance and do not depend on the will of the contracting parties.

Consequences.—

(*a*) Christian marriage is always a Sacrament. (*b*) Christian marriage is always monogamous. (*c*) Entire solution (*a vinculo*) of a consummated marriage is never lawful, though judicial separation (*a mensa et toro*) is permissible for grave reasons. (*d*) It rests with the Church as guardian of the Sacraments to lay down conditions for the lawfulness and validity of the marriages of her subjects. (*e*) The State has also the power and the right to determine just conditions to secure the civil effects even of Christian marriage, but cannot make conditions affecting validity[1] which are not recognized by the Church. (*f*) The

[1] Hence it is plain that, since the Reformation, Governments which have broken off from the Church have constantly usurped and misused her functions in dealing with Christian matrimony by setting up various diriment impediments.

Church permits "mixed" marriages only with conditions intended to secure the Catholicity of the offspring and to remove what is apt to be a deep-rooted and permanent source of difference between man and wife. (*g*) All interference with the primary end of marriage is grievously sinful.

5. Eugenics.

Definition.—The science which aims at eliminating disease, whether bodily or mental, and promoting the healthier development of the race, by prohibiting or sterilizing the marriage of the unfit and degenerate.

Moral Aspect.—The Church, looking beyond mere earthly good, proclaims that all adults have a right to marry (unless they have abandoned that right by vow or have been justly deprived of it as punishment for crime), if they are substantially capable of fulfilling the duties of marriage, including of course the education of their offspring. She teaches that no wrong is done to the State by the begetting of sickly or imbecile children, unless their parents can do nothing to support them. Nor is wrong done to such children themselves, because, in view of the eternal happiness normally within their reach, it is better to be born maimed or tainted than not to be born at all. But the Church, outside the limits of this lawful liberty, welcomes everything that promotes physical and mental well-being.

Deductions.—

(*a*) It is wrong to induce sterility by surgery, as it is wrong to cause any other similar serious mutilation of the innocent. (*b*) Such an operation is useless as a punishment for criminals, being comparatively painless and not depriving them of sensual gratification. (*c*) The State may rightly segregate the wholly unfit, if it can be shown that their marriage with the healthy would

greatly injure the public welfare; it has so acted, for instance, in regard to lepers. (*d*) It is at least arguable that the State, for the common good, can by separate detention prevent the wholly degenerate from intermarrying. (*e*) All practices for the direct impeding of conception or of living birth are utterly unlawful.

6. Education.

Definition.—The training and development of human mind and character, in view of earthly career and heavenly destiny.

Moral Aspect.—A duty incumbent, in the first instance, on parents or their representatives; then, in default of those, on the State; but, on account of its essentially religious nature, always under the guidance of the Church, which has exactly the same natural concern in the development of the destined citizens of heaven as the State has in the development of its members.

Consequence.—It is, therefore, an outrage on the rights of parent and child to deprive the latter of, or refuse to provide it with, an adequate religious training. "Secular" education is an error in theory and a crime in practice. The child's first right is to be told of its destiny, and how to fulfil it. As against the State, it is the parent's right to decide conscientiously what religion shall be taught the child.

Fallacies.—

(*a*) To speak of the State as if it were an entity with interests different or opposed to those of its component parts. (*b*) Under guise of a spurious "neutrality," to teach what is in effect definite irreligion. (*c*) To think that religion can be taught without dogma, or that morals can be effectively inculcated without religion.

7. The Housing Problem.

Definition.—The provision of decent and secure homes and home-surroundings for working-class families.

Moral Aspect.—Decent housing, whereby health and morality are adequately considered, is practically a necessity for decent living. Moreover, besides space and cleanliness, the institution of the family requires some sort of family privacy. "Associated homes," "municipal family dwellings," and the like cannot, be regarded as satisfactory from the Christian standpoint. The first charge on house-property, therefore, is the provision for its occupiers of the means of decent living. Overcrowding, insanitary surroundings, &c., tolerated for the purpose of larger rents, violate justice. It is the duty of the State, in default of private recognition, to enforce this dictate of the natural law.

State of the Case.—Overcrowding exists in all our large, and in most of our smaller, towns, and, strange to say, in our country districts as well, and is a main contributory cause of a vast variety of moral and physical evils. The reasons are largely economic, but fundamentally they spring from that un-Christian individualism which regards labourers merely as "hands," and whilst providing, inadequately enough, for their physical efficiency, has no regard for their higher welfare.

Remedies.—The State and municipal authorities are busy in removing slums, but too often the substitute suggested by economy is the barrack-building, a great improvement on the slum-dwelling but not favourable to family life. A truer remedy is the restoration of the Catholic ideal of the relations between employer and employed, in accordance with which the former (as several great firms actually do at present) shows practical interest in the welfare of the latter out of work hours by seeing that his home-life is passed in decent

surroundings, and a general realization of the duties as well as of the rights of ownership.

8. Socialism.[1]

Definition.—The public collective ownership of all land and capital, and the public collective management of all industries.

Moral Aspect.—In so far as it denies *in practice* the right of private ownership and the sanctity of the family, and assumes the inherent moral rectitude of man, and inasmuch as it could not be carried into effect without manifest injustice, Socialism is radically opposed to Christian teaching. The evils that it aims at removing have already their remedy, devised by God, in the observance of the Christian law. Hence Socialism is in effect an abandonment of the means provided by God to cure the results of human selfishness, in favour of human efforts which rely for a change of heart mainly on a change of environment. The Christian is bound to insist that the solution of Christianity has not really been tried on a large scale to cure modern industrial disorders, and that in the application of Christian principles of justice and neighbourly love is to be found the remedy for whatever is remediable in social life.

Social Reform.—On Catholics more than on any other citizens lies the obligation of labouring for the reform of social abuses. All the virtues that Socialism claims—hatred of dishonesty and injustice, tender regard for the poor and the unfortunate, contempt for useless luxury and for privilege divided from responsibility—is the pure spirit of Christianity, and no Catholic can be called

[1] Unfortunately for clear definition, a great variety of proposed civil polities claim the common name of Socialism: we deal here only with that form which is un-Christian in its essence and developments.

really practical in his religion who can contemplate, without doing something to remove them, the widespread evils of our modern life—the iniquities of sweated labour, the cruel conditions of working-class life, the curse of intemperance, the infamy of "white slavery," the indecencies of literature and the drama, the defective religious education of the young.

Fallacies.—

(*a*) That social evils result mainly from circumstances and not from human nature rebellious against the yoke of Christ. (*b*) That they can therefore be cured by human means without the aid of religion. (*c*) That non-Catholic Christianity, without Sacraments or Sacrifice, aids to worship and means of purification, ascetical discipline and certainty of belief, fairly represents the Christianity of Christ. (*d*) That the individual, not the family, forms the unit of Society. (*e*) That the individual exists for Society, not Society for the individual.

NOTE.—In view of the explicit condemnation of thoroughgoing Socialism by the present Pope and his predecessors and by innumerable similar pronouncements of ecclesiastical authority, it is certainly misleading, and may easily be scandalous, for Catholics to call themselves Socialists.

9. Capitalism.

Definition.—The possession by a minority in the State of great wealth of any kind which is used in the production, for private profit or power, of more wealth.

Moral Aspect.—In itself private property is justified by the natural law, as necessary for the well-being of the individual and the family. The evil connotation of the word capitalism arises only from the abuse of wealth. Wealth, like other talents, carries responsibility for its proper use.

Abuses.—

(*a*) The employment of wealth merely for the private advantage of the owner. (*b*) The accumulation of wealth under the form of means of production in the hands of a small irresponsible class, which reduces the vast bulk of the inhabitants of a country to a kind of economic slavery. (*c*) Various sorts of speculative trickery, possible only to great wealth, by which "corners" are created, competitors ruined, prices inflated, and the evils of gambling produced on a large scale.

Remedies.—It is within the competence of the State, by judicious legislation, to check the excessive accumulation of capital in the hands of a few. The multiplication of small landowners, the spread of the principle of profit-sharing, even the fixing of a maximum rate of interest, would all be steps in this direction. But the only permanent remedy is a conviction in the mind of the capitalist, created by evangelical teaching, that his superfluous wealth, after making due provision for himself and family and for the future conduct of his business, should be freely spent in promoting the welfare of his neighbour.

10. The Living Wage.

Definition.—Such a return for labour expended as will enable the labourer to live in reasonable comfort and support a normal family.

Moral Aspect.—The Catholic Church teaches that the labourer has a natural right to a living wage, and that justice is in some way violated when he does not get it. His lack of it may be due to the unfair dealing of his particular employer or to the faulty industrial conditions of the trade he exercises. In the latter case the immediate employer who *cannot*, owing to trade conditions,

pay his labourers a living wage and make a living himself, does not offend justice by paying less. But the State in its own interests should intervene either to remedy the trade organization or to provide that the defective wages should be supplemented in some other way.

Abuses.—

(*a*) The crime of "sweating," *i.e.*, taking advantage of the necessity of the worker to pay less than a living wage, is, in the Church's teaching, one of the sins "crying to heaven for vengeance." (*b*) All exploitation of labour, as if the labourer were not also a human being with a soul to save and a right to the decencies of life, is condemned by Christianity. (*c*) Useless extravagance, culpable in those who can afford it, is more blameworthy in those whose well-being and that of their families depends on their thrift.

Remedies.—

(*a*) The fixing, whenever possible, of a minimum wage by the State in conjunction with the trade authorities and the workers. (*b*) The refusal on the part of the community to deal with firms that sell "sweated" goods, and to purchase goods the low price of which is the result of "sweating." (*c*) The development of provident systems to secure workfolk against unemployment and fluctuations of demand. (*d*) Combination amongst workfolk the better to resist attempts at the exploitation of labour.

11. Pacificism.

Definition.—The movement in favour of substituting Arbitration for War, as the means of deciding all international disputes.

Moral Aspect.—Inasmuch as Christianity aims at the perfect and universal observance of the moral law, by

communities as well as by individuals, this movement is thoroughly in accord with its spirit. Questions of right, which are moral, cannot be properly decided by physical might. Both parties in a quarrel presumably want only what is theirs by right; they make war only that right may prevail. But to this end war is neither a certain means, for either side may be defeated; nor is it the only means, for the decision of an impartial tribunal is at least as likely to secure justice. As conflicts of right between citizens are settled, not by violence, but by the tribunals of the State, as there are Arbitration Courts for commercial cases, the members of which are chosen by the parties whilst the decisions are sanctioned and enforced by the State, so, by analogy, State quarrels should be referred to an International Tribunal representing the Governments of the world. The analogy is not perfect, because (in the true Catholic theory) the citizens do not confer on the State the authority to judge them, whilst the International Tribunal would receive its authority from all its constituent parts which could always take it back again, but as the principle of arbitration has already been accepted in the main and done much excellent work, there is only question of its extension. In an International Tribunal there would be the same risk of miscarriage of justice as there is in State tribunals, the utility of which is not thereby discredited. And just as the individual, where recourse to law is impossible, is allowed to repel unjust aggression by force, so in like circumstances the like course would be open to the State to follow.

Fallacies.—[1]

(*a*) To think that the State abdicates its sovereignty by appealing to the moral law, interpreted by an authority freely chosen and in part representing itself, rather than

[1] Fallacies abound on *both* sides of this question.

to the sword. No State is sovereign in the sense that it is not subject to justice; and there is no dishonour in that appeal. (*b*) To confound in one general condemnation unjust aggressive wars with just wars of self-protection. Some kinds of war have been so manifestly righteous as to have secured the formal blessing of the Church. (*c*) To assume that because an International Tribunal may be appointed some day, that *now* recourse to methods of violence are unjustifiable. Such methods may be inadequate means of defending the right, but, as things are, they are often the only means. (*d*) To think of war, on account of its spectacular accessories, of the field it offers for the display of high qualities of self-devotion and of its possible good effects, as anything but a deplorable calamity (like shipwreck, or earthquake which also call forth the heroic in human nature), only tolerable as an escape from worse evils. (*e*) To assume a necessary antagonism between different races, as if in God's design all were not meant to live in amity on earth as well as in heaven. War never arises except through some violation of God's purpose and His commands. (*f*) To assume that one's own nation is specially designed by Providence to dominate the rest of the world. What is morally reprobable in an individual as regards his fellows is equally so in a community in its relations with other communities, and no violation of justice may be condoned because executed on a grand scale, or for "patriotic" reasons. (*g*) To imagine that universal arbitration is impossible because it is undeniably difficult to bring about, and thus to delay its accomplishment by unfounded pessimism. War is still possible only because international relations are not yet Christianized. (*h*) To take for granted that all Pacificists are Quakers, or Socialists, or Little Englanders, or members of the Red International.

12. Feminism.

Definition.—That development of the modern democratic movement which has for aim the emancipation of the female sex from all unjust restrictions, social, educational, political, and economic.

Moral Aspect.—The morality of the movement depends entirely on the justice of the claims made; and their justice can only be determined with certainty by reference to the Creator's purpose in making the distinction between male and female, viz., married life and the family. Hence a sound, if general, test to distinguish between true and false feminism is the influence of the particular development on the family ideal. Every development of woman's personality—moral, intellectual, social, economic, and political—which does not impair, or tend to impair her functions in the family, is desirable on exactly the same grounds as the corresponding development of man's personality is desirable. It is not always easy to apply the test, but the following facts cannot be ignored.

Facts of the Case.—

(*a*) Except in regard to their common origin and common destiny and their consequent religious obligations, the sexes are not equal but complementary. (*b*) Having thus different standards of excellence, there is no means of determining whether one sex is or is not naturally superior to the other. (*c*) The normal man is intended by Providence to be a father and the normal woman a mother; their education, therefore, must be mainly governed by that assumption. (*d*) In the family, which is a true society, God has given the father the official headship, which official position does not necessarily connote superior moral or intellectual qualities. (*e*) Divine Providence has with equal explicitness ex-

cluded woman from the official ministry of the Church. (*f*) The marital authority is limited not only by the moral law, but by the fact that the wife is a companion, not a servant, and has her own sphere of internal government, wherein she is held to be supreme. (*g*) The State has rightly, to prevent abuse, limited the husband's authority over his wife's property, and may for the same reason have to make the position of the woman, whether wife or widow, more secure against injustice; but these practical safeguards notwithstanding, the *ideal* Christian marriage connotes a complete fusion of interests. (*h*) Many unreasonable discriminations against woman as such remain to be remedied, especially in the matter of wages. Payment for work done should have reference to the human dignity of the worker, not be determined by sex. The extension of the franchise to women on the same grounds as to men may reasonably be considered a means to remedy these and other abuses. (*i*) Judged by the above-mentioned test, *i.e.*, the welfare of the family, the political enfranchisement of women cannot be shown to be opposed to the spirit of Christianity, any more than is her municipal enfranchisement.

Fallacies.—

(*a*) To ignore the radical distinction of sex and all that it involves. Thus, though man is not tempted to imitate woman, the latter sometimes apes man, even to the extent of donning his garments and adopting his vices. (*b*) To leave out of count, under stress of minor injustices, the great fact that woman, no less than man, is the child of God, and that sex does not debar her in any way from His favour. (*c*) To insist on the complete equality of man and wife, in opposition to Christian teaching. This would make marriage a mere contract and destroy the principle of order in the family. And with the Christian conception of the family will go the

chief factor in raising and keeping raised the status of womankind. (*d*) To regard the subordination of woman in the marriage relation as something degrading to her human dignity. There is no degradation involved in obeying God's representative, however personally unworthy of obedience. (*e*) To think woman in general can compete on fair terms with man in *everything*. Even granting complete moral and intellectual equality, her particular functions in the propagation of the race and the education of the family remain as a perpetual handicap in regard to a great many careers. (*f*) To emphasize sex-rivalry and sex-antagonism; in the last resort—brute force—woman must always get the worst of it.

13. The Right of the Sword.

Definition.—In its fullest significance this means that every independent community has the right to punish crimes against itself, serious ones even by death and lesser ones proportionately.

Moral Aspect.—This right to punish is inherent by the natural law in all organized sovereign communities, as it is essential for their well-being. It responds to the universal human instinct that no one should be allowed to profit by wrongdoing. In its extremest form it may possibly be exercised very rarely, and should, of course, be reserved for crimes which are anti-social in the highest degree, such as wilful murder or high-treason. It rests on the Christian principle that punishment is primarily *retributive*, and only secondarily *medicinal and deterrent*. This doctrine is commonly denied by the false humanitarianism of the day, which is an instinctive revolt against the inexorability of the moral law.

Fallacies.—

(*a*) To think that, because capital punishment is not in the strict sense reformatory, it is unlawful. Its chief

function is to restore the balance upset by the criminal act which deserves and provokes it. (*b*) To think that, because many crimes are due to degeneracy, and are not wholly due to culpable malice, all crimes are such, and that the criminal is merely the product of his circumstances. (*c*) To allow sentimental considerations (which do not diminish guilt) to blind one to the gravity of the crime committed. (*d*) To think that everything uncomfortable, *i.e.*, causing pain, should be eliminated from a prisoner's surroundings. (*e*) To fall into the opposite extreme and to treat the criminal as if punishment were not also meant for his reformation.

14. The "Rights" of Animals.

Definition.—The phrase is often used loosely to signify the claims on mankind which the non-human sentient creation has for humane and considerate treatment.

Moral Aspect.—The Church, in the interests of sound philosophy and true religion, has always taught that animals in regard to man are not "persons" but "things"—*i.e.*, that they were made, like the rest of the non-rational creation, to be subordinated to man's needs, and have no independent *raison d'être*. Only persons, beings endowed with reason and free-will, have rights in the strict sense, having each a separate individual destiny and, therefore, a strict right not to be hindered in securing it. No person can be wholly subordinated to another. The right to life and the means of living, the right of liberty of conscience and such other liberties as that involves, the right to reputation, the right to immunity of goods and person—these personal rights in man are normally inalienable, but they cannot be urged against man on behalf of animals. In their case what would be the highest right

of all, the right to live, man may always ignore when it suits his purposes, and so with regard to all "rights" that are less than this. But man's treatment of the animal creation is not on that account purely arbitrary: besides proper use, there can be misuse and abuse. Though his dealings are not regulated by any charter of liberties that animals can claim, they are under the sway of God's law and the Christian conscience, which emphatically prohibit all *cruelty*—*i.e.*, the direct infliction of physical pain without a justifying object.

Deductions.—

(*a*) Just as to secure food and clothing for himself and to protect himself from their excessive numbers or their ferocity, man may deprive animals of life, so he may deprive them of liberty and make them work for him in various capacities, avoiding always unnecessary infliction of pain. (*b*) It is forbidden to ill-use animals for mere sport—*i.e.*, to cause them pain or death for the sole purpose of exulting over their helplessness or taking delight in their suffering. (*c*) But where the end sought is something to which that suffering is not essential, such as exercise, excitement, exhibition of skill and prowess, no sound ethical considerations can be found to condemn as sinful sports that involve animal suffering. [N.B.—Killing things, by fishing, shooting, &c., which are available for man's use when dead, requires no further justification, supposing unnecessary suffering to be avoided.] (*d*) At the same time it seems certain that, in proportion as Christianity is more fully grasped and universally practised, and the tyranny of convention and prescription shaken off, "blood-sports" generally will fall into discredit, as unworthy of those thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of Christ. Many, like cock-fighting and bull-baiting, have already gone, condemned alike by law and public opinion, and there

are many, such as hunting the carted deer, rabbit-coursing, otter-hunting, tame pigeon-shooting, which are only tolerated because of a sort of general and traditional obtuseness to their real nature. (*e*) The Church does not forbid the use of animals to further the cause of medical science, known as vivisection, always provided conditions are observed which prevent or minimize the suffering of its subjects. The benefits which have accrued, both to man and the lower animals themselves, from this process are so great and so undoubted that it must be considered as thoroughly justifiable.[1] (*f*) A great deal remains to be done before lovers of animals can be satisfied that they are spared all unnecessary suffering. The State very commendably endeavours to supply the lack of Christian principles by legislating against cruelty to animals. Still, voluntary effort, such as that organized by the S.P.C.A., is to be encouraged as a means of making that legislation effective.

Errors to be avoided.—

(*a*) To condemn cruelty to animals on the grounds of our supposed kinship with them, as if we differed from them, not in kind, but only in degree of evolution. (*b*) To overlook in favour of animals the terrible and preventible sufferings which so many of our own species are exposed to: this is an inversion of right order and argues mere sentimentalism rather than Christian principle. (*c*) To read into the actions of irrational beings which have no proper powers of reflection the emotions and purposes of man. (*d*) To advocate vegetarianism on the score that it is wrong to eat animals: it is just as wrong to eat vegetables, which according to "evolution" are also in the line of our ancestry. (*e*) To

[1] See final Report of the Royal Commission on Vivisection, March, 1912 [Cd. 6114].

ascribe to the teaching of the Church and not to racial, political and social defects the greater prevalence of cruelty to animals amongst certain of the Latin races. (*f*) To regard physical pain as the greatest of evils, and to confound the dislike of witnessing it, which is characteristic of refined natures, with the divine virtue of compassion which feels for all God's creatures because He made them. (*g*) To imagine that animals left to themselves would be happier than they are under the dominion of man, whereas "Nature," red in tooth and claw with ravin, would be much redder if man had not to some extent checked her ravages.

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CHRISTIAN WOMANHOOD

I. WOMAN AND THE CHURCH

By the BISHOP OF NORTHAMPTON

The Book of Proverbs, the collected wisdom of the Chosen People, ends with the inspired canticle on the Virtuous Woman (Prov. xxxi. 10 ff.). It is a just climax. For good women are the health of human society as surely evil women are its bane.

Woman owes her power for good or evil chiefly to the sublime office of Motherhood. Linked to her husband by a bond which ought to grow stronger with the passing years; linked to her children by a tie which is the most chaste, the most tender, the most fruitful in heroism, and the most unquenchable of passions; a good mother lives, cloistered by domestic duties and affections, the willing captive and undisputed queen of her home. Her little ones are as clay in her hands. She is their authority, not only in some things but in everything. They ply her with questions without thought of doubting her answers. They appeal to her help as if she were omnipotent. They confide boundlessly in her love. They bow to her law with implicit obedience. And, as she moulds her children, so do they mould her; till the faithful wife and mother becomes the accepted symbol of all that is upright and sacred. "As everlasting

foundations upon a solid rock, so are the commandments of God in the heart of a holy woman" (Ecclus. xxvi. 24).

In face of such commonplace truths, rooted in the nature of the family, the world-wide story of Woman's oppression and degradation by Man reads like a nightmare. It seems incredible that men born of women should have victimized women, on such a scale and for such periods of time, as whole races of men have done, and some do still. Slaves to man's brute force, or objects of man's brute desires, generations upon generations of women, with here and there a rare exception, have passed away without education, without rights, without honour and without virtue. Valued only for their physical beauty or their capacity for drudgery, they sank wholesale into a servile condition and contracted the proverbial duplicity and other vices of servitude.

The emancipation of Woman dates from the Birth of Christ. It came about, not by violent revolution or clamorous agitation, but by the preaching of the Gospel and the creation of a new social sense. The glad news of Redemption, with its annunciation of a Virgin Birth and its glimpses of Bethlehem, Nazareth, and Calvary, revealed a Woman of unsurpassable majesty and holiness —a veritable "sign in heaven" that the long night of darkness and storm was yielding place to the joyous pageantry of day. In the New Testament she who is "blessed among women" gathers around her a sisterhood privileged to minister, first to the Incarnate Word, and then to those who were laying the Church's foundations. She and her company passed into the cherished tradition of Christianity and were incorporated into its teaching and institutions. The Mother of Christ became for ever associated with the Second Adam as another and stainless Eve. The serene light of her glory, falling upon

the rest of her sex, transformed them in their own eyes, and in the eyes of their brethren. Thought and sentiment in their regard were revolutionized, and a new concept of Womanhood was born. Thus the sinless Madonna,

> "Purer than foam on central ocean toss'd,
> Our tainted nature's solitary boast,"

became an object of worship, and thereby the ideal and champion of female honour.

The immediate effect was wonderful. The pagan world witnessed a thing beyond all experience and belief, when mere slave-girls, usually so depraved, displayed in martyrdom such virginal modesty, such unfaltering courage, and such sublime faith. Even to the Christian neophyte it would have come as a shock to see a venerable pontiff offering the Holy Sacrifice and the proudest Roman families kneeling in homage at a tomb which enshrined the mangled body of a slave. The hidden leaven was working vigorously. By the grace of the Gospel, Mary's children were rapidly reconquering their lost provinces in Man's esteem. The odious fiction of Woman's inferiority was tottering; and it fell, once for all, with the Paganism that had engendered it.

The Christian concept of Woman is eminently sane and balanced. It is equally removed from the bitter injustice of the ancients and the silly sentimentality of to-day, which would make of her an irresponsible being or a spoiled child. She is what God has made her :—an object of reverence, rational, free, accountable for her acts, a participant in all the graces and promises of Redemption; "a help" for man, "made like unto himself," and thus capable of entering into his whole life, spiritual and intellectual as well as physical. This equality of nature regulates their mutual relations, and

harmonizes the law of submission with the law of self-respect. In marriage a wife voluntarily accepts partnership with her husband. Good sense and right feeling recognize her husband's precedence as taught by St. Paul: "Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord; because the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the Church." In such subordination there is nothing servile or dishonourable. On the contrary, by their union the wife is raised to her husband's rank, and her loss of independence is more than compensated by the gain of his protective love. "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church and delivered Himself up for it. . . . So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself" (Eph. v. 22 ff.). Thus the steady trend of Christian feeling has been in one direction; not, indeed, to make women men, but to evolve a type of perfect Womanhood.

We see this in the improved legal status of women when the European nations had accepted the Faith. Without entering into detail, it is enough to observe how one by one the shackles of ancient oppression were struck off. Reformed laws of marriage, of property, of hereditary succession, of guardianship of children, and of personal freedom reflected the changed spirit of the time; and an atmosphere of chivalry, like the breath of spring, quickened to new life the withered nature and capabilities of the sex.

The Church, as might be anticipated, showed herself still more generous and trustful in her own province; especially with regard to the ever-increasing multitudes of consecrated maidens who had chosen, with Mary, "the better part." With only as much control as was requisite for their protection and good discipline, she left them free to shape their own lives. They made

their own laws. They governed themselves through their own superiors. They administered their own property. They were even entrusted with a large measure of ecclesiastical patronage and jurisdiction.

The happy results of this liberal policy, in Church and State alike, are a glorious page of history. What a galaxy of noble feminine names are there enrolled! How many mouldering epitaphs bear witness to other multitudes of virtuous women who nourished the faith and sweetened the lives of succeeding generations! What devoted wives sharing a husband's burden and dispensing his goods to the poor! What holy mothers of canonized and uncanonized saints! What great-hearted abbesses, such as our own St. Etheldreda of Ely, spiritual mothers of innumerable and incomparable virgins! What mystics wrapt in ecstatic vision and admitted to the secrets of God! What heroic souls, raised up by special Providence to dominate a crisis,—a St. Catharine of Siena, a Blessed Joan of Arc, or a St. Teresa! Such are the women the Catholic Church has known how to create and how to use.

Lapse of time has brought fresh problems which the Present must spell out for itself. In the Middle Ages, and for long afterwards, there were two recognized states of life for women: the state of marriage for the generality, and the state of Holy Religion for those specially called. The introduction of the modern industrial system has radically altered the situation.

The time-honoured sentiment that Home is the proper sphere for Woman has yielded somewhat to pressure of circumstances. The need for many of the old domestic employments has gone. The need of earning a livelihood is as urgent as ever. In consequence, women, young and old, married and single, are now drafted into the ranks of labour almost as freely as their husbands

and brothers. Three and a quarter millions of unmarried and nearly a million married women are wage-earners in England and Wales. Not to speak of domestic service, they are making their way into more and more occupations. In literature and the arts they have long ago established themselves on equal terms. The teaching profession is largely theirs—the nursing profession almost exclusively. Increasing numbers are engaged in journalism and commerce. Medicine and Law have opened their doors to them. Many skilled crafts have been created or revived by them. And as for unskilled labour, the streets of our towns, when the factories are discharging their workers, furnish overwhelming evidence of their ubiquity.

The dangers and positive evils resulting from this social revolution are notorious. Again and again legislation has been invoked to check abuses which had become a scandal. "Sweating" in its vilest and most aggravated form was one of the earliest results. The health and even the lives of women were ruthlessly sacrificed to the demands of the competitive system. The statistics of infant mortality pointed to motherless homes, or to mothers ignorant of their primary duties. Moral decadence has followed fast on the heels of physical evil. With the dislocation of home-life has come a dangerous spirit of independence. Wage-earning wives are impatient of a husband's control. Wage-earning girls are rebellious against their parents. The marriage-bond is treated lightly. Modesty and virtue are at a discount. The craving for dress, for excitement, and for low amusements is in the ascendant. Unwomanly vices, such as gambling, intemperance, immoral reading, and foul conversation, scarcely cost the offender the penalty of a blush.

It was necessary to glance at these sad phases, but

fortunately there is no need to dwell upon them. The scandals have already provoked reaction among the better educated and more virtuous, resulting in a movement for which two motives are assignable: first, the natural impulse of every good woman to fly to the rescue of her sex; second, the clear perception that private benevolence, by itself, is unequal to cope with the modern peril. It was the latter consideration that induced women to conquer their timidity and offer themselves as candidates for public work. Their success on Poor Law Boards and School Boards has secured them a welcome, as elected or co-opted members, on almost every municipal and county body. Women inspectors, also, by their trustworthiness and insight have made themselves indispensable in what concerns female education and employment. The outcome is a growing persuasion that women are not only capable of administrative work, but that, in certain departments, they alone can discharge it adequately; that women are the ablest advocates of Woman's Cause; and that combination is as important for the female operative as for the male.

The political aspirations of certain sections, and especially the more extravagant features of their agitation, need not concern us. But we are in sight of social results, so far-reaching for good or evil, that it seems desirable to offer some guidance to our Catholic women.

We would direct attention especially to a significant phenomenon constantly reappearing in similar movements. It is our boast, and surely not an empty boast, that the Church is the Mother of true civilization. She has never failed her children even in their secular interests, and has manifested particular care for the labouring class and the needy of all descriptions. All along she has been in fullest sympathy with the schemes of social progress and philanthropy which are the

redeeming feature of our times. Yet what do we find? At home and abroad there is at work a malignant spirit determined to shut out the co-operation of the Catholic Church, to fasten quarrels upon her, and to misrepresent her as an anti-social and retrograde influence. It is pretended that she blocks all reforms. National education is delayed, because she blocks the way. The worker is kept out of his just demands, because she blocks the way. Wives cannot get relief from odious bonds, because she blocks the way. Defectives and imbeciles must continue to be a pest to society, because she blocks the way. Prudence may not regulate the size of families, because she blocks the way. In these and similar matters, by the crafty intrusion of some immoral and wholly unnecessary detail, the Church is forced into opposition to schemes of reform with which she is otherwise in sympathy. Meanwhile a campaign of calumny and persecution is waged, not on practical but on purely anti-religious grounds, against Catholic institutions established for the very objects which the persecutors profess to have so much at heart. In one country after another Catholic schools are closed, orphanages for destitute children and asylums for the aged and infirm are broken up; the very hospitals are "laicised" and incompetent persons intruded, for fear the Church should win credit by the devoted labours of her religious.

The further progress of this anti-Christian conspiracy is matter of grave concern. In England it has already succeeded to some extent in capturing the Labour Movement. It is claiming for itself the monopoly of social reform. It will surely attempt to dominate the Women's Movement by ceaselessly preaching that Woman cannot come into her own until she has shaken off the yoke of Religion.

For reasons such as these we have welcomed the rapid growth of the Catholic Women's League. It has yet to prove itself equal to the emergency; but we believe it has a great future before it. Formed under ecclesiastical auspices, it is a national organization, officered by Catholic women of capacity and social standing, and controlled by a thoroughly Catholic spirit. Similar associations already exist on the Continent, notably in Germany, France, and Switzerland. The objects of the League are not only religious but also social and educative. By membership a Catholic woman obtains that stimulus to effective work which comradeship affords, and is enabled to study in Catholic sources and under Catholic guidance the thorny problems which confront her sex. Ignorance is too often the devil's opportunity. False charges are believed because the refutation has never been heard. False principles are adopted because their fatal tendency has never been indicated. Bad literature circulates because mothers have no knowledge of the authors of the books in vogue. Many a weakling is lost for want of support such as the Catholic Women's League is calculated to supply.

The Church is avaricious for souls. She cannot spare the strong intelligence and courage of her men. She cannot spare the innocence and simple piety of her little ones. Least of all can she spare the unique influence of her women. Nor can Woman dispense with the Church. Fate and fortune have inseparably united them. History proves it. Nature proclaims it. For, if the blind instincts of the lower creatures serve them so admirably in the struggle for existence, can we believe that it is for no purpose that Woman has been endowed with the highest of her rational instincts,—a positive genius for religious emotion? Is it without object that she is gifted with such vivacity of faith, such facility and

comfort in prayer, such natural abhorrence of vice, such ready tears of contrition, such heroism in suffering, such unselfishness in her love, such tenderness in her sympathy, such immovable confidence in God? For these spiritual endowments are just the qualities that make Woman womanly; that render her not only pleasing to God, but also the treasure of her husband, the delight of her children, and the pillar of her home.

II. THE TALENT OF SEX

By Mrs. PHILIP GIBBS

In the preceding pages, his Lordship the Bishop of Northampton has sketched an ideal of Christian Womanhood inspired by the changed social conditions of our day, and has pointed out the dangers to which the modern woman is exposed owing to the prevalent disregard of the Christian principles which have hitherto fostered and guided her development. It may be permitted to one of the sex, keenly alive to the truth of the Bishop's striking picture, to fill in some of its details and emphasize its general teaching.

In a pamphlet already published in this series[1] we were told in general terms how the great secular movement known as Feminism was regarded by Christianity, that revelation of Christ which is embodied in and preserved by the Catholic Church. Judged by the principles of that Church there is a true and a false Feminism, the true making for the development of woman according to the revealed designs of her Creator, the false ignoring and running counter to those designs. It is the purpose of this paper to develop more at length the characteristics of true Feminism, in the advancement of which the Catholic woman is primarily concerned, for she, at all events, has no excuse for mistaken ideals or for slackness in her pursuit of the true. In the movement she is, of course, in a minority; all the more reason for

[1] *Christianity and "Woman's Rights,"* C.S.G. Pamphlet No. 16.

her to exert herself, that by her forethought and her largeness of mind, most of all, by her grasp of Christian principles and her willingness to do and to suffer, posterity may not suffer by the growth of tastes and habits inconsistent with the general welfare of the race.

"Emancipation of Woman" seems to be the most general definition that can be given of Feminism, but it needs, like most general definitions, to be further qualified. The freedom it implies is a good thing if it means emancipation from all sorts of social tyrannies and the opening out of a larger intellectual life. Thus at once woman gains the development of much, once latent, mental power and new scope for its exercise, new possibilities of self-development, a new life. And this emancipation, coinciding, as has been pointed out, with the industrial revolution and the consequent changes in economic conditions, has made it now not only possible, but in many cases necessary, for women to achieve economic independence and to earn their own livelihood.

It must, then, be clearly understood that the word emancipation is used entirely in a social, educational, and economic sense. As regards their spiritual destiny, women and men are by nature equal. In heaven we shall be as the angels, and on earth, as far as sex is concerned, women have equal chances of salvation with men. The exclusion of women from the Christian priesthood is a matter of positive law not implying lack of capacity for spiritual development. So that, from the religious point of view, women have not needed emancipation; they are as free and as well qualified as men to attain the highest perfection.

But from a social, educational, and economic standpoint woman is certainly in process of finding her liberty, at any rate in Western civilization. She has found it so far that she may go round the world alone, pass the

highest examinations, and earn her own livelihood with as little question as any man. Naturally she rejoices in her new-found freedom, and as naturally clamours for more; so much is so pleasant that more must be more so. But all human goods have their natural limits; liberty, for instance, degenerates into license, and some women at least are discovering that unchecked freedom is not always sweet or safe, and would rather stay where they are and keep what they have got than go forward at the risk of losing, not only what they have, but other possessions of womanhood dearer far than liberty itself.

We do not deny, therefore, that the liberty which so far woman has gained has much that is wholesome; it has made her life fuller and given her greater chances of happiness; it has enlarged the scope of her energies and brought her influence to bear on the social and economic problems of the time, often with the most satisfactory results. But—and here we must pause seriously to consider,—Will any further progress of the movement make woman, as such, better either individually or collectively?

The first impulse of a Christian, confronted by a problem of this sort, is to see what help can be got from Divine Revelation. For therein all ethical questions find their clue. Feminism is no exception. St. Paul tells us, "For Adam was first formed, then Eve."[1] Why was Eve formed? Clearly because Adam was not complete without her. If we say, then, that the woman is the complement to man, and man the complement of the woman, so that neither sex can attain its normal development without the other, we are asserting one clear principle which should help us to a fuller solution. Is this principle recognized in all modern developments of Feminism?

[1] 1 Tim. ii. 13.

Let us take a general survey of sex-characteristics, psychologically considered, as the best means of arriving at an answer.

We are told that woman in the ideal combines and transcends all that is perfect on the merely natural plane —beauty of body, grace of virtue, delicacy of mind. Her capabilities are many and diverse; if she has not certain male qualities of mind and soul, she has others as peculiarly her own. And if structurally she is not built as man is, for strength and endurance of fatigue, many women are *de facto* stronger than many men,—just as many beasts are stronger than either. As for intellectual superiority, those who claim it for men on the grounds of the records of history, forget two things—first, that the mental training of women has always been handicapped by the actual or prospective functions of motherhood which nature has assigned her, and which have often been allowed to interfere unduly with the development of her mind; and secondly, that many women, freed from these restrictions, have shown mental vigour quite of the highest class. But perhaps those that deny to the female brain any considerable power of initiative or invention are less easily answered, for undoubtedly woman owes a large amount of her intellectual success to her wonderful powers of imitation, her gift for the acquisition and retention of established facts. What a man has previously done a woman can do after him. But can she do what a man has not done? The records of history are so uniformly silent regarding woman pioneers in any branch of human achievement that it is hard to say that their ineffectiveness is wholly due to lack of opportunity. Want of education has not hindered men from becoming inventors and artists. But instances of women, even with every advantage, reaching the first rank as original discoverers in literature, or painting or

music or science or the mechanical arts, are still to seek in human history. Not many men, of course, are pioneers in these matters, but we are safe in saying hardly any women. On the other hand, she can studiously collect all the knowledge available and retain the mass of details necessary to satisfy the modern examiner. Keeping to observed facts and eschewing conjectures, we gather that she can follow man to the dizziest heights of learning, but is incapable of scaling any peak for herself. We have had women classed equal to or above Senior Wranglers; yet as far as we know no woman has given her name to a single mathematical process or theory. "Male monopoly of education!" cry the feminists; well, perhaps. Our remote descendants will be in a better position to decide.

Whatever, then, be the truth concerning this one point, there seems no reason to suppose that the female brain is, in other respects, less capable than the male. Still, equal brain-power does not mean complete equality. There is something besides brain. Woman's whole character is different from man's, and this difference, for the happiness of both, should be preserved, not destroyed. People have said that all women are alike, and others with equal emphasis that all are unlike. There is truth in both assertions, if we can call individuality a common note. For the keynote of a woman's character is her individuality, the keynote of a man's character is universality. Men have fixed mental habits on which one can readily calculate; they are found in all their fellow-men; woman's point of view is personal to herself. Men concentrate their attention on comparatively few subjects, but women, to fulfil their rôle properly, must have very many interests. However, we are concerned here only with emphasizing that, whilst neither head nor heart alone is a safe guide, the male being is led more by

head than heart, and the female *vice versa*. Hence women accuse men of want of sympathy, and man, the *animal rationale*, asks plaintively who knows what a woman is going to do next. The heart speaks first, and what the heart says, the mind may or may not endorse. If it does not, then when reason succeeds the first promptings of emotion, woman is in duty bound to alter her view and so to bewilder the onlooker. Hence *souvent femme varie*—and her unlooked-for variations prevent the harmony of life from wearying by its sameness. The head cannot do without the heart in the general body of humanity.

To turn now to a distinction which is external, but which to our view is no less natural and permanent than that of intellect, it belongs to women, especially in these drab modern days, to represent the ornamental, artistic, gracious side of life. Great doors often swing on little hinges, and woman's innate and ineradicable love of dress and ornament has been and will always be efficacious in preventing her from usurping much of man's territory. To live as men do would ultimately mean to dress as men dress, not necessarily to adopt the same form of garments—we all know the fate of the attempts which have been made in that direction—but to forgo that love of the beautiful and bright and soft in clothing that is so natural to womankind. Time would be lacking in the first place for that minute attention to dress and toilet demanded by the result to be secured; and secondly, ornament is out of place in the dusty arena of business. Accordingly, as upholding the artistic against the utilitarian, the ornamental against the purely practical, woman is bound to cultivate the beautiful both as regards her own person and her surroundings.

This may sometimes mean suppressing some natural

desires, deciding which of our talents should be developed in view of our duty in life. *Non omnia possumus omnes*, even if we had the universal capacity. The budding lawyer might with practice become a first-class violinist, but he cannot afford the eight hours a day necessary to manipulate the strings. Or in a higher sphere, since zeal for souls is no exclusive attribute of the male sex, many women may feel the desire and possess the faculty of spreading God's kingdom by the word of preaching, but, as God has provided no scope in the ministry of the Church for such, they must allow the talent to lie idle and turn the longing into other channels. Those talents, then, should be chiefly attended to which are most useful in woman's normal sphere—the home—and it will be found that in the home there is little danger of any pronounced aptitude being left undeveloped. Domestic government calls for an all-round personality, and merits woman's whole attention. Indeed, if the small things of life were done with more intelligence, the big things would not so frequently go wrong.

We see, then, that man and woman are differently endowed beings, and that their interest is to remain different. The real question is not what woman can do but what she is intended by Divine Providence to do. She can ape the characteristics of man and aim at those occupations which have ever been regarded as naturally and suitably his. And thus she can make herself a sort of sexless creature, having lost her feminine graces without having acquired the qualities of the other sex. This is merely egalitarianism gone mad,—the ideal of the crude Socialist who thinks that the essential equality of all human beings should be made manifest in all relations of life, in spite of all natural differences of talent and condition. How completely the parable of the talents is ignored by these dreamers, that parable which

speaks so clearly of different gifts as well as of human responsibility and divine authority. Certain Feminists no less than Socialists need to ponder it, and to reflect that the important point is to develop what you have, not to crave for what you have not. It is right to develop natural talents in subordination to the end in view. But woman should remember that *sex also is a talent*, and that she will be called to account for her use of it. Her Judge will not ask her, "How nearly have you approached the ideal of man?" but, "How close have you come to the ideal of woman?"

It will be said that all this is very old-fashioned and unprogressive. And so it is. It is as old as Christianity, or older, and it does not seek to advance beyond the ideal of that Divine Religion. Briefly summarized, our view is that, in the intellectual, moral, and social spheres woman can do most things as well as, and some things better than, man. But as perfection does not consist in doing everything we can, but in doing those things marked out for us in the Divine Purpose, woman, being the complement to man, should seek to develop in herself those qualities which go to perfect her as woman and thus help to perfect man as man.

What, then, are these qualities? Three only need be named, as they can be made to include all that is necessary to attain the goal of womanhood. These are sympathy, unselfishness, and simplicity, three gracious qualities which are the roots of the flower of the sex,—true womanliness.

A woman without sympathy does not possess the most important factor in that subtle influence for good which, as all the world knows, every woman may have if she will. Sympathy comes from the heart and is rooted fast in love, the love of our fellow-men. It means an effort to put oneself in another's place and to do as one would

be done by. It is a quality which makes the lives of others happier and fuller. Gifted with this womanly quality the daughter is a ray of sunshine amongst her brothers, the wife finds it easy to take an interest in her husband's pursuits rather than her own, or in addition to them. She cultivates sympathy of the intellect. Thus also the mother is enabled to ease her child's suffering by the merest touch or word; and woman in every relation to become the comforter of sorrow-stricken friends or to enhance the gladness of the joyful—an exercise of sympathy which is sometimes more difficult.

Thus, sympathy demands the practice of great self-control, and hence it is closely allied with unselfishness, the second great ingredient of true womanliness. Unselfishness in woman is regarded by some as very early-Victorian and out-of-date. "Why should women be more unselfish than men?" is often asked. "Why should husbands and brothers always be waited on and humoured?" "A woman's unselfishness encourages selfishness in man." Such are the remarks one frequently hears from those who do not realize woman's prerogative to lead the way in virtue. Not to make men selfish, but to provoke them to emulation in unselfishness, does woman put that virtue in the forefront. No honourable man becomes selfish because his wife considers his tastes and wants before her own. Does he not rather consider her wishes the more, so that there grows up a loving rivalry between the two as to which shall be the more unselfish, until at last self merges into self and the perfect end of their marriage-union is achieved? And if a man is bad or wholly self-centred, the exhibition of the same vice in those around him will not cure him but only make his disease the more inveterate; whereas the sight of unselfish conduct in others affords at least the possibility of a cure. Moreover, selfishness in a woman has direr

consequences than in a man, as being more manifestly a lapse of duty. Most tragedies in married life, when at all traceable to the wife, are due not to great crimes on the part of the woman, but to her petty selfishness, which leads her, rather than give up her love of amusement, dress, and admiration—little things in themselves,—to sacrifice home, husband, and children. And the woman who has not unselfishness as part of her womanhood loses a charm which dress and display cannot replace, for she is no longer womanly.

As a valuable aid, therefore, to unselfishness comes the third quality of simplicity, which is truth and sincerity in action, a hatred of pretence, exaggeration, and sham. For a simple woman is honest and candid and straightforward. Her "eye" is single, and consequently her whole body is lightsome. Simplicity shuns forwardness and cultivates modesty. It prefers to be rather than to seem to be. It cherishes domesticity, hates all ostentatious display, and taboos extremes in fashion. For all that it is neat and trim, for dowdiness is not simplicity any more than all outspokenness is truth. Here, then, we have sympathy, unselfishness, simplicity, and the sum-total is womanliness.

Now let us return to our query—Will Feminism, as it is generally preached, make woman better as woman? Has it, so far, tended to the better development of those qualities, sympathy, unselfishness, and simplicity, which embrace all the most beautiful characteristics of womanhood? Are women, in consequence of the emancipation movement, more lovable, fonder of their homes, more satisfied with their lot, imbued with domesticity, and ready, for higher ends, to face even drudgery? Or are they fretful, restless, emulous of their neighbours' riches, overfond of dress, anxious for intellectual superiority and dissatisfied with home-life? Is there not a decline of

sympathetic power which makes them harsh, a love of ease and amusement which makes them selfish, and a want of simplicity which leads to double-dealing and pretentiousness?

With the sayings and doings of many leaders in the movement before our eyes, we cannot perhaps say without qualification that the movement has encouraged the womanly virtues, but may we not answer that, if some women have been led astray by a false idea of their true interests and real mission in life, there are others who deplore the fact and who try to retain, amidst much which is new, the old ideal? Among these we may assuredly number the vast majority of Catholic women; but it would seem that even these latter do not yet sufficiently realize the danger that exists of the whole of womankind being permeated by the false theories of ultra-Feminism, and the consequent necessity for them to become women of action in the vanguard of a right Feminism, such as we have endeavoured to sketch.

But they must realize it. The crossways have at last been reached, and some, forgetful of the significance of womanliness, have rushed helter-skelter down the wrong turning. A rally must be made. The trumpet-blast of Catholic principles will bring those really desirous of individual perfection and general social reform back to the standard of a high ideal, a standard borne by the Mother of God, with its ribbons held by women-saints. What a chance for Catholic women! What a need for fellowship, for joining of hands, for co-operation among those who will pioneer this return to a true Feminism! What an incentive to individual effort, to personal service and to the right understanding of each one's responsibility in the matter! But although co-operation be needed, it is a co-operation of intention, a bond of

purpose, rather than a definite organization. It is eminently a case where the individual counts, where none need wait for another, where every unit of womanhood is to work for a common object. Each woman in her own special sphere will strive to give an example of ideal womanliness, exercising all the influence in her power to recover those of her sex who have been blinded by the brightness of a false liberty, and also to prove to the opposite sex that she still stands on a pedestal of idealism and is worthy of their chivalrous reverence and regard.

And if Christian women do this, then and then only will that other great movement—democracy—be guided forward on the right lines. For the women of the people will be permeated with the right notions of their sex, of their place in the world, their mission in life, and they will, unconsciously perhaps, so influence their menfolk that the democracy will not break off from the Christian ideal. Each woman, proud of her place in the divine scheme, submissive to the Divine Potter who has fashioned her as the weaker though not the less honourable vessel, will pass on her contentedness to her husband and her sons, and will bring up her daughters to be as she is. Thus another threatening danger will be averted. Hence women have a double motive to bestir themselves; to help themselves and to help others—to forward a true Feminism and a true Democracy. Did women only know their extraordinary power and influence when they are imbued with sympathy, unselfishness, and simplicity, they would use these qualities as the chief means of ameliorating the sufferings of humanity, of working for social reform and of raising their sex out of the inhuman, and therefore un-Christian, conditions which ruin so many in body and in soul to an honourable, if frugal, competence, to a high standard of purity, to shorter

hours of labour, and to circumstances of life in which healthy children may be born and reared.

Of course all these reforms and many others are to be helped forward by women; but not only by women sitting in public places and discussing infant mortality, a pure milk supply, and shop hours' acts with members of parliament or county councillors. These good things will come as much, and more, from the unselfish district nurse who, going from one house to another, inculcates hygienic methods and much cleanliness; from the sympathetic lady visitor who is always ready with counsel and comfort, and who, wherever she goes, leaves behind her the fragrance of an overflowing charity; and from the mother in the home who with simplicity suckles her babe, requires obedience from her children, ministers to her husband, and is the centre of love round which the whole family circles.

It is not well to say that woman is as good as man. If comparisons must be made, it should be to show that woman is better than man. She should be the link that unites man to higher things and holds him up above the sordid cares and business of this world. For if man supplies the material things whereby the body is replenished, woman should supply the spiritual food for the nourishment of souls. Setting her eyes on the Divine Beauty of a Heavenly Master, she will, if she be wise, eschew the false liberty which unsexes her and choose the better part of womanly virtues. Thus again she will complement man by being a means of sanctification to him.

It is no want of humility for a woman to glory in her sex. The boy is proud of his school, the man of his regiment, and the servant of his master's reputation. A woman who chafes at being a woman and would prefer to be a man, is more of a shame to womanhood than the

woman who, from mistaken zeal, throws stones at members of parliament or who hits out at policemen. Woman is the better half of mankind, and every individual woman may see to it that she attains to the ideal of her sex. It is as well for her to recognize her limitations so that she may not fight against them in vain. After all, the limitations are merely of a secondary order. There are no limitations set to her virtues, to her powers of endurance, her capabilities for sacrifice, for love and for heroic sanctity. These are the better part.

If Catholic women see the danger of some of the tendencies of Feminism, and if each one immediately sets to work to try and become a perfect type of womanhood, she will be co-operating in a movement for the maintenance of the old Catholic ideal of woman. There is no society to join, no need of organization, simply a daily prayer for the recovery of womanliness, and the constant practice of the three womanly virtues, sympathy, unselfishness, and simplicity. Then Feminism will "proceed and prosper" until it becomes a power for good on earth and a means of reaching Heaven.

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PRACTICAL SOCIAL REFORM[1]

I.—THE PROGRAMME

By the Rev. Thomas Wright

The programme to which the Catholic Social Guild is at present committed may be briefly described under its six headings, viz., Poor Law Reform, Catholic Citizenship, Housing Reform, School Clinics, Trade Schools, and a Living Wage. Of these, each suggesting an extensive bibliography, the first five, *i.e.* all excepting the Living Wage, fall to my charge. Obviously I cannot hope, nor will you expect, that I shall succeed in an adequate fulfilment of my task. Where a book rather than an essay would better suggest the space required, it were vain to make pretence to an exhaustive treatment. The most to which I may presume in this paper is to present a few suggestions.

Before dealing specifically with these five points, the practical aspect of a Catholic Social Programme demands, as a necessity, one preliminary remark applicable to its entirety. Granting that the items which are included in our programme have certain clear and definite limits, and, therefore, for a scientific understanding require to be separately studied, and when put into practice would involve a separate administration, nevertheless they defy all strict and rigid division. The more we endeavour to devise some

[1] Two papers read at the National Catholic Congress at Norwich, August 5, 1912.

practical solution of these problems, the more forcibly is the truth borne in upon us that their separate limits become insurmountable barriers, unless their relation, their mutual interdependence, be recognized. The items of the Catholic Social Programme make, as it were, the threads of the woof and warp, which, together, are to form the warm garment of practical justice whereby to clothe the many millions of poor left naked and unprovided in the sad conditions of our unnatural society.

Poor Law Reform

First of all, then, Poor Law Reform. It has become an axiom among us that any true system of Poor Law Reform will have for its aim the prevention of destitution. Merely to relieve poverty, and not to try to remove its causes, is to perpetuate it. The truth of this has the corroborative history of centuries behind it. In common with many persons—a growing number, I believe—who have advocated the total abolition of our present workhouse system, I willingly acknowledge the conscientious administration of the Poor Law by the guardians, and their generous personal sacrifices of time and labour. Unquestionably they have done their best by a bad system, but, unquestionably, the system is bad. Nor can all the Poor Law guardians make the system anything else than what it is—exorbitantly expensive and inherently ineffectual. The Minority Report met with opposition, not surely because of its sane practicability, but partly on account of its drastic nature, and partly on account of the sensitiveness of some to scent Socialism where Socialism is non-existent. To prevent poverty by methods which Christianity approves is surely not Socialism. Prevent poverty in this fashion, and you will take the sting out of the Socialistic wasp. We Catholics should free ourselves of preconceived sentiment, and judge a case on its merits. For my part,

therefore, I venture to submit that the Minority Report strikes at the root of pauperism with far less attendant danger to the spiritual welfare of our Catholic poor than the present Poor Law, which fosters the iniquitous root, or than the Majority Report, which would leave the root as deep-seated as ever. Yet, while the Minority Report seems to me to approach nearest to the ideal as well as to the most practical reform of the Poor Law, it would likewise appear that the only safe mode of redress lies, not in the violent methods proposed, but in a gradual removal of what is evil in it. Our Poor Law system is engrained in the national system: millions sterling are sunken in it. We must needs tolerate the present order while we strive perseveringly to mend it piecemeal, as St. Paul tolerated slavery, but straightway set free a spirit destined to eradicate it. Moreover, Social Reform is of so very tentative a character in many directions that, until it be clearly known what Old Age Pensions, Insurance, the legislative efforts to establish a Living Wage, Housing and so forth, with their further possible amendments, may effect, to attempt a radical change in the Poor Law system were only to make a greater muddle of muddledom. Seeing that the Minority Report turns on three cardinal points—sickness, neglected childhood, and unemployment, the prevention of destitution will be most speedily accomplished if we concentrate our social enterprise on the supply of those remedies which avoidable sickness, neglected childhood, and unemployment demand. Thus, by flanking movements, and not by an impracticable frontal assault, will the most valuable part of the Minority Report be realized. This point of view, I believe, will be the more obvious according as it is better perceived that the reform of our Poor Law depends principally upon the rearing of a healthier generation and upon educating it to a higher level of industrial capability.

School Clinics

Hence arise the questions of School Clinics and Trade Schools. It is curious nowadays to recall with what mingled feelings the Elementary Education (Administration Provisions) Act, 1907, was received. Medical Inspection of Schools was then regarded by many as an unnecessary interference with parental responsibility and a wasteful expenditure of public money. Five years have emphatically shown that this provision of the Act is one of the most essential in our educational equipment. Of course, like all legislation, the Act admits of a very varying interpretation, but, could I go into the details of the admirable administration of the law by the Bradford City Council, with its School Clinic department, its system of meals, its open-air school for weakly children, its recent resolve to erect a sanatorium for consumptives, it would be apparent not only how excellent and how practical is the measure in our possession, but what effective war it wages against the chances of destitution, and how beneficial it would be for the children under the Poor Law to be assigned to the Education Authority, which, by the nature of its organization, the excellence of its methods, and the value of its experience, is capable of rendering to the State the best return on the material committed to it. Bradford has declared its faith in its children. Bradford believes in the future generation. The Bradford City Council has presented a notable example to the country of a governing body holding its first duty to be towards the poorest, weakest and most defenceless of its citizens. Such is Bradford's profession of municipal obligation, and it is a profession, the sound ethics of which is the best guarantee of its true economy. Here, then, is a concrete case worth all that is written on the subject of School Clinics, as suggesting that what has been done here can be done always and everywhere. If Bradford offers an object lesson to the country,

Bradford's performance also indicates how greatly the efficiency of the counties and the city and town boroughs depends upon their official representatives. The practical aspect, therefore, of a Catholic Social Programme under this heading points to the selection and election of those candidates for public service who know, and pledge themselves to carry out, their obligations to a neglected childhood, and it would be praiseworthy indeed if Catholics would themselves compete for place in order to share the privilege of conferring a boon as salutary to society at large as to the uncared-for young themselves.

Trade Schools

In Trade Schools we are faced with a practical plan for social betterment little appreciated as yet in England. During his term of office as Lord Mayor of London, Sir John Stuart Knill strove strenuously to revive the old notion of apprenticeship. Though his endeavour resulted in nothing more than a few meetings of business men in London and a few general discussions, interest was awakened in other circles. It is a significant fact that the keenest concern for the apprenticeship system and the most ardent advocacy of it are now evidenced by the teaching profession. Those interested in education have found the past twelve months remarkable on account of the growing insistence with which, at almost every concourse of teachers, the subject of Trade Schools has been thrust by enthusiastic supporters upon the notice of their confrères. This fact is significant, for it will be perceived that it brings the old idea of apprenticeship into harmony with modern conditions, and shows the only way in which it may become generally practicable. The conditions of industry have so changed that to reinstate apprenticeship by any other means than Trade Schools is impossible. Germany and Austria have both extended a kindly protection to boys after the completion of

their elementary school-days by a wise policy of continuation Trade Schools. Switzerland is far ahead of any country in the thoroughness of its training of boys and girls alike. England has been singularly negligent of the youth of the nation. In England we are up-bringing a sapless youth with as little moral character as it has trade skill. We are manufacturing hosts of casuals for a glutted labour market, with the immediate result of multiplying the unemployed and unemployable. Take together the two general characteristics of many of the working class—love of pleasure and lack of skill,—and you cease to wonder at the Poor Law rates. Trade Schools are economic, but, better still, they are a moral discipline. Trade Schools would become a national asset by restoring at least some virility of character to an enervated youth and by securing an advancement of the best industrial interests of the country. Trade Schools teach the young to live; our present system is to teach the young to play, to waste their all—their manhood and their life. Are our youth alone to blame? No, indeed: it is the nation that is the spendthrift of the nation's highest hopes.

The educational provision for the poorer classes rests entirely with the people's rulers. Compare, then, the established system of education in Switzerland with English methods, and it at once becomes apparent that such domestic training for girls, such manual lessons for boys, such technical education for youths as we possess, can only be described as the merest tinkering. The Swiss elementary school may be no better than our own, but, instead of their final classes being regarded as the ultimate educational goal of the ordinary working-man's child, they represent but the beginning of his educational career. From the elementary school the Swiss boy passes to the secondary school till he is at least fifteen years of age, when the apprentice school, "supplementing on the theoretic side the instruction given in the workshop," claims his

attendance up to his nineteenth birthday. In country districts a similar care is shown the son of the soil. By the like eminently practical means girls are fitted for their sphere in life. Let us cast a glance at our English boy and girl, with this outline sketch of Swiss education as a background, and we cannot help but see that the generous ground of our youth lies before us a lamentable and, considering our resources, a shameful waste. Little Switzerland rears skilled workers—mighty England rears casuals. Switzerland knows the blessing of a contented home-life—England knows the curse of teeming work-houses. With us, in England, Continuation Trade Schools are a novel notion. Public opinion has yet to be won over. It is for us to do all in our power to press this important matter upon the attention of all classes, but especially of the working class, that its benefits and its urgent necessity may be comprehended, and that the Government may be instigated to direct its educational policy along the line of true educational requirements.

Housing

To indicate the practical aspect of the Housing question within the narrow limits at my disposal is extremely difficult. Not only is the question itself of very great dimensions and of innumerable details, but it is replete with complications. There are as many entanglements resulting from the shortcomings of our legislation as from the grounds on which the neglect of that legislation is indefensibly justified.

Until some measure similar to the Labourers' (Ireland) Act 1906 is passed into law and enforced in England, the wide-spread dilemma so seriously stultifying rural housing reform up and down the land will remain. It is no use offering a cottage to a man when his wages are insufficient for its rental. Yet again, until skilled engineers are found in many of our towns and cities to put the housing machinery of the 1909

Housing Act into motion, the inhuman slums, prevalent everywhere, will never be destroyed. In reference to rural housing, however, with all the inadequacy of the law, there is yet room for sound economic amendment by the construction of healthy suitable dwellings for the better-paid agricultural labourer, such as the hedger and hay-binder. That a number of new cottages of three bedrooms, with fifteen poles of land attached, and let at a rental of 4s. a week have been recently built at Chipperfield under the Hemel-Hempstead Rural Council is a striking instance in this regard. Still, with the average low-rated wages of the agricultural labourer, it must be acknowledged that rural housing reform can only be carried out within limits that merely touch the fringe of the problem, unless either the labourer be paid a higher wage—a very considerable amount in many localities—or Parliament grant due facilities with precautions that cannot be eluded. When some 10,000 agricultural labourers annually migrate to the towns to displace labour and to accentuate the social difficulties besetting town-life, rural housing—for to the want of this is the migration chiefly to be assigned—demands immediate attention.

It is gratifying to note that in the cities and towns a "housing conscience" is being aroused. Huddersfield, perhaps, presents the most recent example of this enlightenment by its offer of a goodly prize for the best town-planning scheme. Nevertheless, in many quarters any white-elephant plan seems to find favour in preference to those that aim at supplying proper housing for the poor. Cases may be cited where whole areas have been swept away for street improvements, and in consequence where hundreds of poor families have been compelled to huddle more densely together in the slums that remained, where nevertheless the City Council was advised by its officials that no overcrowding existed, that no additional risk of immoral herding together had been

incurred, in fact that there was no housing problem to solve.

When they shall become alive to the truth regarding the existence and conditions of the slums, when they shall have it brought home to them how largely infantile mortality, disease, intemperance, immorality and pauperism are attributable to bad housing, then will citizens press their Council to amend so maleficent an injustice. The most effective means, I believe, of bringing a public authority to its sense of duty is the formation of a non-partizan Housing Committee of citizens conversant with local needs as with the housing question in general, to act as a medium between the poor and their municipal representatives. Some twenty-five years ago such a committee, "members of all sects and none," set to work at Sheffield. "We became a sort of Watch Committee for housing," says my correspondent. "The Corporation invariably acted on our recommendation. We got yards paved and drained, houses roofed, houses condemned, etc. A whole unhealthy area disappeared, and the Corporation have built houses of their own on it. The effect on property owners was remarkable. The work has never ceased, and the Corporation is always taking districts in hand."

Catholic Citizenship

Lastly, I come to the important matter of Catholic citizenship. As regards this question, the Catholic Social Guild does not even remotely hint that an aloofness among Catholics from their fellow countrymen is in the least degree desirable; on the other hand, much less does it propose that the formation of a Catholic party is, in our circumstances, an ideal to be entertained. By promoting Catholic citizenship the Guild expresses its anxiety to see cultivated among Catholics the true spirit of civic duty, to urge upon Catholics that, as they possess rights claiming

respect from others as well as from their own co-religionists, so they have duties demanding fulfilment to others besides their own. Instead of fostering shyness, aloofness, division, the aim of the Guild is precisely to discover that common ground of principle in social reform whereon Catholics may stand shoulder to shoulder with other citizens. Had the Guild, indeed, any different motive in advancing the rights and duties of Catholic citizenship, it would straightway frustrate its own end. If a Catholic Social Programme is to be made practical, it is evident that it will depend upon two essential factors, viz., the practical support of Catholic citizens and the practical assistance of non-Catholic co-operators. We may be able to stand alone, but alone we cannot move—alone our power is approximately nothing. An illustration will make my contention clear. Though outside my present sphere, I may be suffered to say that more fundamental than any of the items of our social programme with which I have dealt, is the Living Wage, and that, in point of fact, unless the worker be paid a living wage, social readjustment will always be impeded. Now there are two forces at work amongst us which tend to place a living wage outside the bounds of attainment, viz., Capitalism and Socialism. Capitalism has a doctrine of greed according to which it refuses to pay labour its due reward: Socialism is a creed which tends to close the hand of capital even more than the greed of Capitalism. What is the distinctive method of capital? Not justice, but opportunism—the opportunism which makes labour stand for the labourer, converts a "soul" into a "hand," and reduces the wage-bill to a minimum. And what is the characteristic method of Socialism? Once more opportunism—the opportunism which seeks to squeeze the capitalist, whether the circumstances justify it or not, under the unproved plea that the means of production should be the monopoly of the State. While these methods are upheld, we shall see the counter-

strokes of strike and lock-out; we shall witness continued repressiveness and obstinacy among capitalists, and among the workers a growing bitterness and unscrupulousness; we shall behold the social fabric torn more and more asunder till every thread of peace and contentment be broken. To the pursuit of these methods no true citizens will be a party. Nor, on the other hand, will wise citizens have hasty recourse to legislation for their redress. So long as the spirit of Capitalism and the spirit of Socialism remain what they are, much more, if they grow in their virulence, legislation will be of little avail. The heads and hearts of men are wrong, and laws do not ordinarily change heads and hearts. *What is needed on the side both of Capitalism and Socialism is a new conscience respecting the primary dictates of social well-being—the right of man to live.* Let this truth and all that it means sink into the conscience, and men's minds will broaden, their hearts soften and their unjust methods disappear. Then, for the recalcitrant, legislation may effectively provide. To accomplish so great a change manifestly calls for more than the Catholics of England may of themselves hope to achieve. Nor is it required of them. The Social Summer School, recently held at Swanwick, has served to show, were such testimony necessary, how extensively stretches the ground common to the Catholic and the non-Catholic citizen. Catholic principle, for the reason that it is simple justice, has at its back an army of non-Catholic adherents. Wherefore, with such we may join and should join forces because we are citizens, but even more, because we are Catholics. Until Catholics, however, have duly fitted themselves for their duty as citizens, little fruitful collaboration will be forthcoming from our ranks. Whether in the fundamental question of the Living Wage, or in the questions of School Clinics, Poor Law Reform, Trade Schools and Housing, our campaign will necessarily be confined mostly to the region of advocacy—seeking to renew consciences,

and thus shape conduct; to advance policies, and thus determine laws. That we may rear worthy advocates, the practical aspect of a Catholic Social Programme obviously indicates the necessity of social study. Catholic citizens, to play their full part as citizens, should devote their gifts and energies to the scientific study of social problems. What strength could the Catholic Trade Unionist, for instance, exercise in his Union, captured to his chagrin and sorrow by the Socialist, were he to wield the knowledge of true Catholic Social reform! Already many Catholics have succeeded well in this study, furnishing a comforting augury for the future of the Catholic Social Guild. While encouraging the private student to the best of its power, the Guild sets its greatest hope in the formation of Study Clubs. In order that Catholic citizenship may reach its full and splendid expression, the Guild urges Catholics of all classes to form or join Study Clubs, and then to give their heartiest and most practical approval to its study scheme.

As a result of these comments on the five items of the Catholic Social Programme, one conclusion, as personal as it is practical, thrusts itself insistently before us. We Catholics, not without good reason, often complain of our lack of full civil liberty, despite the religious toleration accorded to us. We are constrained to look, with constant watchfulness, to the spiritual interests of our children, so frequently threatened by unjust educational measures. We have to regret a sad leakage in the Church, especially amid the ranks of our poor, a leakage which undeniably is largely attributable to the pressure of dire social conditions and therefore to the want of that minimum of civic well-being without which a normal man cannot be relied on to give a due service to God. We see that in the competition for public place and honours Catholics receive but a tardy and stinted support. We find, too, that even in the concerns of business our religion is oftentimes no small obstacle to success.

Would we mend all this, let us awaken to our responsibility as Catholic citizens, and while justice demands the preservation of the strictest balance between capital and labour, let us show that large-hearted sympathy, so characteristic of true Catholic citizenship, with the long-suffering worker and his child, by a Catholic Social Programme, practically conceived and carried out, and then we shall discover that sympathy, ever faithful to its nature, will beget sympathy. Then will our non-Catholic fellow-citizens, blinded no more by a perverted idea of our Faith, open their eyes to and be attracted by one salient consequence of it, a proper conception of civic duty. Then will the gates of civil liberty, closed so long against us and not yet fully open, turn wide apart, and Catholics, after many years, will take their due position in the State.

II.—THE LIVING WAGE

By George Milligan

The Righteousness of the Claim

It must be consoling to a Christian working man to know that the traditional Christian view upholds the principle of the Living Wage. In a chapter on this subject in No. 2 of the "Catholic Social Guild Manuals,"[1] quotations are given from the Old Testament and the New, and from the Early Fathers and Doctors down to St. Thomas Aquinas, to prove that Christian theologians of different ages have all alike held it "but just that the labourer should be able to support himself and his family decently by the work of his hands." Unfortunately from various causes the declaration of this principle became intermittent and feeble, if it did not cease altogether, amid the babel of discordant voices that arose at and after the time of the "Reformation" in northern Europe. But in these latter days there have resounded once again the voices of our great Christian Sociologists in support of the principle. The physical degradation of the workers, who had become victims of a heartless and un-Christian commercialism, kindled the indignation and inspired the genius of men like Bishop Ketteler, Cardinal Manning and others. In clarion tones the old principle was re-proclaimed and the proclamation was taken up by one to whom the whole Christian world should surely listen with respect. Pope Leo XIII., in his great Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, authoritatively declared for the principle of the Living Wage.

"Let it be granted," [says the Holy Father] "that the workman and his master may freely make agreements, especially as

[1] *Sweated Labour and the Trade Boards Act*, King & Son, 6d.

to the amount of wages; nevertheless, there is an underlying principle of natural justice greater and older than any free desires of the contracting parties, to wit, that the wage must be sufficient to support a frugal and steady workman. For if the workman, compelled by his needs or influenced by fear of worse evils, agrees to harder terms which he must unwillingly accept, because the master or contractor so insists, he becomes the victim of force that justice condemns."

This statement, quoted with approval by Pope Pius X., is very clear, one to which all workers may pin their faith in the righteousness of the claim to a living wage. It deliberately emphasizes the natural right of every labourer to wages that shall decently support him. And it does more than this. It condemns as injustice anything short of the Living Wage. What a wholesale condemnation is herein contained! In a business atmosphere that has for 400 years known no principle but that of soulless bargaining, underpayment abounds and every master or contractor deliberately guilty of underpaying his employees is, by the above declaration, stigmatized as an oppressor of the poor. This land of ours is unfortunately not now Catholic, whatever it may be one day with the help of God, and the majority of masters and contractors are doubtless indifferent to the words and warnings of the Vicar of Christ; but, alas! those who are of the household of the Faith are also, more often than not, deaf to his voice on these matters. It is almost certain that they for the most part err through ignorance, and it is surely a great work and a pressing duty to carry to such people the Holy Father's message. This is one of the privileges devolving upon those members of the Catholic Social Guild who have taken to heart the following words of Pope Leo, "we would have them" [he is addressing the well-to-do] "consider for themselves that they are not free to choose whether they will take up the cause of the poor or not: it is a matter of simple duty." Now, if it be established that the promulgation of the doctrine of the Living Wage is a righteous cause to take up, it is well, in order to apply

the principle, that we have a concrete estimate of the amount, a reduction of the Living Wage to figures. It is gratifying to know that such an estimate exists. In the manual already quoted (which, indeed, should be read by every Catholic in the land), the opinions of Catholic experts regarding the nature of the Living Wage are freely given. And it is a significant fact, one that will hearten and encourage our Catholic poor to learn, that they all agree, not only that a personal living wage is the sacred right of every labourer, but that a wage sufficient to maintain a family is also a right of an imperative nature. As it is well said there, "God, who has given to the average man the right to marry and to pro-create children, has thereby laid upon him the duty of supporting his family, and that duty necessarily carries with it the strict right to the necessary means of fulfilling it." Catholic expert opinion, therefore, clearly maintains that if a man be fully employed he is entitled to, at least, a wage sufficient to support his family in frugal comfort.

What is the money value of that wage? The answer can best be given in the words of the interpreter himself, from whom the liberty is taken to quote in full on this point. In estimating this amount he says:

"It is not sufficient to consider merely what a man requires to maintain himself as an efficient instrument of production. Christian sociology must have regard also to what is due to him as a human being possessed of rights and duties. Now there are many estimates by economists, sociologists, labour leaders, priests, etc., which, though varying in some important points because of the varying points of view of their authors, are yet surprisingly in substantial accord. What they all practically amount to for present purposes is this :—

(1) The labourer should have command over sufficient food, clothing, shelter, fuel, etc., to enable him to preserve himself and his wife and children in health and reasonable comfort ; to make it unnecessary for his wife to leave the care of the home in order to earn wages, or for his children to become wage-earners before they are reasonably grown and educated (*i.e.* before they attain the age of at least sixteen years) ; to provide all with warm and decent clothing, in sufficient quantity for cleanliness and neatness ; to own (or at least have reasonably secure control over) a

home of at least five rooms, plainly but sufficiently furnished, and in a proper state of repair.

(2) The labourer must normally be able, out of his income, to provide against sickness, accidents, old age and unemployment, by contributions to a friendly society, a medical club, his proper Trade Union, and any contributory State fund established for any of these purposes.

(3) Further, he should be able to satisfy his mental and spiritual needs by payments, congruous to his state, in support of the Church and charitable institutions, and by reasonable access to periodical and other literature, to public educational establishments (museums, galleries, etc.), and to a moderate amount of recreation.

Now if we take an average working class family to consist of a man, his wife, and four children (for a less number of children per family would mean that the population was decreasing), and if we accept, in relation to current prices, the estimates of recent investigators as to the *minimum* cost per head per week for food, clothing, rent, etc., in the countryside, in moderate and in large towns respectively, it should be possible to arrive at a rough estimate of the money value that would represent the above necessities of decent life. For sheer *subsistence* this will work out at a family cost of £1, 3s. 6d. per week in the country, of £1, 6s. in medium-sized towns, and of £1, 9s. in the large towns, as prices are at present. If we add a small sum, rising from about 2s. 6d. in the country to about 6s. in the large towns, to represent those further expenses which have been enumerated under headings 2 and 3 above, as the reasonable necessities of a frugal and decent life, we arrive at the result that a *family living wage in this country amounts to about* 26*s. a week in the country*, 30*s. a week in medium-sized towns, and* 35*s. a week in the large towns.* And this, it must not be forgotten, is the wage due to agricultural labourers and unskilled workmen; as the skill of the workman, and therefore his social position and reasonable standard of life *rises*, so will the family living wage due to him.

It will, of course, be objected that thousands of families can and do subsist, in apparent comfort, on much less than the wage suggested above. They do, but at what ultimate cost to the nation in infant mortality, in impaired efficiency, in diminished power of resistance to disease, in desperate resort to bodily pleasures, in crime, and finally in pauperism, is but partly shown by the national expenditure on the Poor Law, the prisons, the reformatories, the hospitals and the asylums, and by the statistics of child mortality, of illegitimacy, and of drunkenness. The payment of less than a living wage is, even from a merely commercial point of view, too costly in the long-run to the nation that permits it."

Let it be remembered that the above definite figures only represent the minimum amount of wages by which an ordinary labourer can meet the reasonable necessities of a frugal and decent life. If they represent anything approximating to justice (and they have been calculated carefully by minds at once unbiassed and well-informed), what a scope there is for the redressing of grievous wrong. The investigations of accredited statisticians, such as Sir Charles Booth and Mr. Rowntree, have proved that from 28 to 30 per cent. of the working population both in London and the provinces are habitually in receipt of wages not only below the estimated family wage given above, but well below the bare *subsistence wage.* Working people need not the assurance of these kindly philanthropists as to the truth of their investigations. Life to the ordinary unskilled labourer (and to thousands of skilled artisans also) is one long struggle with poverty. He is haunted from the time he leaves school to the grave with fears that stultify his nobler faculties and embitter his better nature. He never really knows what life means. His miserable, grinding existence has much in it to unman, to brutalize, to enfeeble, little to uplift or to ennoble. "Degraded poverty is not a favourable condition for the living of a Christian life: such poverty is not the poverty commended by our Lord," and, indeed, it is true that a widespread destitution is reducing thousands of our fellow-Christians and fellow-Catholics to a condition of which the loss of faith is the natural sequence. This state of things exists in a land where wealth and plenty abound. We Christians are bidden to love one another. Is Christian love compatible with indifference to dire wrongs suffered by fellow-Christians? You whose lines may be cast in pleasant places, who have never known what it was to lack the necessaries of life, never suffered bodily hardships, never known the anguish that a man feels when those he loves are drooping and in despair; never known

the awful, ever-present threat of homelessness and the workhouse—have you ever given these things a thought? Has no twinge of conscience ever disturbed the tranquillity of your daily life? Have the bowed shoulders and grimy face of the passing toiler never appealed to your sympathies? Few holidays for him. Little but drab, sordid, day-by-day servitude. Week in, week out, year in, year out, he tramps down in the early morning to his work, which is often mere demoralizing drudgery. Yet it *is* security, and he is glad of it and fearful of losing it. Unemployment and sickness are his perpetual dread. His wildest dreams never hope for a glimpse of the varied beauties of our wonderful world. Culture and leisure and travel are as far from him as an ideal of manhood. Is not this man, so heavily handicapped in the race of life, worthy of a living wage for his labour? Is it any wonder that this human worm, trodden on for so long by thoughtless feet, has at length turned? Is it strange that a tidal wave of rebellion, ominous and threatening, is rising upon the shores of the industrial world? Oh, my Catholic brothers and sisters, the righteousness of this cause can not be gainsaid, the cause of the promotion of a living wage! The Catholic Church has always claimed to be the champion of the poor, in material as well as in spiritual matters. Our plain duty lies here. As the Holy Father said, it is not a matter of freedom of choice, but of simple duty. Let us do this duty, then, in God's name, and for God's sake.

Is Payment of a Living Wage Possible?

There are those who will say that it is not economically possible to pay a universal living wage, that the National Income will not allow of it. Mr. Chiozza Money proved in 1908 that nearly one half of the total National Income was paid in the form of rent, interest and profits, to less than one-eighth of the

population, while of that one half, two-thirds was received by a small rich group amounting to less than one-thirteenth of the whole nation, and later figures have but confirmed and emphasized this fact. These figures make one think (and feel) furiously. In the face of this evidence of unequal distribution, dares anybody say that the National Income will not allow of the payment of a living wage? The other hackneyed objection that an increased wage-bill will lift prices and ruin the trade may also be ignored. Even if it were true that certain of this country's industries would suffer in consequence, that would not justify the continuance of such fundamental injustice. *The first charge on any industrial concern should be the efficiency and welfare of its members, an efficiency and welfare impossible with underpayment of wages.* Any industrial fabric built on such a rotten foundation as ill-paid labour deserves destruction. And again, the workers of every country with whom we trade are alike, with a wonderful unanimity, awakening to a sense of the justice of the demand for a minimum living wage. So that international competitors, at least in this respect, will very soon, if they do not already, all start level. But above and beyond all other argument stands out the glaring fact that, if a demand be based, as is this for a living wage, on the Christian principles of individual rights, personal dignity, and justice, surely every Christian must say, whether he be rich or poor, master or worker, "Let justice be done, though the heavens should fall."

The Effects of a Living Wage

What would be the probable effects to the worker of the payment of a universal living wage in this country? A moment's consideration shows that they would be tremendous and far-reaching. Take the case of a labourer in a large town such as Liverpool, who is told that he is to have at least thirty-

five shillings per week—the navvy, docker, railwayman, warehouseman, millworker, sugar-house-worker, engineer's labourer, builder's labourer etc. Imagine the fact of somewhere about 70,000 men being thus lifted to a financial condition they have never known in their lives before. At present the majority of them live in what are known as poor neighbourhoods and slums, not because they like rearing families in such an environment, but because their miserable wages will not allow of the weekly payment of a higher than slum rent. It is certain that such an opportunity of a more commodious home-life would be seized by the majority. All the evils which the members of their families suffer from at present by over-crowding would thereby be removed. Only those who have come into contact with the horrors of slum life know the variety and extent of those horrors. An atmosphere of physical dirt, which is inseparable from overcrowding, is indisputably conducive to mental and moral degradation. "Cleanliness is next to Godliness."

Overcrowding, too, has its other dangers, and families burrowing in gloomy cellars and herded together in single rooms might, with the advent of a general living wage to the breadwinner, be drafted to clean, spacious, and wholesome surroundings. Then there is the evil of the wife going out charing to add a few shillings to the income—to the neglect of the children and the home. There would be no longer necessity for that. Nor would it be necessary, under the new régime, to send the younger boys out on the streets at night selling evening papers. And if the father of the family was in receipt of a substantial wage he could send those lads, when their schooldays were over, to learn trades and businesses instead of, as now, rushing them into "blind alley" occupations that *for the time being only* give the greatest monetary return. The pawnshop and moneylending traffic, which are the scourges of poverty in large towns,

would receive a wholesome check. At present they are almost indispensable to the poor, on whose scant supplies and pressing needs they thrive like parasites. Families existing from hand to mouth must fly to the one or the other whenever sickness or unemployment falls upon them. It is rank hypocrisy to preach thrift and providence to a family whose head may be receiving about eighteen shillings a week, as are many in the sugar-houses and oil-cake mills of Liverpool to-day. The casual docker is often even worse off; yet on these poor miserables hosts of pawnbrokers and moneylenders flourish. The publican thrives also, and there are those who seize on the point and attribute the degradation of the half-paid toiler to this cause. It is the writer's firm belief, based on a first-hand experience, that better wages, producing a higher standard of life, would diminish very largely the prevalent curse of drunkenness. Living under such monstrous conditions the temptation to seek occasional respite, even at the expense of the week's bread and butter, is often irresistible. The gaudy alehouse maybe offers the only bit of light and colour to minds darkened and dehumanized by their surroundings.

And what of religion? The possession of wealth, or of the material comforts of life, does not ensure the practice of virtue, or stimulate to greater fervour of faith. Many comfortable people, alas, are quite careless of their religious obligations, just as many very poor people are quite solicitous about them; and, knowing this, it is with no mistaken view that a minimum of human comfort is advocated. The point is that men and women who are submerged below the level of a natural living wage are tremendously handicapped, not only in a bodily sense, but in the matter of the salvation of their souls. The glories and beauties of our holy Faith cannot be fully understood or truly loved by soured and stunted intelligences, and such misery as may be seen in the

homes of many labourers is calculated to embitter and stultify the soul. Notwithstanding the well-known fact that the ranks, even of the very poorest, produce grand examples of piety and holiness, it cannot be denied that a state of destitution renders an ordinary man or woman an easier prey to bad angels than to good. Well do the priests in the poor parishes of large towns know this. Their task of reclamation is a continuous and a heavy one. The establishment of a minimum living wage would socially (at least in the city quoted) revolutionize the working classes, and bring them up to that level which the Catholic Church would designate decent poverty; and, in doing that, quite apart from the merit of righting a natural wrong, the greatest cause in the world would be advanced, namely, the cause of the salvation of souls.

One can only guess at the beneficent effects of a law of a minimum living wage in the small towns and agricultural districts. The half-timer problem in the manufacturing towns would thus solve itself, for assuredly pieceworkers would demand in justice a rate proportioned to the amount of the increased daily or weekly wage, and the necessity for their wives and children to augment the family income would automatically disappear. As for the farm labourer in the country districts, the poorest paid, perhaps, of all labourers, his frugal and decent life on at least twenty-six shillings a week, or its equivalent, would be a comparative Utopia, so far as material prosperity was concerned. How far we must have neglected Christian principles when the realization of such a bare measure of justice entails such a drastic change! The weighty words of Pope Leo may aptly be re-considered here: "Justice demands that the interests of the poorer classes should be carefully watched over by public authority, so that they who contribute so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits

they create—that being housed, clothed, and enabled to sustain life, they may find their existence less hard and more endurable." Now, all that it has been presumed would follow the compulsory payment of a living wage is but a tithe of the broad general effects. The countless imitations, make-believes, and shoddies of the shopkeepers in our day have only a sale by reason of the ultra-poverty of the common people. Most of the modern dilutions and adulterations of food and drink are supplied in response to the demand from ill-paid penurious consumers. Purchasers with a sufficiency would demand pure and nutritious food, healthy and decent clothing. How much of the degeneracy of the rising generation is due to bad and under-feeding! This period of our boasted civilization might aptly be called the "margarine age!" Many a working man's family never tastes pure butter, or fresh milk, or meat other than frozen (and little of that) from January to December. And who chiefly supports the sweater but the unfortunate working man himself? His children must be clothed and shod somehow, and out of his poor pittance the mother goes to the cheapest market, thus perpetuating evil on evil. If a universal living wage would abolish the sweater and the shoddy man, and be the means of restoring purity and sturdiness and health to our race, what man or woman claiming the title of Christian but would put hand to the plough to bring it about?

As to provision for sickness, old age and unemployment, the man in receipt of a fair wage would have every opportunity to make this. One of the strongest objections to the Health Insurance and Unemployment Insurance legislation lies in the undoubted fact that a man honestly cannot afford to insure who is being paid much less than a living wage. Indeed, it seems to the writer that the legislative reformers began at the wrong end. However good the intention of the lawmakers, their method was bad: they should

surely have framed laws to compel a minimum sufficiency of wages rather than laws to render less what was already insufficient. With a wage that would allow the recipient to take advantage of the various schemes of provision for the future, objections would be dissipated and encouragement given to those who plan out this species of economic and beneficent provision.

And would not the Church be a material gainer? Against great odds in these lands, places of worship have been raised to meet the growing needs of the Catholic community. From the penal days our people have been heavily handicapped as compared with others, hence they are usually the poorest, hewers of wood and drawers of water. The Church's material wants have been supplied very largely by the pennies of the poor. These have been freely given in a spirit of passionate love for the Church, but the donors were generous in spite of their destitution, not because of it; and if the Catholic labourer was certain of a weekly wage worth the name, in the light of such evidence of his splendid unselfishness in the past, who could deny that the work of the Church would gain immensely thereby?

Then there is the problem of female competition and the marriage question, for they are linked together. It is apparent to anybody that studies these matters that marriage nowadays is not too popular among the marriageable male workers. The reason may here again clearly be traced to the evil of ill-paid labour. A young man will hesitate to start housekeeping on his inadequate wages, even if he has skimped to save the money to furnish a house; so that he never gets beyond the walking-out stage with his lady acquaintances. They have their revenge —a most unsatisfactory one even to themselves—when they enter the industrial arena and displace him, instead of brightening his home life as happy wives and contented mothers. The living wage would

enable any young working man to marry, when he met the girl of his heart. She would surely be more willing to accept his offer than to compete with him for his job. At present there are far too many women competing with men in the labour market: dire necessity makes them rivals rather than helpmates; a living wage for working men would minimize the evil by freeing many women from the need to seek manual work.

So much, then, for some of the probable effects of the establishment of a living wage. Are they worth striving after? Shall the Catholic Social Guild support the claim? Hitherto useful work has been done by the Guild in a quiet unobtrusive way. A small band of Catholics have voluntarily spent their time and money in the production and distribution of literature bearing on the Social Question. They have done much to clear the way for greater and more extensive effort. The time has now come for that effort, as grave harm is being done to the Church by those who preach unsound social doctrine, and the most powerful imaginable means to counteract the propagation of false principles is the propagation of sound ones. Besides teaching these principles, however, the Catholic Social Guild proposes also "to assist in working out the application of Catholic principles to actual social conditions." There is scope for magnificent work in the promotion of the doctrine of the living wage. The Guild has declared in favour of the principle. *When, where, and how* can the principle be applied?

The following suggested rules, to be rigorously observed by members, might do something towards achieving the end in view. It is not claimed that they are either complete or flawless:—

(1) Members of the Guild, if they be sole employers, should pay the aforesaid living wage, if possible, at once; if not, as soon as practicable.

(2) Members of the Guild who are shareholders in

commercial businesses, or managers, or contractors, should exert their personal influence to secure the payment of a living wage to all employees.

(3) Members of the Guild, either employers or employees, should at seasonable times endeavour to induce others to see the justice of the worker's claim to a family living wage, using for this end press, platform, or private conversation.

(4) Members of the Guild should invariably encourage and support any machinery, such as Trade Unionism, Labour Organization, Local or National Legislation, etc., which is calculated to bring nearer the realization of the minimum living wage.

(5) Members of the Guild should, irrespective of party politics, vote for any honest, Christian politician who proclaims his or her intention of furthering the ideal of a statutory living wage.

(6) Members of the Guild should give the preference, in all their dealings with others, to those who pay a living wage, or, at least, the nearest approximation to it.

In conclusion, to some people the detailed programme of action laid down in this paper may seem too heroic to be practicable, to others it may seem inadequate—not to go far enough. To the former may it be pointed out that unless something practical is done by Catholics, and done quickly, to show their real indignation at a condition of things which is a disgrace to our civilization, we leave ourselves open to the charge of preaching what we do not believe. Our only apparent rival as the champion of the poor, the Socialist, does not, at least, leave himself open to this charge. He has a hand in almost every industrial and social reform. He openly and consistently advocates the means of a higher standard of life for the poor. Do we, or shall we, stand second to Socialist, or anybody else, in such a championship?

To the possible objection that our programme does not go far enough, it is not claimed that the Living

Wage is the whole and sole cure for the social sickness of to-day. The establishment of the living wage, it is admitted, would not remove *all* the prevalent social injustices. In the writer's opinion the worker of to-day receives a very unjust proportion of the profits of industry. The expansion of trade, the marvellous progress of invention, all the triumphs of commercial activity in modern times, have left the poor worker, not better, but if anything worse off than before in many respects. His proportion of gain is quite incommensurate with his utility and effectiveness as part of the industrial machine. The worker deserves a higher proportion all round than is yielded to him. Old canons of payment and old scales of obligation must be revised and new ones introduced. The worker himself is realizing his past wrongs and his own powers of righting them. He will be restless everywhere now until he comes into his own, though the coming may be gradual. And the restoration of his true share of the profits of industry and the sweets of life will, when it comes, be better for the country at large. It will come one day, please God. But until that better distribution of the national wealth is brought about, it is surely good, meanwhile, to fix a low-water mark for industrial poverty. And as a child of the poor who has seen something of the terrible consequences to those submerged, with all the strength of a deep conviction, the writer appeals for a large-hearted co-operation in the work of bringing about this fundamental measure of social justice—the establishment of a universal minimum—the statutory compulsion of the payment to all working men in this country of a family living wage.[1]

[1] The writer must not be taken as equivalently asserting that all employers who do not actually pay a living wage are unjust. He is aware that the fault may lie not with the man but with the faulty industrial conditions of the trade. In that case the obligation to bring about just conditions rests ultimately upon the State.

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THE QUESTION OF THE FEEBLE-MINDED

By the Very Rev. Vincent McNabb, O.P.[1]

On the 9th day of September, in the year 1904, a Royal Commission was appointed to "consider the existing methods of dealing with idiots and epileptics, and with imbecile, feeble-minded, and defective persons not certified under the Lunacy Laws."[2]

The Commissioners were an Earl, Principal Clerk to the Secretary of State, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, a Commissioner in Lunacy, three barristers-at-law, a manager of Inebriate Reformatories, two prison officials, the Chairman of the Charity Organisation Society, and a woman, Ellen Frances Pinsent.

Of these it has been said, "A very distinguished and able body of Commissioners, certainly; but not one of whom could be taken as prominent in the councils of the Associations of English local authorities, or as representative of the working classes."[3]

[1] A paper read at the National Catholic Congress at Norwich, August 1912. Since then the Mental Deficiency Bill has been withdrawn; but as the Home Secretary promises further legislation next session, the present criticism of its provisions is still necessary.

[2] *Report of the Royal Commission on the Cure and Control of the Feeble-Minded*, 1908, par. 1.

[3] *The Mental Deficiency Bill*, by R. A. Leach, barrister-at-law, p. viii.

On July 10, 1908, after about four years' investigation, they published a *Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded.* As a result of the Commissioners' Report, Mr M'Kenna, the Home Secretary, on May 16 of this year brought in a Bill "to make further and better provision with respect to feeble-minded and other mentally defective persons." Its short title is the "Mental Deficiency Act, 1912." It does not apply to Ireland. If passed it will come into operation on the first day of January 1913.

It has already passed its second reading by a majority of 223, composed of all sections of the House except the Irish Nationalists, who abstained from the debate and voting.[1]

To the ordinary citizen, or even to the ordinary social worker, there seems nothing in the Bill beyond what is usually called "an honest and earnest effort to deal with an urgent social evil." But to some of the more cautious social and ethical thinkers the Bill presents features that arouse grave concern. Indeed, it will be part of the burden of the present writer that he will be unable in the time at his command to draw attention to the mass of misleading statistics, careless reasoning, and unholy ethics which the Bill contains.

Influence of Eugenics

It is quite clear that one of the most powerful factors in drawing up both the Commissioners' Report and the Home Secretary's Bill is the Eugenic Society. The rapidly increasing number of people whom the theories of Francis Galton have fascinated

[1] The Bill is at present in Committee and undergoing certain changes. Our criticism refers, of course, to the original Government project.

have made their influence felt in the Report and the Bill. Indeed, so great has been the weight of their unending petitions, meetings, and resolutions, that the Report and the Bill, far from being non-contentious, are almost a challenge.

We have no quarrel with a eugenics which will merely be a harmless science of good mating and begetting. But some of the Eugenists of to-day are so thorough in their cult of nature and nurture that they deliberately propose what is nothing less than the mortal sin of neo-Malthusianism. They contrive to think that the human race will improve by methods of race suicide. In this manner, of course, they are supported by the mass of non-Catholic opinion. But in addressing Catholics it is not necessary for a speaker to say that the Catholic attitude is rigid and clear.

General Defects of the Bill

The following pages of authority and reasoning might have been grouped under other heads, because they include another series of ideas. Students of this matter will readily see that the Bill, now on the threshold of being made into law, is opposed—

1. *To Facts.*—Some of its fundamental statements, like that of the increase of feeble-mindedness, are not true.

2. *To Logic.*—Some of the deductions from true facts are untrue deductions. It is argued that because some feeble-minded spring from the feeble-minded, we shall stamp out feeble-mindedness by segregating the feeble-minded.

3. *To Science.*—It is *not* scientific to suggest that a theory is certain when the experts are disagreed.

4. *To Liberty.*—The life imprisonment of persons not proved to be guilty of crime is a new and ominous feature in English life.

5. *To Ethics.*—The compulsory overriding of fundamental rights has no justification in ethics.

6. *To Economics.*—It is urged that these feeble-minded folk are a cost to the nation. But are they anything like the cost of, say, the army or navy, or the non-productive financial adventurer, who out-Turpins Turpin in the toll he lays upon honest defenceless folk?

Details of the Bill

I. Roughly speaking, the Bill provides "Compulsory permanent control"—*i.e.* life imprisonment—for the mentally defective.

Some persons object to the phrase "life imprisonment"; but this permanent control is either against the will of the patient or with the will of the patient. If it is against the patient's will, no matter what polysyllable covering phrase we use, it is imprisonment. But if this permanent control is with the patient's will, then what need is there of making it compulsory?

II. Under English law life imprisonment can be given only by the highest courts, and is open to appeal.

But this imprisonment of the mentally defective is to be handed over "to any judge of county courts, police or stipendiary magistrate, or specially appointed justice who is a judicial authority for the purposes of the Lunacy Acts."[1]

The case may be tried entirely in private.[2] The accused person will be allowed to appear by counsel or solicitor.[3] This, of course, will be of use to the rich, but of no use to the poor. There will be no appeal. No one who has anything to do with the putting away of a mentally-defective is liable to "any

[1] Mental Deficiency Bill, par. 20 (7). [2] Par. 20 (4). [3] *Ibid.*

civil or criminal proceedings, if such person has acted in good faith and with reasonable care."[1]

It will be admitted that all this reeks of the court-house. Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that it recalls the Star Chamber. We are not in an atmosphere of charity—the eldest daughter of Heaven—seeking out the stricken and laying down its life for them. We are angered by the sleuth hounds of revenge tracking a foe to its lair.

III. Now these criminal proceedings, for I can call them nothing less, are to be the special burden of the poor. "It shall be the duty"—mark the word, "duty"—"of the local authority (*a*) to ascertain what persons within their area are defectives, and are subject to be dealt with under this Act; (*b*) to keep such persons under supervision; (*c*) to keep registers of defectives."[2]

I need not add that it is the poor—not the rich—who will be tracked, kept under supervision, and registered. Again, try to imagine the mental condition, or indeed the moral quality, of the person who drew up the following sections:—

"(*a*) The following persons shall be subject to be dealt with under this Act, that is to say, persons who are defectives and . . . (*b*) who are charged with the commission of an offence."[3] Hence a passive resister, or a person summoned by the Education Attendance Committee, or a person who, having asked for a drink of water, is charged with begging. Here, again, the rich, who can contrive to avoid the law-courts, will be exempt.

Moreover,

"When any person, tried before any court of assize or quarter sessions, is acquitted, the court may, if it appears that there is reasonable ground for believing that he is defective, notwithstanding any enactment or rule of law to the contrary, order him

[1] Mental Deficiency Bill, par. 58. [2] Par. 12. [3] Par. 17.

to be examined as to his mental condition, and for that purpose, if necessary, to be detained in an institution for defectives pending the examination, and for such further time as may be required for the presentation of a petition for an order under this Act."[1]

But I need hardly go on with the details of a procedure which reads like a contrivance for lessening the numbers of what are commonly called the lower classes.

However, whilst we are on this point, it may not be useless to quote from a remarkable paper read at the recent Eugenic Congress by Professor G. Smith, of Minnesota University:—

"It is well enough to deplore that too many children come into the homes of squalor, and that the poor and ignorant do not, and cannot, properly care for them; but what voice could make itself understood when it declared that the problem of the upper classes is always the greatest problem of any people? The problem of parenthood from this point of view becomes fundamentally an ethical problem. It is one which defies legislation, mocks at literature, and ignores religion. We mourn for the vices of the poor, *but it is still true that the vices of the rich are more serious and more numerous.* Hence it is that the solution of the problem of eugenics must at last be psychical and ethical. . . . Society on the whole suffered more from the vices of the rich than from the vices of the poor."[2]

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller emphasized the same view in well-considered words:—

"In their new-born zeal to educate every one they had rather forgotten that the great failure of education had always lain in its dealings with the powerful and rich. . . . It is precisely because these favourites of fortune already had what most people desired and had to work for, that they degenerate. Inherited wealth, rank, power, and honour, without effort of their own, deprived them of the ordinary objects of human ambition, and the chief motives of exertion."[3]

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[1] Mental Deficiency Bill, par. 27.
[2] *Daily Telegraph*, July 29, 1912.
[3] *Ibid.*

The Burdens of Women

IV. In the next place we shall see that the chief burdens of this Bill will rest upon women. The reasons for this are so obvious and so unsuited for public discussion that they need not be given in detail. But the fact is explicitly stated or hinted at. Professor Smith, in the above-mentioned paper, makes use of the significant words:—"Enlightened States have already agreed that the feeble-minded, the insane, the pauper, must not be allowed to become parents. . . . The only remedy is for the State to restrain the feeble-minded woman."[1]

Now, I venture to suggest that this is a stupid, unscientific, tyrannous way of punishing the weak for the sins of the strong. It is taken for granted that the feeble-minded woman can be protected merely by being imprisoned. Indeed, it seems to confuse the feeble-minded with the moral imbecile.

But parenthood is very often due not to the feeble-minded mother, but to an ill-minded, dissolute, cowardly father. Dr. Alice Vowe Johnson, writing of the Gheel Catholic Colony for the Insane, says:—"During twenty-two years there have been only four cases of pregnancy, and the fault of the paternity in no one case rested with the patient."[2]

We venture to think that these statistics present an ethical level far beyond that of the normal classes!

Again, in the *Reports of the Medical Investigators*, we read the following words of Dr. Sutherland, Deputy Commissioner of Lunacy in Scotland:—

"The feeble-minded male is no real offender. It is the female taken advantage of by unscrupulous men, and the female who is actively erotic."[3]

[1] *Daily Telegraph*, July 29, 1912.
[2] *The Month*, Feb. 1911; p. 134.
[3] Vol. iii. p. 240.

Another investigator, Dr. Tredgold, of Somersetshire, says:—

"The only aspect of this question which I shall consider is the propagation of children by women who are actually feeble-minded. . . . In some instances they undoubtedly have pronounced erotic tendencies, but more often this state of affairs is due to the fact that they are of facile disposition, which makes them a ready prey to the first sexually-disposed man . . . one girl of this class I met was systematically made use of by her mother in order to procure the latter drink."[1]

Hence it seems quite unscientific and tyrannous where two have been concerned in a fault to lay the punishment, and that life-long imprisonment, upon the innocent party.

Has the State ever done anything to find out the normal-minded father to whose fault alone the parentage is due? Until this has been done, compulsory permanent control is as unscientific as an attempt to stamp out fever by methods of compulsory quarantine.

This view of the necessity of detecting and punishing the normal-minded father, which some of us felt to be just and scientific, received welcome confirmation from the Memorandum to the Commissioners' Report by Mr. H. D. Greene, barrister, and one of the Commissioners. He says:—

"I do not agree to abstain from making a definite pronouncement on what I consider to be one of the most important points disclosed by the evidence, viz. the state of the law as to the protection of the mentally defective from the sensual allurements and attacks of vicious persons. . . .

"Admitting that it is not desirable to turn all sins into crimes, yet it can hardly be claimed that the moral and physical degradation of weak and unintelligent persons by those of sound mind is a matter in which the State may not justly interfere with a very strong hand.

"The Statute Law supplies the moral standard of many people who regard as permissible whatever is not prohibited. For such as these a positive and unqualified prohibition with punitive sanction is absolutely necessary."[2]

[1] *Reports of Investigators*, p. 235.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 497.

He thereupon recommends that the law respecting the feeble-minded of all ages should be the same as that safeguarding girls under sixteen years of age.

It is a strange circumstance that the Bill proposes to accept Mr. Greene's recommendation only in the case of *certified* defectives. The uncertified defectives are entirely unprotected.

It may be urged that it would be a great hardship to punish a man for not knowing that a person was mentally weak. But (1) it will be equally a hardship to punish them for not knowing that they are certified; (2) it is not looked upon as a hardship to punish a man who commits a crime with a girl under sixteen; (3) strangely enough, it is considered a misdemeanour to solemnize or to connive at the marriage of an uncertified defective. What inconsistency, to give the criminal no punishment whilst punishing the innocent.

Under the foregoing heading we have dealt with several important points. But we would emphasize the point that the feeble-minded woman is to be punished by life imprisonment, and the vicious-minded man, who is probably considered normal, is to escape.

I urge that this is gross injustice. If my readers cannot see the injustice of it, let them turn it about. Let them apply the law to the normal-minded father, whoever he may be. Let them find him out, try him in private before a County Court judge, police or stipendiary magistrate, and sentence him, without appeal, to life imprisonment, tempered by the consoling name of "permanent control." Let them think what would be the feeling of the men of the House of Commons, or the members of the Eugenic Society, if it was proposed to apply it to them.

After all, the most necessary contribution towards clear, just, and righteous thinking on these hard heights is to remember the Master's appeal to the men pre-

pared to stone. It was an unexpected *tu quoque*, which has lost neither its point nor its urgency.

The Classifications of the Bill

A. One of the weakest, and therefore the most wicked, parts of the Bill is its attempt at classification. It classes as "defectives within the meaning of the Act"—(1) Idiots; (2) Imbeciles, (3) Feeble-minded persons; (4) Moral imbeciles; (5) Mentally-infirm persons.

One of the Commissioners (Dr. Dunton), in his special memorandum to the Report, had drawn attention to the cross-divisions of this classification.

A more serious matter is the definitions which the Bill gives of these various divisions. These are in every case the definitions drawn up in the Report. We will single out the moral imbecile and the feeble-minded person. Moral imbeciles are defined as "persons who from an early age display some mental defect coupled with strong, vicious, or criminal propensities on which punishment has little or no deterrent effects."[1] This would make moral imbeciles of the whole human race. "Every man is a liar"; and who is there among us who has no mental defect? It is evident that this definition is more cynically comprehensive than the "mostly-fools" theory of the sage of Chelsea.

At any rate, it would condemn to the ranks of moral imbeciles *all* Catholics, whose adherence to what is looked upon as a superstition is such that punishment has little or no deterrent effect. Indeed, the "moral imbecility" of Catholicism seems to thrive under coercion. *Semen ecclesiae sanguis Christianorum.*

I would here remark once for all that though the whole question of the care and control of the mentally and morally defective is largely ethical, the

[1] Bill, par. 17.

politicians have not thought fit to call in any satisfactory expert ethical opinions.

The definition of the "feeble-minded person" is still more unscientific:—"Feeble-minded persons are persons who may be capable of earning their living under favourable circumstances, but are incapable, through mental defect existing from birth or *at* (from?) an early age (1) of competing on equal terms with their normal fellows; or (2) of managing themselves and their affairs with ordinary prudence."[1]

Let us now remark: (*a*) This definition is taken word for word from the Commissioners' Report, par. 559.

(*b*) We are assured by Mr. Ellis Griffith, Under-Secretary of State, and second sponsor to the Bill, that this definition had the authority of the Royal College of Physicians (Debate on the Second Reading.—*Daily Telegraph*, July 20, 1912).[2]

(*c*) Mr. Karl Pearson says:—

"The difficulty centres largely in the definition of a mentally-defective person. . . . Now there is no rigid division between the mentally defective and the very dull, and you can leave the drawing of the line to the arbitrary personal equation of the medical man—it is a point on which the teacher has as much, and possibly more, authoritative knowledge than the medical man. . . . To satisfy this definition you have (1) to define the normal person. There is no such person. There is a wide range of ability in the community, and no man of small ability can earn his living on equal terms with one of great ability. (2) To 'manage their affairs with ordinary prudence' is equally idle when analyzed. There is every grade of prudence in the community, and, again, without experience of what individuals do as adults in actual life you cannot say whether they would fall under this definition or not."[3]

(*d*) In the recent debate on the Second Reading, Mr Wedgwood (R, Newcastle-under-Lyme) pointed

[1] The Report itself says: "For the definitions we are chiefly indebted to the Royal College of Physicians," par. 559.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Daily Mail*, May 20, 1912.

out that "such a definition would apply to a great many members of the House of Commons and half the population of the country." Sir F. Banbury (U., City of London) said: "Though Cobden was a very great man, he could not manage his own affairs, and was often in debt. Under this Bill he would have been locked up."[1]

In both cases the remarks were met with a chorus of laughter. But laughter is, of course, a serious matter. And the serious side of this laughter is that it was caused, not by any caricature, but by translating the definition of the Bill in terms of the men taking part in the debate. It reminds us of Æsop's fable of the "Boy and the Frogs."

(*e*) However, the Standing Committee have received an assurance from Mr. M'Kenna that this definition clause will be dealt with as soon as possible. I confess that a Standing Committee of politicians amending the technical definitions drawn up by a Royal Commission with the approval of the Royal College of Physicians is a sight for sore eyes. *Solvuntur risu tabulae.*

(*f*) However, there is one good result of this classification. A clear distinction is made between the *feeble-minded*, whose defect is one of understanding, and the *moral imbeciles*, who have a defective or hardened (?) conscience. This is all the more necessary because even Catholics, as will be seen later, are misled by the reckless substitute for thinking, which is so widespread.

Thus Miss Frances Zanetti writes:

"The feeble-minded are a constant menace to the physical and moral welfare of the community."[2]

It becomes the more necessary to speak when such an accurate and masterly writer as Canon Barry has been misled into writing:

[1] *Daily Telegraph*, July 29, 1912. [2] *Catholic News*, May 25, 1912.

"These feeble-minded persons transmit their weakness to their offspring . . . from these degenerates the predatory criminal and vicious classes are constantly recruited.'"[1]

In answer to this we have but (1) to refer to the distinction made by the Commissioners' Report and by the Bill between the feeble-minded and the moral imbeciles; (2) to weigh the authorities quoted above in Section IV.; (3) to consider such testimony as that of Robert Derward Clarkson, M.B., C.M.B.Sc., Edin., Medical Officer, Scottish National Institution for the Education of Imbecile Children: "The great majority of them are as open to good suggestions as to evil ones, and when kept in suitable surroundings they lead placid, contented lives."[2]

Persons to be Dealt With

B. In close connection with these inaccurate definitions is the series of "defective persons subject to be dealt with under the Act."

Section *b* relates to those "who are *charged* with the commission of any offence." Notice the word *charged*—not convicted. Again, *any offence, i.e.* refusing to pay a usurious interest, or an education rate. We have already referred to this above.

The crowning shame of the Bill is in the Sections *e* and *f*, which we must copy in full. The defective persons who are subject to be dealt with are those: (*e*) In whose case it is desirable, in the interests of the community, that they should be deprived of the opportunity of procreating children; (*f*) in whose case such other circumstances exist as may be specified in any order made by the Secretary of State as being circumstances which make it desirable that they should be subject to be dealt with under this Act.

1. The appalling nature of this section of an

[1] *The Problem of Lost Catholic Children*, p. 4.
[2] Annual Conference on After-Care. Report for 1911, p. 48.

English Act of Parliament is beyond words. In all seriousness, and as a Catholic priest, I say that whoever drew up this section either did not reflect on his own words or shows a feeble-mindedness or moral imbecility which should make him the first victim of his own legislation.

2. We were asked to give permission to deprive men and women of the opportunity of using the natural right of marriage. Have the framers of this inhuman legislation reflected that this would be to deprive mankind of one of its first and most fundamental rights? I own that the Church has sometimes the right, for grave social reasons, to declare and even to make diriment impediments. It can declare that the number of persons whom X—— may wed is limited, and it can declare that when X——, through birth or mishap, lacks any essential quality for the marriage contract, his marriage would be invalid. But what the State cannot do is to declare that a person shall not marry anyone, even though he or she has committed no crime and lacks none of the essential qualities of a marriageable subject.

If a man or woman who has committed no crime has the mental capacity to understand in general the nature of the marriage contract, then, *caeteris paribus*, no authority on earth has the right to prevent their marriage; and if they have a right to marry, their further right to procreate children cannot be denied.

3. The same prurient social thinking which has begotten this monster of legislation may go on to insist, under legal penalty, that other sections of the community shall be compelled to marry. Mr. Whetham is at hand to say [1] that the marked decrease of great men in the fourteenth and fifteenth century is due to the fact that the *best* types of the thirteenth century found their way into the celibate ranks of the mendicant friars. Heaven protect us from the

[1] *Hibbert Journal*, July 1912.

meddlesome Eugenic State which would throw open the gates of monasteries with the cry of some of its futile catch-words.

Some writers have pointed out how certain forms of criminality or moral weakness tend to spread rapidly and widely under institutional treatment.

Now let me argue from the principles and theory of the Eugenist.

Imagine what will be the moral state of an institution where numbers of human beings are herded together with the avowed aim of depriving them of wedlock and paternity. I leave the details of this to the calm reasoning of my readers.

4. These would-be legislators who have been hoodwinked by embryonic Eugenism have not thought out the full content of their sub-section. They propose to segregate—*i.e.* to imprison for life—anyone "in whose case it is desirable in the interests of the community that they should be deprived of the opportunity of procreating children."

But Professor Smith, of Minnesota, and Dr. Schiller have agreed in telling us that "the problem of the upper classes is always the greatest problem of any people. . . . We mourn for the vices of the poor; but it is still more true that the vices of the rich are more serious and more numerous. . . . Society on the whole suffers more from the vices of the rich than from the vices of the poor."[1]

If the Bill proposes permanent control for those who are causing the lesser evil, can it withhold it from those who are causing the greater evil?

If this Bill becomes law, what is to prevent a Socialist Secretary of State segregating all persons whose incomes are above £20,000 a year.

5. To put it still stronger. Pope Leo XIII., in his Encyclical on the Condition of the Working Classes, lays it down solemnly that "the pressing question"

[1] *Daily Telegraph*, July 29, 1912.

and evil of the hour is (not the case of the handful of feeble-minded folk, but) "the concentration of so many branches of trade in the hands of a few individuals, so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the labouring poor a yoke little better than that of slavery itself."

If this Bill, as its stands, becomes law, what is to prevent a Catholic Secretary of State taking the Pope's words quite seriously and, in the spirit of those who destroyed slavery, segregating these few very rich men who are the chief cause of the social misery?

6. Section *f*, giving the Secretary of State complete power to segregate anyone he thinks fit, is an overwhelming attack on British liberty. That it should come from a Government calling itself Liberal is beyond understanding.

Let us hear the temperate words of a legal expert in social legislation:—"The proposal that the Secretary of State shall be able to make such an order is somewhat of a new feature in English legislation. It involves the liberty of the subject—a liberty which Parliament has been ever zealous to guard—or, in other words, disability. It is a very different thing from empowering the Secretary of State to make an order to extend a right."[1]

The Basis of the Bill

The present writer is quite willing to admit what is undeniable, that much, if not all, of the motive power behind this Bill is well-intentioned. But it is probably the experience of Catholics who work with public boards that nothing is more common, though less intended, than to do evil with an intention of good. Not every bullet hits the target, but it usually hits something.

[1] *The Mental Deficiency Bill*, by R. A. Leach.

The general basis of the Bill may be found in two propositions:—

(*a*) Mental deficiency is large and increasing.

(*b*) Mental deficiency is hereditary.

1. It is very often said that the army of mentally defectives is increasing day by day.

2. Things have become serious when even Catholic writers are misled. I cannot state the position better than in the words of two Catholic writers who have accepted inaccurate or misread statistics.

Miss Frances Zanetti writes:—

"The feeble-minded are a constant menace to the moral and physical welfare of the community. They are the source from which our workhouses, prisons, and asylums are supplied *with an ever-growing* population."[1]

Canon Barry writes:—

"These feeble-minded persons transmit their weakness to their offspring. The rate of increase in such families tends to exceed the normal, as the rate of mortality also does, but not to the same degree. Hence the mentally defective may grow in numbers out of proportion to the healthy and the sane."

Dr. Barry goes on to name the book, *The Problem of Race Regeneration* by Dr. Havelock Ellis, to which, he says, "I am indebted for the above statistics."[2]

The Lack of Statistics

3. In general, it must be remarked that there is a lack of statistics. This is a confessed point.

(*a*) In the preliminary notice of the Eugenics Congress it was pointed out that at present the urgent need is for more knowledge *both of the facts of heredity* and of the effects of social institutions in effecting racial change.[3]

(*b*) At the Health Conference, held at the Agricultural Hall, June 27, 1912, Dr. Saleeby lamented

[1] *Catholic News*, May 25, 1912.
[2] *Problem of Lost Catholic Children*, p. 4.
[3] *Daily Telegraph*, July 26, 1912.

the lack of the facts, and said: "You cannot get your facts until you get your educated public opinion."

(*c*) A scholarly writer in the *Edinburgh Review* of January 1911 says of the proposal to segregate, that "it does not possess that character of absolute certainty which alone would justify fiddle-fadding with the germ plasm" (p. 102).

(*d*) Sir J. Crichton Browne, M.D., formerly Lunacy Commissioner, and now Lord Chancellor's Visitor in Lunacy, in his evidence before the Royal Commission, says: "No definite opinion can be expressed as to whether the number of idiots, imbeciles, epileptics, feeble-minded and defective persons is increasing out of proportion to the population."[1]

(*e*) The words of another expert may be quoted. Dr. F. W. Mott, Pathologist to the London County Asylums, said at the recent Eugenics' Congress: "He believed the great increase of insanity *is apparent rather than real, for several reasons.*"[2]

(*f*) But the final word may be left with the Annual Report of the Lunacy Commissioners for the year 1911.

"The increase in the number of the insane recorded year by year is no proof of an actual growth of insanity. There are, in fact, no sufficient data for a correct judgment; and such facts as are available tend to the conclusion that if insanity is increasing, it is doing so very slowly and by no means proportionately to the increasing numbers of insane persons under care."[3]

The Report for the year 1912 repeats this fact:

"The great question of whether or not insanity is actually increasing or decreasing still escapes complete and conclusive solution. . . . Nevertheless the *facts* outlined above lead one to believe with some confidence that there are no grounds for presuming the tide of degeneracy imagined by some to be flooding our population, and that in respect to the actual growth of insanity we are in no worse case than we have ever been."

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[1] Reports, vol. i. [2] *Daily Telegraph*, July 31, 1912.
[3] *Poor Law Officers' Journal*, August 11, 1911, p. 853.

(*g*) But this question of the increase of the physically and mentally unfit, and the proposal to segregate them, in order to prevent their procreation, assumes an aspect of awful ethical importance when we weigh such words as those of Dr. A. Newsholme, Principal Medical Officer of the Local Government Board, in his book, *The Declining Birth Rate*.[1] "Meanwhile, all the facts point to the conclusion that the *volitional limitation of the family* is the chief and vastly predominant cause of the decline in the birth-rate, which is taking place in so many countries."

If, then, I add, the ratio of the feeble-minded were increasing, it would be because the normal-minded are deliberately lessening their offspring; and, as we ethical teachers know, by means that are wholly immoral and unsocial. The normal-minded are thus not moral-minded!

Yet the only proposition these normal-minded lay before the nation is either to segregate or sterilize those who, at any rate, are not so immoral as to check offspring.

To keep our minds in a medium of pure science we must think deeply on the meaning of our facts. The fact is that according to the largest estimate there are not more than 200,000 mentally defectives in Great Britain. The population roughly speaking is 40,000,000.

Now, if we are to believe some men of science, man has been thousands—indeed, tens of thousands—of years on the earth. Nature has been left entirely to herself. Whether there has been the survival of the fittest or unfittest I do not know. But something has survived, namely, about forty millions of persons certifiably normal and two hundred thousand certifiably abnormal in this northern land. Meanwhile Nature, as if in play, has given us Richard I., Sir Thomas More, and William Shakespeare.

[1] Cassell & Co., London, 1911.

This argument should appeal with added force to those evolutionists who see in mental defect the traces of our irrational ancestry. Nature left to herself has driven out all traces of this ancestry from the vast majority of the human family. The conclusion would seem to include a certain trust in Nature's quiet methods.

I do not quote these names as if the chief aim of nature or science should be to breed supermen. These supermen would be the first to greet such a proposal with strong disapproval. But it is quite evident that the Eugenist dread that the tide of feeble-mindedness is rising so rapidly as to threaten the speedy extinction of the normal is denied by every tongue of man's history.

A recent article in the *British Medical Journal* (June 22, 1912) may go towards explaining this flagrant denial of the fears of the Eugenists:—

"A further point to which Dr. Mott directs attention is what is called the 'law of anticipation.' Nettleship has also previously discussed the matter. By this term it is meant that the manifestation of an inherited morbid change tends to appear at an earlier age in successive generations or in the successive children of the same parents. In this connection Mott makes an important pronouncement as the result of his wide experience. He says that he has 'often observed that there is a general tendency for insanity not to proceed beyond three generations. *There is frequently either a regression to a normal type* or the stock dies out. Not infrequently the stock dies out by the inborn tendency to insanity manifesting itself in the form of congenital imbecility or in the insanity of adolescence. Such parents, especially paupers, are prone to die of tuberculosis; thus rotten twigs are continually dropping off.'"

One answer and one alone has been made to this quiet persuasive witness of the centuries. It is said that by our modern efficient methods we are preserving many of the mental defectives who would otherwise die.

1. But in reply it may be urged that the same efficient methods which preserve many of the mental defectives preserve also many of the mentally normals,

who would otherwise die. The numbers of each class preserved from death would balance.

2. The objector presumes that the chief reason why so many people are at the present time feeble-minded is that modern methods are preserving the feeble-minded. But it is quite as likely that modern industrial circumstances are producing the feeble-minded. Again and again experts in lunacy warn us that we are living at too great a pace. The wild race for wealth, the close international struggle for the sun, and I would add, the denial of God, are unbalancing the mind to an extent that is registered in our asylums and prisons, and finds its place in the problem of the feeble-minded.

3. The normal-minded have but one defence of their immorality, and that is to maim or imprison those who are more moral than themselves. By such crimes nations, even before death, lose all claim to live!

Heredity and Segregation

4. The whole basis of this Bill is segregation; and the whole basis of segregation is heredity.[1]

[1] A medical friend of mine has pointed out two things:—

1. There is a widespread confusion between what is *congenital* and what is *hereditary*. It is wrong reasoning to conclude that a quality must be through heredity, because it comes through birth.

2. Care should be taken to give due weight to *pre-natal environment*. Where this is unsatisfactory, children may be born with congenital defects which are not hereditary.

An example may be given. In Mr. Hancock Nunn's note to the Majority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, the following case occurs:—

"The man was constantly drunk. The wife was emaciated and terror-stricken. Her little girl of eleven was suffering from tubercular glands and was spitting blood. Her boy of five was half paralyzed. Her baby of *two years was a hopeless idiot*. . . . It was announced that another baby was shortly to be added. . . . Daily milk and eggs were supplied to the wife for four months before her confinement, and for seven or eight months afterwards. A beautiful baby was born, quite normal, and at the close of the year it is still thoroughly healthy."—Report, p. 968.

In the first place we must not lose sight of the extremely embryonic state of our knowledge on this question. The Royal Commission and the Government Bill give a definition of feeble-minded persons which has deserved the approval of the Royal College of Physicians. Prof. Karl Pearson calls it "idle."

The Report itself says:—

"In much of the evidence on causation (of mental deficiency) terms were used without fixed meaning, in different senses by different witnesses, or in more than one sense by a single witness. This confusion has been no less noticeable in the medical than in the general evidence given on the important question of heredity."[1]

The reason of this is as Dr. M. D. Eder says: "I can count on the fingers of one hand those in England who have first-hand knowledge of modern researches in the domain of the mind."[2]

In his evidence before the Commissioners, Dr Eichholz, of the Board of Education, said:—

"It is rarely—not more than in 5 per cent. of the cases—that a history of direct nerve taint in the parent occurs so as to point to the conclusion that the parent should not have married. In consequence of this, the argument in favour of custodial treatment of the feeble-minded does not rest upon histories of hereditary transmission."

And he goes on to support a point we have already dealt with:—

"There is again evidence for believing that the feeble-minded recruit their own class to a lesser extent only, the evidence for this resting (*a*) upon the fact of their offspring participating in the general law of healthy birth; (*b*) upon the indication that fertility of the feeble-minded is a diminishing factor in spite of their occasional sexual activity; and (*c*) finally upon the enormous infant mortality."

Dr. Mercier's evidence was even more striking:—

"The statistics, supposing them to be wholly trustworthy, are deprived of all value by the absence of any statistics of similar

[1] Report, par. 541.

[2] *Daily Herald*, May 31, 1912.

hereditary influence in the sane. For aught we know to the contrary, hereditary influence tending, as we suppose, to produce insanity, as is indicated by the 22 per cent. in which it has been ascertained to exist in the families of the insane, may exist in the sane in a very much larger proportion than in the insane. . . . While, then, we may continue to regard it as a *prima facie* likelihood that the children of persons of feeble mind will be more likely to be feeble-minded than the children of normal parents, we cannot rate this likelihood so high as to justify the adoption of extreme measures with a view to prevent reproduction by such persons."

At the recent Health Conference, June 27, Dr. Saleeby admitted that the hereditary history of tuberculosis was most unsatisfactory. He spoke of three factors, (1) infection and susceptibility, (2) natural or (3) acquired, adding these solemn words: "Until these three are thoroughly investigated, Eugenists had better hold their tongue." Yet he went on to say that this taint of heredity, which is so uncertain and unproved in the sphere of tuberculosis, is quite certain in the sphere of feeble-mindedness—a psychical defect which even a Royal College of Physicians, a Royal Commission, and an Act of Parliament cannot properly define.

One ounce of valid statistics is worth cargoes of generalization. On March 11, Mr. John Burns was able to say in the House of Commons: "Out of 12,000 boys and girls turned out from the Metropolitan Poor Law schools in ten years, only forty-eight were sent back to the guardians for inability to earn their living or for bad behaviour. This put Eton and Harrow to shame. Could any 12,000 public-school boys show a better record?"[1]

The Rev. Father A. G. O'Loughlin, D.D., Ph.D., who has been prison chaplain for many years, gives an expert opinion: "I can only say that experience has convinced me . . . that the appearance of crime in the stock does not fit in with any known law

[1] *Daily Telegraph*, March 12, 1912.

governing the appearance either of pure dominants, impure dominants, or recessives."[1]

Dr. Eder writes: "The clause (in the Bill) which proposes to shut up people as unfit for parentage assumes that the laws of heredity are matters of exact knowledge, that we know precisely from the parents what the children will be. There is not a single biologist or a physician who can conscientiously make any such statement about any individual parent." He quotes the *British Medical Journal* as saying: "The attempts made to regard practical matters of sociology in the light of the Mendelian doctrine do not appear helpful. The doctrine adds no weight to the dictum that it is desirable to segregate those who are hopelessly defective in mind."

He adds: "There lies upon my table a great French encyclopædia on mental defects. In summing up the question of heredity the writer says: 'this question of heredity is most difficult, and there is no unanimity about the statistics. Perhaps one can say that in the families of the insane there is frequent feeble-mindedness, but that identical heredity is rare.'"[2]

The Royal Commission's Report

But I reserve for the last place an authority which, if rightly weighed, should mean the withdrawal of the Government Bill. That Bill draws up an elaborate system of disabilities and life imprisonment, on the basis that many people are unfit for parentage, and should be segregated lest their offspring, tainted inevitably with their parents' infirmity, should be a national burden upon the fit. The Bill purports to be the result and the inspiration of the Royal Commissioners' Report. But it is almost incredible that the Report practically abandons the whole basis.

We have already seen how the Report complains

[1] *Catholic Times*, June 7, 1912. [2] *Daily Herald*, May 23, 1912.

of even the medical inaccuracy in using the word "heredity." It goes on to say:—

"Apart from this loose and equivocal use of the terms 'mental defect' and 'heredity,' another great difficulty has been the absence of any considerable body of statistics. . . . *It will thus be seen that, owing to the absence of necessary statistics, an absolutely conclusive reply, based on facts alone, cannot be given to the question whether a parent or parents who are mentally defective are much more likely to have mentally defective children than are mentally normal parents.*"[1]

I have not time to emphasize every point in this astounding admission. (1) There is an absence of statistics; (2) there is no conclusive reply; (3) there is no conclusive reply from fact. Now it is the boast of modern science to rest on *facts* and *facts* alone. If the men of science are backing a Bill which does not rest on *facts*, they have renounced the scientific method.

(4) It is not proved that even *two* feeble-minded parents will produce more feeble-minded offspring than will normal parents.

At the Health Conference the admission of the Royal Commission was put before Dr. Saleeby, the protagonist of the Eugenists. It was rammed home with the following logic:—"If the feeble-minded are to be segregated because they produce a certain percentage of feeble-minded offspring, and it is not proved that they produce more than do the normal-minded, must we not also segregate the normal-minded?"

Dr. Saleeby, in reply, gave up the Royal Commission, and suggested that they were not experts; but he spoke about a Dr. Davenport from New York.

But I ask any lawyer, or indeed any plain, blunt Englishman, what would he think of a judge summing up the evidence and saying, "Verdict—Not proven: Penalty—Imprisonment for life"?

Now, it is a tradition, if not a point, of English law

[1] Report, par. 543.

that no penalty, and certainly no severe penalty, shall be inflicted on any but certain evidence. If there is a doubt either about the law or the fact, the accused must be given the benefit of the doubt. In law, with its immense and irresistible power of punishment, it is a point agreed that nine guilty men must escape rather than one innocent man should be punished. Every judge takes occasion to charge the jury that, setting aside all personal conviction, or even knowledge, their duty is to judge whether the *evidence* is certain that the accused is guilty of the accusation. If they think the evidence submitted does not prove, then they are obliged to acquit the accused.

To do otherwise, as the framers of the Mental Deficiency Bill would have them do, is to overthrow one of the finest traditions of our legal code.

The Danger of the Bill

We have hitherto spoken of the actual evils of the Bill. I must draw attention to one of its greatest dangers, namely, sterilization.

1. There is no doubt that if the present Bill became actually administered law, the cost to the country would be enormous. Dr. Dunlop, in his Memorandum to the Report, uses the significant words: "I dissent from making the provision of training or education of mentally defective children of all grades a public duty, because, in my opinion, the advantages gained are not sufficient to justify the enormous cost which would be involved."[1]

2. Dr. Davenport, the Director of the Eugenics Record Office of America,[2] at the recent Eugenics Congress, frankly said: "Laws against marriage of the feeble-minded are futile; the only way to prevent

[1] Report, p. 482.

[2] He is the authority on whom Dr. Saleeby fell back when driven from the Report.

the reproduction of the feeble-minded is to *sterilize* or segregate them."[1]

3. Dr. Rentoul has made himself notorious by his open advocacy of this assault. Thus he writes to the *Local Government Journal*, January 1, 1910: "We howl about the increase of paupers, yet we allow the pauper to leave the workhouse to get married." His view is that "it shall be lawful for the surgeons to perform such operation for the prevention of procreation as shall be safest and most effective."

4. Dr. Saleeby in his book, *The Methods of Race Regeneration*, speaks of negative methods, such as the lethal chamber and mutilative surgery. Whilst rejecting these he takes occasion to say: "By mutilative surgery, I do NOT mean non-mutilative sterilization." (P. 47.)

5. At the Central Poor Law Conference of 1911, the principal paper was by Mr. H. Beaumont, Clerk to the Wakefield Board of Guardians. He said: "If I do not urge segregation or surgical sterilization, it is not because such is Utopian or impracticable, but because public opinion is (perhaps) not yet educated and sufficiently informed to deal with the subject."[2] But he took occasion to hand round to the delegates a plea for this method, instead of "segregation, with its enormous cost." He concluded: "This would stop the supply, and save the country at least £20,000,000."

That this is no Utopian idea may be proved from the fact that in several of the United States it is now the law.

SUGGESTIONS

It is hardly right to offer merely destructive criticism, even though in the present epidemic of helter-skelter

[1] *Daily Telegraph*, July 27, 1912.
[2] *Poor Law Officers' Journal*, Feb. 24, 1911.

legislation a brake is not without its function. However, though our aim has been chiefly to arrest the progress of a Bill which commits deadly sins against science, logic, politics, liberty, and ethics, we can but outline a constructive measure which might be at once practical and not criminal.

1. There should be no compulsion, except in rare and extreme cases. The compulsory theory is at least as old as Malthus. Cobbett, in his *Protestant Reformation*, Letter 6, says: "Parson Malthus was to compel the labouring classes to refrain, to a great extent, from marriage; and Mr. Scarlett actually brought a Bill into Parliament, having, in one part of it, this object avowedly in view; the great end proposed by both being to cause a diminution of the poor-rate."

But this compulsion has been proved to be unnecessary.

I believe it is true that all the voluntary institutions for feeble-minded people are crowded to the full, and are unable to meet the demands.

Even Mr. Stewart (U., Wirral), who sponsored the first Mental Deficiency Bill, when speaking of the well-known Monyhull Colony for the Feeble-minded, near Birmingham, said, in the House of Commons: "Although they could leave when they liked, they preferred to remain."

At a Conference of Poor Law Authorities, convened by the Basford Guardians, the Clerk to the Guardians said that "it would be best to make provision for the feeble-minded before asking for compulsory powers of detention. Only two per cent. of the total number already admitted to such institutions had applied for their discharge, so it was fairly clear that there would be no difficulty in getting the cases in."[1]

It should not be forgotten that in matters ethical or bordering on the ethical, the free will plays the chief part. Voluntaryism, no matter how tawdry its

[1] *Poor Law Officers' Journal*, 1911.

accompaniments, contains something vital that is wanting to all mere compulsion. "One volunteer is worth three pressed men" obtains not merely in the sphere of a nation's military service. So much is thought of the free will by those to whom compulsory methods offer a bait that they steadily resist compulsory powers. The Catholic Church boasts of religious orders dedicated to the reform of the Magdalen class, but I have never heard that these Sisters have asked for compulsory powers. Their experience has taught them that compulsion, on the whole, takes from the "children" as they call them, a something necessary for their uplifting.

Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the State has one great home of compulsion—the prison. I speak as a prison chaplain when I say that few even of the prison officials would look upon prison work as an argument for a widespread compulsion.

2. The Bill should not set up a new and costly Board of Control, but should act under the existing Boards. Under the new Bill there will be four authorities dealing with the mentally deficient: (1) The Board of Control; (2) The Lunacy Commissioners; (3) The Education Authority; (4) The Poor Law Guardians.

3. The voluntary agencies should be encouraged to develop their activities. Boards of Guardians should be encouraged — and if compulsion is necessary, compelled—to act jointly for the voluntary custodial treatment of the mentally deficient.

4. The State should take more care to change those conditions which beget or foster feeble-mindedness.

A feeble-minded person is one who under favourable conditions could earn his own living. This is to define feeble-mindedness in terms of the environment. It should be the duty of the State to change that environment.

5. It is sometimes claimed that the children under

the control of the After-Care Committees are taken away by their parents as wage-earners. Of course, the percentage is small, but it might be made even smaller if some attempt was made to reduce the home poverty, which is too often the excitant.

6. More effort should be made to find out and punish the responsible father when feeble-minded women become mothers. It is socially absurd to think that the only protection is imprisonment for the less guilty.

7. Care should be taken that amongst those responsible for the administration of the laws affecting the mentally deficient there should be some ethical experts. It is right that there should be legal and medical experts. But it is evident that there is a mental as well as a moral side and there is a moral as well as a legal side to the whole question.

8. More effort might be made to do what I may call research work among the mentally deficient. Dr. Eder has called attention to the attempts made, chiefly in America, to give a series of educational equivalents for mental states. Even in our voluntary homes the mere domestic side of the work should not wholly displace the educational side.

9. There should be no hesitation in withdrawing a Bill which has all the marks of hasty reasoning and panic legislation. If another Bill is to be introduced, it should be drawn up by a Board, including at least one expert Catholic doctor and one expert Catholic priest. The doctor's claim to be upon the Board will be readily admitted. But it may not be so evident that the priest has an equal claim with the doctor. Yet it is clear that the whole genesis, diagnosis, and control of the mental defective has such roots in ethics that a Board deprived of ethical expert advice would be itself scientifically defective.

APPENDIX I

ON October 31 the Standing Committee of the House of Commons approached the discussion of Clause 17 which contains the now famous definitions. Mr. M'Kenna probably startled some of the Committee by making what the Press called "a general statement" regarding the intentions of the Government in respect of this part of the Bill. He said:—

> "The Government proposed that no person should be brought under the operation of the Bill merely because such person was feeble-minded.—(Hear, hear.) It was recognized that the condition of feeble-mindedness was one which might not of itself call for direct interference by the law.—(Hear, hear.) The intention was that no feeble-minded persons should be dealt with compulsorily unless such person, for some reason or another, had already come into contact — he used a very wide term — with the existing law; and when being dealt with by the law for some reason or other was found in fact by a judicial authority to be feeble-minded and was then adjudged to be one who would more appropriately be dealt with as a feeble-minded person than dealt with by some existing legal authority.
>
> "Every person whom it was proposed to treat as feeble-minded for the purposes of the Bill would have first to come under the law as 1st, a criminal; 2nd, a person neglected; 3rd, or cruelly treated; 4th, a person becoming chargeable to the State; 5th, or a person dealt with by the local education authorities in a particular way."[1]

I. In the opinion of the present writer this "general statement" of the Home Secretary means the withdrawal of the Bill. Nothing is clearer than that the framers of the Bill were wholly inspired by Karl Pearson's view of eugenics. What else could have prompted them to commit to a Home Secretary the power of life-imprisoning anyone

> "in whose case it is desirable in the interests of the community that they should be deprived of the opportunity of procreating children"? (Section 17 (*f*).)

[1] *Daily Telegraph*, November 1, 1912.

This most inhuman and obscene proposal has actually found its place in the sections of a Government measure. Only a eugenic motive could have emboldened men to such an onslaught on human liberty. But if the feeble-minded, as such, are not to be dealt with, the whole motive of the Bill is at an end. The nation is not asked to embark upon a voyage of eugenic adventure or enterprise, with the purpose of discovering or evolving supermen. It is merely asked to deal with certain classes of the criminal or destitute classes.

II. It is quite evident that the crusade of enlightenment formally inaugurated by the Norwich Congress has been of avail. The Home Secretary has laid it down as a guiding principle "*that the condition of feeble-mindedness was one which might not of itself call for direct interference by the law.*" Catholics should take care not to forget this admission. Eugenists will no doubt minimize it, because it is practically a deathblow to their cause.

It is the very essence of the eugenists to bring about what they call "such an enlightened public opinion" that unworthy parenthood, that is, of the feeble-minded, shall be made legally and physically impossible. Again and again when eugenists have been challenged with the fact that their proposals would mainly affect the poor, they have replied that it was their desire to deal with the feeble-minded as such whether rich or poor. They believe that feeble-mindedness is such a national disease and menace that it should be dealt with by compulsory segregation; in other words, by direct interference by law. Mr. M'Kenna, we are glad to say, now admits that feeble-mindedness is not such a national menace that it should be dealt with by law.

III. We would direct great attention to the Home Secretary's new proposal. At first sight it has an innocent look, yet it may mean that the rich feeble-minded shall escape and the poor be segregated. For it is patent that it is not the rich but the poor who, through their poverty, come oftenest before the magistrates or become chargeable to the State or are specially dealt with by education authorities.

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THE LIVING WAGE

INTRODUCTION

THE Catholic Social Guild, although one of the most recent of our organizations in this country, has already more than justified its creation by the number of excellent and practical handbooks on great social questions which it has produced within the short space of time since its inception. Here, as in every other part of the civilized world, the Catholic Church finds herself face to face with two grave dangers,—dangers for herself, dangers for the human society in which and for which she lives. On the one hand, there is the undeniable unrest, the inevitable discontent of the vast body of the industrial workers, owing to the lamentable and often preposterous conditions of their life; on the other, the specious, attractive, and doubtlessly sincere, though pernicious, theories and programmes of a universally diffused Socialism.

What ought to be the attitude of the Church between these tremendous forces? It cannot afford to be a purely negative one. The Catholic writers and preachers are quite right in denouncing the dangers of socialistic theories, and warning the working man against the socialist propaganda. But

this is not enough. We must first of all convince the working classes that we are as fully aware as the socialist of the undeniable evils of our present social state, the outcome of the unnatural economic developments of the past century, and as earnestly eager to labour for their amelioration. Next, we must be prepared to offer at least as plausible proposals for such amelioration as the most ardent socialist writers. But in order to do this, we require to be fully informed by an exact knowledge of the actual economic and social conditions of our time, and to comprehend clearly the great underlying principles, ethical as well as economic, which must form the basis of any solution that has the hope of permanent success.

It is, I take it, primarily to supply our own thinkers and writers with information of this kind that the C.S.G., in conjunction with the C.T.S., is issuing the various booklets of which the present will be found not the least opportune. Incidentally its publication will serve the further purpose of making known to English readers an eminent American Catholic sociologist; the more Catholic thinkers and writers on these all-important topics in various countries become known to one another, the better will it be for us all, and for the great interests that we have at heart.

✠ LOUIS CHARLES,
Bishop of Salford.

13th June 1913.

THE LIVING WAGE

By the Rev. John A. Ryan,[1] S.T.D.
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I. Definitions

What do we mean by a living wage? To begin with, there are three things which we do not mean. A living wage is not the same as a subsistence wage, nor a wage adequate for the maintenance of productive efficiency, nor a wage that corresponds to any of the current scales of expenditure. It has some reference to all of these standards, but it is identical with none of them. If it were the equivalent of mere subsistence it could not become the basis of discussion; for even now practically every worker gets sufficient remuneration to keep him alive. A wage that will maintain the labourer at a normal level of productive efficiency is considerably higher than a subsistence wage, and in the long run would perhaps not fall far below a living wage; yet it is vitally defective, inasmuch as it regards the labourer primarily as a means to national production or social welfare. It applies to a human being the same

[1] An appreciation of Dr Ryan's position as a sociologist and of the main principle of his social teaching, from the pen of the Rev. Michael Maher, S.J., D.Litt., will be found in the Appendix, pp. 21–24.

standard of valuation that is employed in the case of a draught-horse or a locomotive. As to the current scales or standards of living, they are so flexible and so varied that none of them can be forthwith adopted as a universally applicable measure of a minimum living wage in any given territory.

Briefly defined, a living wage is a wage adequate to a livelihood. It is that amount of remuneration which will provide the labourer with a livelihood becoming to, worthy of, proper for a human being. Hence the ideas of a living wage and a decent livelihood are fundamentally moral rather than physical or economic. They regard the labourer as a person, as a quasi-sacred being, as one possessed of intrinsic worth, as "an end in himself." The labourer is not conceived as a mere means to any other individual, or to any social purpose or interest. He is a person, morally obliged and morally privileged to pursue self-perfection, to develop his personality, to live a reasonable human life. For this purpose he must have the means of exercising and developing all his faculties, physical, mental, moral and spiritual. To what degree? Well, to some degree; to a reasonable degree; to that degree at least which is necessary in order that he may live as a human being and not as a horse or a pig. So much at least is embraced in the idea of a decent livelihood.

2. Elements of a Decent Livelihood

In more concrete terms, a decent livelihood comprises food, clothing and housing sufficient in quantity and quality to maintain the worker in normal health, in elementary comfort, and in an

environment in which morality and religion can be safeguarded with a reasonable amount of effort. It embraces, moreover, that quantity of provision for the future which is necessary for elementary security and contentment; and sufficient opportunities of recreation, amusement, social intercourse, education, reading matter and church-membership to conserve health and strength and to exercise in some degree the higher faculties. Although these statements may still seem to be somewhat vague, their meaning could be readily put into more definite and satisfactory terms, in any community, by any committee of intelligent and honest persons. And the estimate or description upon which such a committee would be able to agree would be sufficiently high for all practical purposes. Once the members of the committee acknowledged that a human being is a moral entity whose needs are on an essentially different and higher level than the needs of a brute, they would find it practically easy to agree upon a minimum of goods and opportunities which would reasonably meet and safeguard all the worker's essential needs and purposes. Now, a wage adequate to provide the individual with all these requisites is a living wage, except in the case of adult men. Since the headship of a family is necessary for the normal development of personality, for right and reasonable life, the material means required for the proper discharge of this function must, generally speaking, be included in the labouring man's decent livelihood and living wage.[1]

[1] [As, of course, would also be the case with a labouring woman on whom a family was dependent—C.S.G.]

3. The Grounds of the Claim

(a) The Moral Basis

The grounds upon which the claim to a living wage may be based are moral, religious, social and popular. First comes the moral basis. Like all other persons, the labourer has a natural right to live from the bounty of the earth; for, on the one hand, all men are of equal moral or intrinsic value, and, on the other hand, God has made the earth the common heritage of all His children, whereby they are to live. Furthermore, men have equal rights to live *human lives*, to a decent livelihood, from this undivided heritage. To withhold from some persons the means of living decently, as befits human beings, is no more reasonable than to withhold from them the means of their subsistence; to deprive them of their subsistence is no more justifiable than to take away their liberty or their lives. While these rights differ in degree of importance, they are all essential, all necessary to the perfection and development of personality. If the intrinsic worth of the human being does not imply a moral claim to life worthy of a human being, it is a mere form of words, and affords no moral protection against any sort of physical aggression, even maiming or murder.

Like all other rights, however, the right to a decent livelihood from the goods of the earth is limited and conditioned. It is valid only on conditions that are reasonable. Of these, two are especially to be considered: the labourer must normally perform a reasonable amount of work, and the product must be sufficiently large to afford a decent livelihood for

all that share in causing it. Assuming that both these conditions are verified in the present system, we see that the labourer's right to a decent livelihood under the capitalist *régime* takes the form of a right to a living wage. In the present social organisation, there is no other way by which this right can become effectual. In these circumstances, the right to a living wage is as valid as the right to liberty, and the social organization is quite as unwarranted in depriving him of the one as of the other. Both are necessary to life and welfare, and all that is implied in both is fundamentally a free gift of God to all persons.

It ought not to be necessary to remark that the doctrine of man's equal rights to a decent livelihood does not imply rights to equal amounts of the earth's goods or products. In some respects men are equal; in others they are unequal. Justice demands that with regard to the former they should be treated equally, but with regard to the latter unequally. Since they are equal as persons, they have equal claims to the means of safeguarding personality; since they are unequal in the degrees of their capacities and needs, they have no claim to receive equal amounts of opportunities and satisfactions.

Whether equality of personal dignity requires that, in a civilisation as rich as ours, all men should have more than the minimum decent livelihood above described, is a question that does not call for discussion in this paper. Our present concern is merely with the *minimum* that is compatible with the dignity of personality. Deny to the labourer this minimum, and you treat him no longer as an end in himself,

but as a mere means to the welfare of his fellows. You make an unreasonable and unjust distribution of the undivided gifts of God.

(b) The Religious Basis

The religious argument for a living wage rests upon Christ's precept of Brotherly Love and His Golden Rule.[1] No interpretation of the former which does not assure the labourer at least a decent livelihood can be defended for a moment; while the Golden Rule, implying as it does *the essential sacredness and equality of men*, contains the germ of the moral argument outlined in the preceding paragraphs. Historically, the concept of a living wage is ultimately traceable to these two Christian principles, while its formulation and development have been the work of the Catholic Church. Ever since the Middle Ages, the living-wage principle has been an implicit element of Catholic moral teaching. It was expressed in most definite and unconditional form in the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII. on the "Condition of Labour": ". . . *There is a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort. If, through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the workman accepts harder conditions because an employer or contractor will give him no better, he is the victim of force and injustice.*" Within recent years representative bodies of many of the Protestant

[1] "All things, therefore, whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."—St. Matt. vii. 10.

denominations have given the living wage a prominent place in their programmes of social reform.

(c) The Social Basis

The social argument for a living wage is that the injury to society resulting from underpaid labour is not offset by the saving in the outlay for wages. In summary form the injury may be described thus: diminished power of production by the underpaid workers owing to lowered strength and vitality; abnormal sickness and unemployment and premature death; expenditures by society for the relief of all forms of unnecessary distress—for example, lack of the necessaries of life, sickness and funeral expenses; various forms of outlay in connection with such crime as is ultimately traceable to inhumane conditions of living and low wages; and finally, the progressive degeneration of that large section of the population which is composed of the underpaid workers and their descendants—a phenomenon which has become alarmingly prevalent and manifest in Great Britain. Owing to the lack of detailed and comprehensive statistics, the foregoing statements are not susceptible of proof in terms of mathematics, but the evidence is sufficiently clear and extensive to generate practical certainty in the mind of any honest and competent student. Indeed, there is good reason to think that the saving effected through the payment of less than living wages is all lost to the nation through the diminished productive efficiency of the underpaid workers. In other words, if the latter were to receive a living wage they would, in conjunction with the improved methods of production which

would inevitably follow, make good their increased remuneration. At any rate, it is almost a truism to say that, from the viewpoint of social welfare, underpaid labour is not cheap labour. It does not pay society.

(d) The Popular Basis.

What I have called the popular argument consists in the fact that the vast majority of persons believe almost intuitively that the labourer is unfairly treated unless he receives at least a living wage. During a large part of the last century this popular conviction was obscured and weakened, but only because public opinion was misled by the teaching of the "classical" economists and their followers concerning the power of unlimited competition to ensure every man a reasonable amount of economic opportunity. Now that this theory has been refuted by experience, the ethical doctrine based upon it, namely that "every free contract is also a fair contract," is no longer accepted by either the larger or the saner part of the community.

4. The Claim in the Concrete

What to-day is a living wage in terms of money? Obviously it differs in different places. Professor Chapin places it at 900 dollars per year (£167, 10s.) for a man and wife and three children in New York City (see *The Standard of Living in New York City*). Mr Streightoff's estimate is 650 dollars (£135, 3s. 4d.) for smaller cities, without any provision for saving or insurance (see *The Standard of Living among the Industrial People of America*). Probably the majority of competent students would

agree that for the head of a family the minimum adequate living wage to-day in the large cities of the North and East is 750 dollars a year (£156, 5s.). In the case of women workers the living wage is not less than 8 dollars (£1, 13s. 4d.) a week in any large city.

What proportion of the labouring population gets less than a living wage? Computations based upon the special investigation of manufacturing establishments made by the U.S. Census in 1904 show that 38 per cent. of the adult men were receiving less than 600 dollars (£125) per year, while 50 per cent. of the women were paid less than 6 dollars (£1, 5s.) per week. According to Professor Nearing, whose work, *Wages in the United States*, contains the latest statistics and the most recent estimates, three-fourths of the male adults in urban employments are getting less than 600 dollars (£125) net income annually, and three-fifths of the women fail to receive as much as 6½ dollars (£1, 7s. 1d.) per week. Making due allowance for all possible exaggeration in Professor Nearing's findings, we are justified in the statement that three-fourths of the American wage-earning population, both men and women, are to-day receiving less than an adequate living wage, and that the number of persons who are in these conditions is somewhere between ten and fifteen millions.

[5. As Applicable to British Isles

NOTE.—The above figures have been given as Dr Ryan wrote them, for the American conditions are of peculiar interest to all English-speaking

nations, as illustrating both the standard and the cost of life in the great Republic. But, in order to make this pamphlet actual for this country, it is necessary to add here some outline of the contemporary and parallel British conditions, an addition which is made by Dr Ryan's request.

More than ten years ago, Mr B. S. Rowntree published, in an interesting study of social conditions in York (*Poverty*, London, 1902), an elaborate calculation, *based on the then current prices*, of the *smallest possible expenditure* necessary to keep a normal working-class family in a condition of health and efficiency. In other words, he calculated what Dr Ryan calls "a wage adequate to the maintenance of productive efficiency." The figures arrived at by Mr Rowntree were admitted, by all competent to judge, to be reliable, and they were confirmed by other investigators, such as Mr P. H. Mann (*Life in an Agricultural Village in England*, in *Transactions of the Sociological Society for* 1904) and the late Miss Maud F. Davies (*Life in an English Village*, London, 1909). The necessary amounts were: *food*, per head, per week (over sixteen), 3s.; (under sixteen). 2s. 3d.; *clothing*, per head, per week (over sixteen), 6d.; (under sixteen), 5d.; *fuel*, etc., about 1s. 10d. per week; *rent*, per week, in the country, 2s. 6d. to 4s.; in medium-sized towns, 5s. 6d. to 7s. 6d.; in large towns, 6s. 6d. to 11s. 6d. It must be noted that the rent here given for country cottages is such as will not cause loss to the average landlord or builder. Any reduction of rent below this point is merely a peculiarly undesirable form of "truck" wages and a direct discouragement to cottage-

building. Now these figures represented the cost of *mere efficient subsistence*; yet, if we take as the normal family two adults and four children (and any less number implies a falling population), the results were £1, 3s. 6d. per week in the country, £1, 6s. in the medium-sized towns, and £1, 9s. in the large towns. But it has been calculated by Professor W. J. Ashley (*The Rise in Prices and the Cost of Living*, in *The Evening News*, October 3–7, 10–12, 1910) that, since the publication of Mr B. S. Rowntree's calculations, there has been a rise in the cost of the main necessaries of subsistence of about 10 per cent. in the period that has elapsed. This means that about 2s. a week should be added to each of the wages given above, for there is but slight variation in the cost of food, clothing, etc., in town or country. Therefore, to-day (1913), the figures should work out (very roughly, it is true, but with sufficient accuracy to form a basis of discussion) at £1, 5s. 6d., £1, 8s., and £1, 11s. respectively.

But this, it must again be recalled, is only an "efficiency wage." In order to arrive at a "living wage," we must add to these figures some sufficient sum to represent the cost of the reasonable recreation, educative facilities, provision against misfortune and satisfaction of mental and spiritual needs, that every human being has a *right* to expect in return for honest labour. It would be difficult to allow less for all these than sums rising from 2s. 6d. in the country to about 6s. in the large cities (where locomotion also has to be considered). *So that, according to the estimates of these experts, we should arrive at the following rough figures to represent the lowest possible*

"living wage" for normal families: £1, 8s. in the country; £1, 12s. in a medium-sized town; £1, 17s. in the great cities. How do the facts compare with this standard? It is impossible, with the extremely imperfect statistics available, to give an accurate answer. But some indication may be attempted. The Board of Trade census for 1906, *taking the organized trades alone*, gives about 500,000 men and about 300,000 women who earn less than 21s. and 12s. respectively per week, *when in full work.* To these must be added many dockers, practically the whole body of casual workers, and a large proportion of the agricultural labourers of the United Kingdom. In London, the weekly rates of wages of unskilled labour, even in the organized trades, show an average deficiency of about 8s. to 13s. from the standard; in Birmingham, the deficiency is from about 10s. to 16s.; in Derby, from about 10s. to 12s.; in Hull, from about 4s. to 10s.; in Wolverhampton, from about 5s. to 12s.; and so on throughout the country. With the unorganized and casual labour it is even worse. As for the wages of agricultural labourers in the United Kingdom, they vary enormously, from the 9s. 10d. in five Irish counties to the 22s. of Durham. The Rural League Enquiry of 1912–13 gives the following averages for "cash-wages and earnings": Northern counties, £1, 0s. 9d. to £1, 3s. 3d.; Midland counties, 17s. to 19s. 2d.; Eastern counties, 17s.; South-eastern counties, 18s. 4d.; South-western counties, 17s. 9d. The best of these figures is well below the required standard, the worst scandalously deficient: the average for the whole of agricultural England is at

least 8s. 8d. too little for "a livelihood becoming to, worthy of, proper for" a decent labourer's family. Out of the 8,000,000 to 8,500,000 adult workmen in the United Kingdom, it is doubtful if there are 1,000,000 who are receiving what is really a living wage.—C. S. G.]

6. The Remedy.

The living wage problem is, therefore, sufficiently grave and sufficiently difficult. It cannot be solved by any quick, easy or simple method, or by any one method whatever. Its solution can be brought about only through the co-operation of many agencies, individual and social. In the first place, a large proportion of the underpaid labourers could very materially raise their wages by the practice of greater industry, efficiency, thrift, sobriety and courage in their everyday lives, but especially by becoming faithful and active members of labour organizations. On the other hand, probably a majority of those employers who now pay less than living wages could increase these rates of remuneration without being driven out of business, and without being compelled to reduce their own standards of living notably or unreasonably. After all, it is upon the employer that the moral responsibility of paying a living wage primarily falls. Only in case of his default does the obligation revert to society or the State. Nevertheless, it is improbable that the private efforts either of the labourers or of their employers will raise to the plane of a living wage more than a minority of those who are now below the level. Hence the necessity and the

duty of the State[1] to intervene through legislation discouraging any employer from paying any labourer less than the regularly determined minimum. At the outset the legal minimum may be lower than the measure of a living wage given in this paper, but it could be raised gradually, in accordance with the conditions of industry and the growth of favourable public opinion. In principle, legislation of this kind prevailed very widely in the Catholic Middle Ages. It has recently begun to be revived in Australia and in Great Britain through the device of Minimum Wage Boards. The results have been on the whole satisfactory. Against wise legislation on these lines there can be no valid objection either from the side of morals, politics, economics or business. For the State ought to protect the labourer's livelihood as well as his life, his limb or his pocket-book; raising wages by law will produce no economic effects different from those which result from an increase

[1] [It must not, however, be forgotten that, in an essentially oligarchical community like our own, there is grave danger lest any State regulation of wages for the non-possessing classes should involve State *compulsion* to labour in the interests of the possessing classes; that is to say, the reduction of labour again from conditions of free contract to conditions of legal serfdom. There are already not a few disquieting indications of a tendency in this direction, deliberately (or, at least, half-consciously) fostered by some non-Christian economists and social theorists (see Mr H. Belloc's recent work, *The Servile State*, Edinburgh, 1912). A less dangerous and more Catholic method of protecting the remuneration of the labourer would be by the transformation of trade unions or labour organizations into State-recognized, but (except in cases of abuse), autonomous guilds, regulating the various occupations, accompanied by a greatly extended distribution of productive property among all classes of the population. (See J. E. F. Mann, N. J. Sievers, and R. W. T. Cox, *The Real Democracy*, London, 1913.) State action may be sometimes useful or necessary, but not where voluntary and co-operative action would be possible and effective. Also, it is not possible to argue validly from the conditions of one country to those of another, when considering how far State action is, in any instance, either possible or desirable.—C. S. G.]

through the action of a trade union; and no decent employer will be injured by a law which compels all fellow-employers to conform to a certain minimum standard of wages. Only the sweater, the employer who succeeds because he reduces wages below his rivals, would have any reason to object, and his case calls for neither sympathy nor special consideration.

Those of us who do not believe in Socialism, or in any other single and simple solution of the social question, ought to do our utmost to promote the movement for a universal living wage. If all the workers who are now compelled to accept wages inadequate to a decent livelihood had their remuneration raised to that level, all the remaining particular industrial problems would be within measurable distance of solution, and the menace of Socialism would be relatively negligible. With a living wage assured to all workers, even the weaker sections of the labouring classes would be able to organize and to contend effectively for further advantages; whilst the Socialist appeal would have lost ninety per cent. of its force. For we must remember that the practical strength of Socialism lies for the most part neither in its peculiar social philosophy nor in its specific economic proposals, but in its lurid description and denunciation of the evils of the present system—evils of which at least three-fourths are due directly or indirectly to insufficient rates of wages.[1]

[1] See the writer's pamphlet, *A Minimum Wage by Legislation*, published by the Central Bureau of the Catholic Central-Verein, 18 S. Sixth Street, St. Louis, Mo., U.S.A. Price 5 cents.

[7. Difficulties Solved

Note as to the Immediate Obligation of Employers

As has been said, the securing of a living wage all round cannot be effected all at once, nor by any one method. Suggestions as to its gradual accomplishment have been given.

Meanwhile, what of the conscientious employer who is anxious to do his duty, but who finds himself simply unable to pay the wages above indicated as the minimum for decent living? His rival employers, it may be, are keeping wages down; or the conditions of the industry are such that it cannot be carried on if a living wage is paid to the workers, at least during a certain period. Is our conscientious employer bound to pay a living wage when it involves carrying on his business at a loss?

Two cases may be considered. The first is that of a man who manages his own business and employs (at least mainly) his own capital. The second is that of the responsible manager of a joint-stock company. In the first case he will have two kinds of claim upon the business: (*a*) to the wages of management; (*b*) to such interest upon capital as the proper conduct of the business will fairly allow.

(*a*) His claim to wages of management is at least as valid as that of his employees to a living wage. Father Lehmkuhl, whom (together with many other leading authorities) we have consulted, writes:—

"The industrial labour of the employer himself has a claim to recompense. If, therefore, the total profits are not sufficient to give to the workman an *ex se* just wage, and to the employer a minimum

wage of management, then justice only requires that the wages of both employer and workman be proportionately reduced below the figure which would normally constitute a just wage in each case. But charity *may* require the employer to waive his own just claim in such a case, when the workman is reduced to extreme poverty."

As regards this point Fr. Slater writes :—

"Occasionally in bad times he (the employer) may be bound out of charity to give employment without profit to himself or even at personal loss" (*Manual of Moral Theology*, i. p. 294).

(*b*) The employer's second claim, viz. that to the interest upon his capital, is valid, but of comparatively minor importance: it is inferior to that of the labourer to gain a decent living by means of his toil.

Our second case was that in which the employer was but the responsible manager of a company. In this case the responsibility for paying the workman a living wage may rest upon directors and shareholders. He himself, however, is bound to make every effort to secure the payment of such a wage.

In particular cases, it is generally agreed, employers may pay something less than a living wage without violating justice. Whether they violate charity will depend upon further circumstances. Even when the employer who pays less than a living wage makes no *profit*, he may still cause harm to others by the general depression of wages which his action tends to produce.

But, one further point should be noted. Businesses that cannot afford to pay the employees living wages

are parasitic on the whole community. For it is impossible for the State to neglect the *effects* of insufficient wages — the half-starved children, the premature old age, the destitution that necessarily ensues on sickness or old age, the immorality caused by overcrowding, the epidemics resulting from too cheap and insanitary dwellings, etc. All these things are chiefly caused by the lack of a decent remuneration of labour, and all these things are a continual and heavy charge on the whole community. Therefore the community has a right to protect itself against the cause of these things (*i.e.* too low wages), by making and encouraging such social arrangements as shall ensure that every worker shall receive proper remuneration for his labour.—C. S. G.].

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APPENDIX

DR RYAN AND HIS TEACHING

By the Rev. MICHAEL MAHER, S.J., D.Lit.

IT is hardly necessary to say that for any reader familiar with Dr Ryan's classical work, *A Living Wage: its Ethical and Economic Aspects*, an estimate of his attitude is needless. But as it is anticipated that this pamphlet will have a wide circulation amongst readers here in England who may not be acquainted with the larger work of this distinguished American Catholic writer which has achieved such success in his own country, it may be perhaps desirable to add a few words about the standing of the author in his own country for the benefit of Catholic students of economics over here.

The Rev. John A. Ryan, S.T.D., Professor of Moral Theology at the St Paul Seminary, is probably the first Catholic authority in social science in America. His volume on *The Living Wage*, above referred to (of which a two-shilling edition has recently been published by Messrs. Macmillan), is by no means his only contribution to this particular branch of his subject. His address on "A Minimum Wage by Legislation," first delivered at the annual conference of the Consumers' League, held in Milwaukee in March 1910, and since reprinted by the *Central-Verein*, exercised considerable influence in promoting the introduction of bills for minimum-wage legislation in more than one State Legislature of America. His *Programme of Social*

Reform by Legislation has likewise attracted much attention. Besides being in great demand as a lecturer at American summer schools and conferences, he is well known to readers of American reviews. His wide knowledge and incisive mind are valued in the highest quarters in America, Catholic and non-Catholic.

I think all readers will agree that the Catholic Social Guild was very fortunate in securing the services of Dr Ryan for the foregoing pamphlet. The problem of the living wage is of the very first importance among social questions. It is at the root of most of them. Dr Ryan handles it with boldness and vigour, retaining a clear grasp of both ethical principles and economic maxims throughout.

It is not impossible that some readers—even some Catholic readers—may be surprised, not to say a little startled, at certain statements in this pamphlet. But if so, it is probably because they are not familiar with the social encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII. or with the old Catholic teaching on interest. For Dr Ryan's teaching, both here and in his larger work (to which we refer the reader for a fuller statement of, and a detailed justification for, the conclusions here set down), is merely the development of authoritative Catholic teaching and its application to this problem.

The principle from which the social teaching of Leo XIII. started (and it was but the traditional Catholic principle) was the inherent dignity of the human being, the intrinsic worth of individual human life, given to man by God. *That* is the Christian basis of the social system : and that alone will afford

firm ground for every moral right of poor or rich, weak or strong.

In brief: man is placed in this world by God to attain a certain end. It is that end which gives value to his life. Man has therefore from God a right to the necessary means to attain that end. But a *human* life is such a necessary means. There in the last analysis is the justification alike of the right of property and of the right of labour. The first charge on the produce of labour must therefore be the provision of a human subsistence to the labourer. Again, man can adequately realize the purpose of his existence only in Society. But Society is made for man, not (as Socialism teaches) man for Society. It must, then, be the highest aim of the social system to make it possible for man to realize the divine purpose of his individual existence. The structure and functions of the State, its laws and regulations about persons and things, rights and wrongs, are merely devices to achieve this object. No mistaken estimate of the value of particular rules or customs must obscure this aim. Expressed in other words, the true end of the civil State is the well-being of the whole nation; and its object should ever be to render it possible for all to live a human life and realize the divine purpose for which each man was created, and for which the other creatures of the world were placed at man's disposal.

These problems undoubtedly raise difficult and perturbing questions. But they must be faced. Socialism is advocating its solution with enormous energy and considerable success. Its apostles exhibit both ability and devotion in the furtherance

of their cause. And it can be presented very seductively. Dr Ryan justly insists that its chief strength lies in the evils and injustices of the present system. Unless it can be made quite plain that true Catholic teaching, so far from palliating those evils, provides the only solid defence of the rights of labour as well as of property, there is imminent danger that a large part of the rising manhood of our Catholic working classes will be lured unwittingly away from the freedom of Christianity into an intolerable system of slavery in which such Socialism, if successful, will inevitably result.

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"THE THINGS THAT ARE CÆSAR'S"

BY THE REV. JOSEPH KEATING, S.J.

"Render therefore to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's."—ST. MATT. xxii. 21.
"We must obey God rather than men."—ACTS v. 29.

Introduction

THERE is a feeling in this country, dating from the days of Elizabeth and still widely prevalent, that the sincere profession of the Catholic religion is incompatible with whole-hearted loyalty and patriotism. The feeling has never been more plausibly expressed than in Gladstone's *Vaticanism*, nor more thoroughly shown to be baseless than in Newman's answer, *A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk.* Yet it is so deeply rooted in national prejudice, and is held to be so amply illustrated and confirmed by national misreading of history, that, in spite of its finding no support in fact, its groundlessness needs to be constantly demonstrated. It is hoped that the following attempt to trace the source and limits of civil authority will incidentally show once more that, so far from Catholicism and patriotism being even potentially at variance, the contrary is the case; the better the Catholic the better the citizen—in other words, that the State possesses in the teaching of the Church the surest support for all its lawful claims, and the citizens the strongest motives for yielding obedience.

Catholic Doctrine concerning the State

It is Catholic doctrine, as we shall see, that the State, no less than the Church, is established by God, fulfils the purpose of God, and wields in its own sphere the authority of God. In his famous answer to the Pharisees, our Divine Lord proclaimed "Cæsar's" right to obedience and tribute, not of course as an independent authority and still less as a rival, but as representing in purely earthly concerns the Lord and Master of all. And, as on another occasion He declared the love of man to be identical in motive with the love of God, so here He showed that obedience to God's representatives is but one form of rendering to God the things that are His.

As these are commonplaces of Catholic doctrine, why is it, we may ask, that we do not generally find Catholics in this land foremost in every branch of voluntary public service? The answer lies in their past treatment by the State. When the State for long years has discriminated against one section of its subjects, has put them in many ways outside the pale of citizenship, has only gradually and with reluctance and not yet perfectly allowed their claim to equality before the law, it is not astonishing that there should linger amongst that section feelings of mistrust towards the civil power, a sense of partial outlawry, a disposition to hold aloof from civic concerns, a certain awkwardness in fulfilling public duties. Thus it happens that British Catholics, precisely on account of their past experience, do not seem as yet to have wholly realized that the State belongs to them just as it does to their neighbours, that they have a right to resent being in any way penalized on account of their creed, that they may claim full citizen rights, and that, therefore, they

should be ready to assume to the full the duties of citizenship. The old state of things has happily passed away, and with it should go the dispositions it engendered. "Cæsar" is no longer to be regarded as an unjust tyrant, only to be served with fear and reluctance, but rather as the God-appointed head of the community, claiming the free and loving obedience of its members. That service, we repeat, is his due by divine charter, but—a point of prime importance—it has its limits, also divinely imposed. To be good citizens one must recognize the limits as well as the rights. What, then, are "the things that are Cæsar's"?

What is Authority?

To answer this question properly we must first determine with greater exactness the nature and origin of civil authority. Authority, amongst free human beings, implies the moral right to direct the conduct of others and the correlative duty of obedience on their part. In exercise, it is the pressure of one human will on another, by means of which the latter is brought into agreement with the former. Thus it is essentially a spiritual influence, depending for its full interior effect upon the consent of the subject will. For, being gifted with freedom, the will cannot really be forced. By one means or other, motives for yielding may be put before it, but the decision rests with itself. Whether consent is won by the recognition of the moral obligation of obeying or by an apprehension of the physical disadvantages of disobedience, it is ultimately free.[1] At the same time, external compliance may be forced, and an

[1] We need not discuss the cases when the passions of fear or desire are so vehement as to usurp the functions of reason, and thus deprive the will of its guidance, or when that guide points only in one direction, as in the presence of an overwhelming good or evil. In the first case, the act is not rational; in the second, there is no real opportunity of choice.

unwilling obedience rendered, as when, the moral claims of authority being denied, one yet submits exteriorly because of physical constraint. Circumstances may justify such mechanical obedience, provided that the command does not enjoin something bad in itself or absolutely forbidden by a higher authority. One may always choose the less of two evils, and prefer to suffer some loss or do something foolish rather than be more grievously persecuted. In acting thus, one may claim to be led by prudence, and, although exteriorly constrained, can still remain interiorly free. The dignity of the human will does not allow it to yield to superior might, but only to superior right.

What is Civil Authority?

We are now in a position to understand the nature of the authority wielded by the civil power. It is a legitimate authority within its own sphere, and has a moral claim on our obedience. Whether its positive enactments, outside the range of moral obligations (for the State like the Church can add its sanction to the moral law; many of the Ten Commandments are enforced by civil penalties), are merely penal[1] laws or not is disputed. It is for the legislative authority to decide whether its laws are to bind in conscience. The balance of expert opinion inclines to the belief that in the British State such laws, like the bye-laws of a railway company, are meant to be strictly penal, that is, offer to the subject the alternative of obedience or submission to the penalty exacted; so that, in this sense, con-

[1] I need hardly remind the reader that "penal" here has a strictly technical sense, and is only applied to laws outside the domain of morality, those, *i.e.*, which depend for their sanction on some fixed extrinsic penalty. It has no reference to the anti-Catholic laws passed in persecution times.

science is bound to submit to one or the other.[1] It is possible, of course, for a fallible institution like the State to pass laws which, so far from embodying and determining the divine law, are in more or less direct opposition to it. The Roman Emperors did so in decreeing that Christians should worship idols; Elizabeth did so in decreeing that Catholics should worship in Protestant churches. In such a case the supremacy of conscience must of course be asserted, a consideration which brings us to the question of the source of civil authority.

Whence is Civil Authority?

As in all questions which go to the root of things, our answer in this case will be radically different according as we receive or reject the facts of divine faith. The rationalist, with his theory of blind evolution, the Christian, with his conviction of a divine plan, must necessarily differ in regard to this problem of human development. The fact of a Creator, of Providence, of the Fall, of the Incarnation, of the Church, cannot but influence the Christian's speculations; the rationalist, denying these facts or their significance, must frame his theories irrespective of their import. Those facts being true, it follows that the rationalist's theories are false and his inductions invalid, and that only the believer in revelation has the requisite material for framing a hypothesis which shall account for all the observed phenomena. Revelation, as embodied

[1] It might be feared that this doctrine, which is supported by the great lawyers, Blackstone and Austin, would open the door to all sorts of trickery in the way of evading the penalties of transgression, if we did not reflect that there are very few enactments which do not in one way or another involve moral obligation, generally in the form of social justice. Taxation, for instance, is levied in the name of distributive justice, and, though men may rightly protest against an unjust tax, it is not, generally speaking, for the individual to decide whether he is justified in refusing to pay it. Resistance may easily cause worse evils.

in the Scriptures and the Tradition of the Teaching Church, tells us much about human origins and, in particular, about the source of civil authority. The most explicit declaration is to be found in St. Paul, and it may be well to set forth his words as contained in the thirteenth chapter of Romans.

"Let every soul be subject to higher powers. For there is no power but from God, and those that are, exist by God's arrangement. Wherefore, he that resisteth the power, resisteth the arrangement of God, and they that resist shall bring judgement upon themselves. . . . The ruler is God's minister for good in thy regard. But if thou doest evil, be afraid, for he beareth not the sword in vain. Yea, he is God's minister, an avenger to [execute] wrath on the evil-doer. Wherefore you must needs be subject, not alone for [fear of] wrath, but also for conscience' sake. This, too, is your reason for paying tribute."

St. Paul wishes his readers to understand that their "Christian liberty" does not mean independence of civil rule. Submission is a matter of conscience, not merely of convenience or of necessity. And by immediate inference his words form a striking vindication of human dignity and of the essential equality of men amongst themselves. No one has a right to the obedience of his fellows, save as representing in one way or another, with more or less directness, the supreme authority of God. It is no shame to be subject to the Self-Existing and the Omnipotent, whereas every act of submission to authority, which is not actually or constructively motived by God's will, is a lowering of our native dignity.[1]

[1] We may, of course, do the will of another from motives not connected with authority, as from a desire to please or benefit, or for the prospect of gain.

The State a Natural Development

The same conclusion is reached by an analysis of existing facts. Assuming the fact of creation, we are justified in saying that the Author of mankind also brought into being those conditions which spring naturally and spontaneously from man's constitution. Such conditions are—family life and life in community. It is a fact of observation that family and social life are necessary for proper human development, and it is a fact of historical deduction that family life preceded life in community. All other groupings of humanity sprang originally from this first organized society—the family unit of man, wife, and children. I am not here concerned with tracing the process, the various intermediate steps, which transformed the family unit into the organized social State. The Sacred Records and other sources of human history leave the matter open, and ethnologists are still in dispute about it. All that I need to point out is that God made human beings gregarious by nature, and that consequently the State—the community organized for social welfare—is not a fortuitous or arbitrary development, not a convenient arrangement which may be dispensed with, but a divine institution. Man does not form States of his own free-will: he has really no option in the matter. The alternatives before him are—an ordered life of security and progress made possible by association, or a lapse into the conditions of the beast. The "noble savage" who persists in running wild in woods is free, it is true, from many conventions, but he remains only half a man, a savage very far from noble.

As, then, the Creator instituted States by making man a social being dependent for his development on intercourse with his fellows, so He must be held

to have constituted that element in each State without which it could not exist or endure—a supreme authority. No independent organization could resist disintegration unless endowed with such power over its constituent parts as to control the activities of each to the welfare of all. A single supreme will is the only possible principle of cohesion in a community of self-determining beings, as thus alone can harmony and union be brought about between its multitudinous functions. Accordingly, the principle of civil authority is as directly due to God, the Creator, as is the formation of separate States itself. "By me kings reign and lawgivers decree just things" (Prov. viii. 15).

Non-Christian Theories

Such is the Christian teaching in this matter. Those who reject God and His Providence are naturally obliged to look elsewhere for the source of civil authority, but, while most of them agree that life in community is a necessity of nature, they endeavour inconsistently to show that the supreme authority arises from the voluntary surrender on the part of those concerned of some of their freedom to certain representatives of their own choice. This was the conception so persuasively elaborated by Jean Jacques Rousseau, and it has infected much of modern thought. That overrated philosopher tells us in the *Contrat Social* that he set out "to find a form of association which shall defend and protect, with the entire common force, the person and goods of each associate, and by which, each uniting himself to all, may nevertheless obey only himself and *remain as free as before.*"

Man, that is, has to be under government: man wants to be independent; let us, then, invent an arrangement that shall save his pride whilst securing

for him the benefits of society. Let man consent to give up a certain measure of liberty for the sake of those benefits: he will do so freely for his own self-interest: the restrictions he must suffer are self-imposed: in obeying them he is in reality following his own will.

We may grant that this is an ingenious speculation, and the only possible way of maintaining man's self-respect, if faith in God is discarded. But it is disproved both by history and by a right analysis of existing facts. That there should be a supreme authority in the State does not depend on the citizens, but on Him who made the State, nor can the power it wields be a delegation from them. A delegated authority is an inferior authority. It is contrary to reason and right order that a delegated authority should exercise power over and exact obedience from the authority which constitutes it; still more, that it should possess powers which do not reside in the source whence it springs. Society is not like a club, a free association of independent units who surrender a definite measure of their autonomy to certain of their number for some immediate end. Society is a natural organism made up of entities, normally unfitted to develop and prosper by themselves.

The fact is, Rousseau and his school have confused two distinct things. They have imagined that, because the citizens are left at liberty to choose whatever form of government suits them, it is they who give its authority to the government of their choice. In a sense, to be sure, they do—as the conduit-pipes give water to the house. But the water comes from the reservoir.[1]

[1] Similarly, it is the Chapter which elects the Bishop, but his jurisdiction comes from the Pope; it is the priest who administers the sacrament, but God gives the grace.

Extent of Civil Liberty

God, then, has left it to each sovereign community to determine for itself in what hands authority shall reside and how it shall be exercised. Republicanism cannot claim divine right any more than monarchy. St. Paul, as we have seen, in setting forth the theory of civil obedience, takes care to mention no specific form of government. "There is no power but from God." Hence, the State claims our allegiance, not as representing the collective will of the community, but as representing the divine authority. One constantly hears appeals to the "Will of the People" as the source and sanction of all legislation, and the dictum that law derives its validity from the "consent of the governed" is another expression of the same fallacy. Law, in fact, derives its force from God: its *efficacy* in any particular case will depend on the acceptance of the majority of those whom it is meant to affect. We are not ruled by our equals but by our Superior. This is the truth that makes us really free.

The Popes declare the Catholic Doctrine

Pope Leo, in several of his great Encyclicals, notably in that on "The Christian Constitution of States," enlarges on this doctrine, but it is most conveniently summarized in a passage from the Encyclical on "Political Power."[1]

"It is important," he writes, "to notice at this point that those who are to be set in the place of power can, on occasion, be chosen, in full accordance with Catholic teaching, by the will and judgement of the community. But the effect of that choice is simply to mark out the ruler, not to give him authority to rule; it does not delegate the supreme

[1] Encyclical *Diuturnum illud.*

power, but determines the person that shall wield it."

Thus man's freedom merely consists in the power to choose within a limited range what form of government he shall obey: the motive and sanction of that obedience is not the popular will but the ordinance of God: the people open the shutters, but the light comes from the sun. Another consideration will make this clearer. The mere fact that States possess authority to kill, to coerce, and to legislate for posterity—powers beyond the competence of any individual—shows that such authority comes from some higher source than mutual consent. No club or merely voluntary association could delegate such powers to its executive. It is needless to cite the emphatic endorsement of this Christian theory which is contained in the present Holy Father's letter on the subject of "Le Sillon"[1]—a most weighty pronouncement wholly devoted to establishing the limits and principles of lawful democratic action and to denouncing current errors.

No Form of Government can claim to be the Ideal

We may, however, point out that the papal teaching gives no support to the contention that democracy, supposing it really attainable, is the ideal form of government. It is not, as it has been called, "the political expression of justice." Pius X. recalls the doctrine of his predecessor in the Encyclical on "Political Power," where we read: "Provided justice be safeguarded, nations are not forbidden to give themselves the form of government most in harmony with their character, or with in-

[1] Issued 25th August 1910. Published as a penny pamphlet by the C.T.S. of Ireland.

stitutions and customs they have received from their ancestors," words followed by an account of the three general sorts of government; which indicates that all three are compatible with perfect justice. But it is not to our purpose here to discuss which form of government is best, which is best fitted to secure the common aim of all governments—the general good—at the least sacrifice of human freedom—the good of the individual. The human race has tried all forms, has sometimes, indeed, as in the old Jewish polities, been assisted by divine direction in its choice, but all alike have proved liable to abuse. Systems less perfect in theory have excelled in practice those better theoretically than they. There is point in Pope's decision—

> "For forms of government let fools contest,
> Whate'er is best administered is best,"

provided that the particular form in question *is* capable of being administered well. We can settle things satisfactorily in the abstract, but history is apt to give us the lie.

Service, therefore, is due to all Forms

Our business, then, is to recognize that all duly constituted and effective governments, of whatever form, come from God and wield His authority within their proper limits. Such a government has a just claim to our homage, love, and service; it is the source of many benefits to us otherwise beyond our reach, and thus it merits our gratitude as well. It is not to be thought of as an inconvenient necessity, as extreme individualists proclaim. No doubt its necessity is the greater on account of the Fall of Man. Fallen, unregenerate man is essentially self-regarding, and needs tuition to make him recognize

the rights of others, and coercion to prevent him from violating them. If man were what some modern Socialists imagine him to be, a being essentially upright and law-abiding and reasonable, only forced into wrong-doing by unnatural surroundings, we may allow that an organized coercive civil authority would be superfluous. Families would in that case have joined together for mutual assistance, but they would have been so enlightened, so altruistic, so scrupulously regardful of each other's rights and interests, as to obviate all causes of friction. Each man would know exactly how far his own particular advantage could be pursued without detriment to his neighbour or to the common welfare, and each would spontaneously make that knowledge the rule of his conduct. All titles to honour, obedience, and emolument would be freely and fully acknowledged. The proportion and harmony established by each individual between all the powers of his own complex personality would be perfectly reflected in the social order.

But we have no guarantee that even unfallen man would have realized this socialistic ideal. Wherever intelligence is limited, there may be inculpable conflict of wills, and some authority to decide such disputes would seem to be necessary even in a sinless humanity.

All the more imperative, then, taking things as they are, is the formation of States amongst men. So long as man is not fully acquainted with his duty, and so long as his natural self-love is not completely under the guidance of reason, we must surely allow that external authority is necessary. It is to supply these natural defects that the authority with which God has endowed the community is organized into power, legislative, coercive, and executive, and that the whole body is knit together by the bond of rule.

Each man has to be taught to extend his regard beyond himself as an individual to himself as a member of society, and it is the community's business to see that he is taught. Pure individualism is essentially anarchic and unnatural, the cause of the first sin and of all that have followed.

Functions of the State

Accordingly, the State is a good, not in any sense an evil. It secures the presence in due proportion of the two great factors in human progress, liberty and law—liberty so necessary for human dignity, law so essential for human rectitude. There are those who would confine the functions of the State to external defence and the preservation of domestic order, and deprecate, in the interests of their godless evolutionary creed, any such interference with the play of natural forces as would prevent the "struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest." Happily, that school is now discredited, and men generally hold that it is the business of the community collectively to perform a vast variety of works of public utility which cannot well be done by private enterprise. In fact, there is now a danger, as we shall see, lest the action of the State should be extended beyond its proper sphere to the other extreme.

The first object, then, of the civil authority is the promotion of the common good. And the common good is promoted negatively by such control of the citizens in the exercise of their rights and the pursuit of their interests as prevents them from unduly interfering with one another. This control exists primarily for the benefit of the individual. Some interference, some loss of liberty and abandonment of claims, there plainly must be, if the State has to adjust a number of conflicting rights, but it should not in any case proceed so far as to hinder

the due development of each man's personality and the substantial fulfilment of his destiny. Unless the State were there to check the prosecution of purely private advantage in the temporal order, the common good would be lost sight of in a medley of competing interests. So that the State may be said to exact from the individual, as the price of its protection of his claims and rights, the sacrifice of some proportion of those rights to itself. But such sacrifice is not really complete and is amply rewarded. What a man loses as an individual he gains as a citizen, for the common good—the peace and prosperity of the community—is also the good of each member.

How the State promotes the Common Good

It is hardly necessary to point out how the State positively furthers the general welfare. In addition to national defence, whereby it exercises its natural right of repelling aggression and prosecuting just claims, it maintains peace at home by preventing or punishing crime, "bearing the sword not in vain," and by deciding all manner of disputes amongst its members. It determines the conditions of industry, and facilitates works of public utility. It administers various public services, such as the post office, and in some countries the means of transport. In this country it has practically assumed charge of elementary education, a matter in which it has real though not exclusive rights, and burdened itself with the maintenance of the destitute. The Old Age Pensions Act and the National Insurance Act, whatever may be said about the actual character of that legislation, are indications that the community as a whole recognizes its obligations to make special provision for its indigent and helpless members. It possesses what lawyers call "eminent domain" (*altum*

dominium), *i.e.* it can determine the limits of private ownership of land, etc., in cases where individual rights really conflict with the general welfare, being of course always bound to give due compensation to the expropriated.

It is well to notice that the specific right of capital punishment is vindicated for the State by St. Paul in the passage above quoted. The exercise of this right was expressly enjoined in the Jewish theocracy by divine ordinance. The State has thus the power to avenge the injury to social order involved in grave crime and to consult the general welfare by removing harmful elements. But the power can be, and has been, terribly abused. The punishment of death was attached in less-civilized times to many offences which did not deserve it. It should be reserved for the most serious offences; moreover, it is within the competence of the State to withhold its exercise altogether, provided the object of its infliction can be adequately attained by other means.

The State is not an End but a Means

Are we, therefore, after contemplating this brief summary of its beneficent activities, to conclude that in the institution of the State lies all the means of human advancement? There is a tendency, plainly evidenced in the theory of Socialism, to hold this view and to make the State an end in itself, sacrificing the individual wholly to its perfection.

Against this tendency the spirit of Christianity has ever fought. The limits of State authority are as plainly determined by the Creator as are its rights: they are indicated by the object of the State itself, viz. temporal good; they are more clearly defined by the institution of the Church. Man is not merely a member of the State. He has a separate individuality, he belongs to a family, he is

a child of God, he has a destiny beyond this earth. The State exists to promote his temporal welfare, but he has an eternal welfare to secure as well. Thus from both the natural and supernatural points of view he has interests apart from his interests as citizen, and with these the State has no direct concern.

The Limits of State Authority vary with Circumstances

Here, then, we have limits, limits both in kind and degree, to the obedience which the State may exact from its members in return for the benefits which it confers. The things that are really Cæsar's vary to some extent with conditions of time and place, but can in general be stated with sufficient certainty. In case of a hostile invasion, for instance, the community may demand from its members an entire sacrifice of external goods and the risk, at least, of losing liberty or life, but such exactions under normal circumstances would obviously be intolerable. The peace and order produced in an emergency by martial law would be too dearly purchased if such law were made permanent. Speaking, then, broadly the State cannot with justice place its members habitually under such conditions—slavery, for instance, or enforced ignorance or insecurity of property or damage to health—as would prevent them from living a normal human life. Nor can it rightly interfere with the proper constitution of the family, usurping parental duties, for example, or legalizing amongst Christians dissolution of the marriage-bond. Still less may it ignore or violate obligations which concern man's eternal destiny and his relations with his Maker. God's service must come before even that of the State; all civil laws are void which conflict with the moral law and, in purely religious

matters, with the positive laws of that institution which God has appointed to guard the moral law. Everywhere and always it is beyond the State's commission to dictate to conscience, or to prevent the due enlightenment of conscience by the knowledge of revelation.

The Rights of Man ordinarily inalienable

A more detailed examination of those rights, over which the civil authority has no control, only serves to show how completely reasonable is that exemption. To take the natural rights first. The State cannot invade man's natural right to live. Not for the greatest diplomatic or commercial advantage can it put an innocent person, though the meanest of its subjects, to death. Nor, similarly, can a man's personal liberty be infringed, or his right to self-development according to his circumstances, or to the exercise of his various faculties for his own benefit, provided such exercise does not violate the equal rights of others and thus call for a compromise. Once again, he has a natural right to enter into private association with his fellows for lawful purposes, and, as a particular form of such association, the right to marry. And connected with family life there are a number of concerns which the State cannot justly control. The family is prior to the State in order of nature and existence, and what is essential to the preservation of the family, such as the integrity of marriage and the possession of property, is also essential to the well-being of the community. Chief amongst these rights is that of having control, though not exclusive control, of the education of the children; however, as education is essentially religious, this may best be considered as a right springing from man's relations towards God.

Most of the above rights, those arising from the

very nature of man and from the essential constitution of the family, may on occasion be restricted or even abrogated, for instance in punishment for crime; but man's spiritual rights are entirely indefeasible, for they are concerned with the welfare of his soul and involve the interests of his Creator. No power, therefore, can justly take from man the right to know God and to follow conscience in His service. The right to supernatural life is even more absolute than that to natural; hence the criminal folly of those irresponsible theorists who would hamper or hinder the teaching of religion in the public schools. They are violating at one stroke the rights of God, of the parent, and of the child. And as God has entrusted the furtherance of His interests on earth to that Body in which His Spirit perpetually dwells, such interference violates also the rights of the Church.

Education and the State

This does not mean that the State has no concern in education; on the contrary, it has every claim to secure that every citizen should receive at least such a modicum of training as will enable him to fulfil his functions in the commonwealth. It is its interest and its duty to see to this, and even, in default of parental action, itself to undertake it. But to assume complete control of education is to usurp parental rights, and when that control is exercised in such a way as to exclude religion from the school curriculum, or to put it in a secondary place, or to hedge it round with disabilities and restrictions and penalties, then the State is acting tyrannically; it is not promoting the common welfare, it is discriminating against all its members who have conscientious religious beliefs, it is treating the child as if it were nothing but a citizen and had no other rights or duties save those

involved in membership of a purely earthly community: it is invading the just claims of God. It is not, of course, the business of the State to teach religion: God has made other provision for that task; but it has no right to prevent religion being taught, or to penalize those who desire it for their offspring.

Civil Authority and Despotism

The tendency of civil authority is always towards absolutism; supremacy in one sphere begets desire for supremacy in all. There are natural reasons for this. An absolutist government can be carried on with much greater order and expedition, and with much less expenditure of effort and money, than one which has to shape its conduct so as to recognize various limitations of its power. What Napoleon accomplished in France, what Bismarck tried in Germany, what the old pre-Christian States simply took for granted—absolute control over all citizens—indicates that the State, if its power is not effectively checked, will always develop a despotic character. Human love of liberty is one check, but not a permanently effective one. Some authority capable of advocating and asserting "the things that are God's" alone can set a limit to "the things that are Cæsar's." Only in the keeping of the Church which God established are the fundamental rights of man, whether natural or supernatural, which we have been considering, secure from violation. The knowledge of the rights of the Church brings into effective prominence the limits of the rights of "Cæsar."

Relations of Church and State

The question of the relations between State and Church is a question which will be continually

agitated till both come to an end with the end of all things. Final harmony between them can result only from the entire prevalence of one or other view of their relations—the Christian or the non-Christian. The non-Christian view is that the State is absolutely supreme within its own borders, in matters ecclesiastical as well as civil—a contention aptly enough designated as "Cæsarism," because it is in effect a lapse into the old pagan notion of the divine absolutism of the Roman Emperor. The Christian or Catholic view is that the Church was established precisely to destroy "Cæsarism," to vindicate human liberty, and to bring home to the consciousness of States as well as of individuals the supreme rights and claims of Almighty God. State and Church have in the main separate, though not opposed, spheres of action; if ever they do come into conflict (as distinct from contact), it is because one or other is exceeding its scope. "The foremost duty of the rulers of the State," says Pope Leo XIII.,[1] "should be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the commonwealth, shall be such of themselves as to realize public well-being and private prosperity"; whereas the primary function of the Church is to train the individual to be worthy of eternal life. As their activities affect the same persons, they are constantly in contact; whenever their demands, just in themselves, happen to be incompatible, it is plain that the temporal should yield to the eternal, the lesser good to the greater. If Christianity had never been established, the inhabitants of the world, split up into a number of autonomous nations with opposing ambitions and interests, would have been in danger of ignoring their common origin and their common destiny, the existence, that is, of bonds more fundamental and permanent than any

[1] Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (C.T.S. : Id.), pp. 24–25.

influences which kept them apart. But the setting-up of the world-wide, wholly-spiritual kingdom of the Church has emphasized the fact that there is more to unite than to divide the races of men, and that the citizens of the various States have common interests outside the sphere of nationality.

Neither view, as a matter of historical fact, has ever been universally accepted. Approaches have been made for a short time or in a limited area to the divine ideal, in which both Church and State were left free to decide matters belonging to their own spheres, and in which, where the spheres intersected, the Church had still full liberty of action. But its complete realization is apparently as difficult to attain as the harmony between nature and grace in the individual. Human history, since the introduction of Christianity, forms one long account of the conflict between the two theories, the false and the true. "Cæsar" can ill brook a rival influence which limits his own in so many ways, and reminds him of an account to be rendered to a Higher Power, whilst the human element in the Church has not seldom tried to extend unduly the spiritual prerogative.

National Churches fail to check State Absolutism

But, before the Reformation, the theory, at any rate, of a divine universal Church, supreme in its own sphere and independent of the State, was commonly accepted. The disruption of Christendom in the sixteenth century, and the establishment of national dependent Churches over a large part of Europe, is thus largely a return to pre-Christian conditions and pagan ideals. When religion became local and national, when the Church was looked on as merely a department of the State, there could no

longer be that appeal to the public conscience of Christendom which was so effective a check on secular absolutism, and thus in many civilized communities to-day "Cæsar," the civil authority, no longer recognizes a divinely-established authority, co-ordinate with, and in some regards superior to, his own. Ignoring the claims of the Church, he tends, as a natural consequence, to ignore the rights of the family and the individual. For example, the Church has safeguarded the institution of the family by teaching that the matrimonial contract is a sacrament, and that Christian marriage is one and indissoluble. The State attacks the family by treating marriage as if it were merely a civil contract, rescindable under certain conditions, and thus it opens the door to the evils of polygamy. Again, the Church teaches that the main factor in the training of the young must be the imparting to them of the facts of revelation and the moulding of their characters by the knowledge and love of God. The non-Catholic State tends more and more to set this factor aside and to make education secular, that is, practically atheistic.

The Varying Fortunes of the Church

It is thus plain that the ability of the Church, as representing a higher authority, to vindicate man's inherent rights, especially those which concern his eternal destiny, will vary according to the state of the community in which she finds herself. If such community as a whole believes in her divine character and commission, that belief will be reflected in its laws, which accordingly will allow God's instrument free play in its beneficent work of saving the souls of its subjects. If the Church is planted as a small body in an unbelieving State, it cannot, of course, expect any official recognition, but must

be content with the possession of those ordinary powers of association which all law-abiding citizens may claim, and that freedom of conscience which is every man's birthright. On the other hand, it must be prepared to be viewed with suspicion and distrust, for its claims go far beyond what would be reasonable in the purely human institution that the State believes it to be. Only by proving in practice that those claims result in better citizenship can it hope for real toleration. If, finally, the community can be called a mixed one, in which the Church includes at least a large minority, she may reasonably claim, as may all other religious bodies, the active protection of the law in carrying out her office and ministering to her own children. It is an unfortunate result of religious differences that the harmony and efficiency of government are thereby necessarily impeded, but that is a result which cannot be removed by being ignored, and which makes itself felt in every variety of civil government. Even a Catholic State which, recognizing a divinely-appointed supra-national Church, must theoretically support and further its interests (since the community owes to Almighty God the same service and worship as the individual does, and is equally bound to give effect to its beliefs in action), must make practical allowance for diversities of conscientious belief amongst its citizens. Still more is a non-Catholic community, which in practice denies certainty in faith, bound on its own principles to tolerate all religions which are not manifestly injurious to the commonweal. It is not the function of the State to decide religious disputes.

Status of the Church in the British Empire

Hence the Church in the British Empire, representing a compact and considerable minority of

the inhabitants, cannot lawfully be impeded in its activities, always supposing these latter are not really detrimental to the public peace. In furtherance of their supernatural interests she may make laws binding her subjects' consciences, determining, for instance, not indeed the civil character and effects, but the validity before God of the marriage-contract. She can erect her churches, regulate her worship, staff her own schools. This is after all no more than other religious bodies do, and must do, if they recognize the supremacy of conscience and the guidance of divine authority. The Protestant's views of State legislation are modified by his interpretation of the Bible, just as the Catholic's are by the teaching of the Church.

The Civil Duty of the Christian

However, the fact that the State has practically broken away from Christianity does not absolve Christians from taking their part in its service; indeed, they are the more obliged to do so, if only to supply indirectly the guidance which it has officially abandoned. As it may be their duty to insist on "Cæsar" not exacting more than his due, so it should be their particular care to give him that due, willingly and entirely. He is God's representative, even though he doesn't know it. And if in his government he is misled by false social theories and, especially, unaware of the character and function of the Christian Church, it behoves Christians to do what they can to keep him from going too far astray. The State can be made to do God's work even when it only aims at doing its own There is nothing in social conditions which calls for redress on moral grounds which the Church does not denounce more emphatically even than the civil government. She is more keen than the State is

for the promotion of just dealing amongst the citizens and the establishment of that degree of public virtue which is necessary for civic well-being. In fact, in so far as the saving of souls is involved in the betterment of social conditions, that social betterment is the direct concern of the Church as well.

But the Church as an ally has been set aside, and consequently the State is beginning to advance into that realm which of old was largely controlled by ecclesiastical influence. And it is very apt to blunder badly. It is tampering in many ways with the foundations of society—family life, the security of property, the respect for law, religious education. And even when its efforts are well-directed, they are often miserably inadequate. From the nature of the case, the State can only reach the surface, but the seat of the disease is within; it can apply only material remedies to moral ailments. Itself without faith, it is governing a community which has very largely ceased to be moved by spiritual considerations. Its own claim to absolutism is met by an exaggerated individualism. The citizen tends to become anti-social and the State a tyrant. As far as we can see, either anarchy or despotism will follow the complete loss of the Christian ideal.

Force has to be used in default of Conscience

What, then, is the Christian to do? Instead of blaming the blunders of "Cæsar" or sitting with folded hands beneath his exactions, he should endeavour to revivify in the body politic those inner principles which alone can effectively check the extremes of tyranny and licence. At present the State cannot help itself. Given the existence of even a small body of citizens who have discarded

the moral law and have no scruple in seeking their personal gain by encouraging every form of vice, the community as a whole is necessarily exposed to constant restrictions of liberty. If it were not for the law against indecent publications, and for the censorship of the stage, imperfect though both are in their operation, how completely would literature and drama be delivered over to the devil and the flesh! Unless the State interfered to check adulteration in food and excess in drink and open immorality, to what deep degradation would not the community sink? Unless the law protected the helpless, children, imbeciles, the brute creation, what atrocities of cruelty should we not have to witness? To suppress the wicked and to protect the weak we need legislation at every turn, and *the less we can rely on conscience, the more must we look to force.* If we could only convert the wicked and strengthen the weak, we could reduce the interference of the State to insignificance. It was Christianity that broke the despotisms of the heathen, and it is only Christianity that can preserve the liberties it won and avert the reimposition of "Cæsar's" yoke. Let man but submit to the law of God, and then human law, with its irritating and ignoble sanctions, will not come to worry him. The law, as St. Paul tells us, is not made for the just man.[1]

Summary

To sum up. Under modern conditions, with the Church deprived of her providential function and the State endeavouring to maintain a Christian civilization without recourse to the forces and principles which brought it into being, the range of State action is inevitably extended. In addition to

[1] 1 Tim. i. 9.

its normal work of repressing disorder, administering public services, and fostering public prosperity, it has to supply the deficiencies and remedy the abuses which an unchristian industrial system has brought about. It has to educate, and in some cases to feed, children, a business which properly belongs to parents; it has to pension the aged, whereas they should have been able themselves to provide for their declining years; it has to find employment for the workless who otherwise would starve, yet no one should be in danger of starving in a normal community; it has to interfere in various private interests, because private interests are often pursued to public detriment. Whilst steadfastly resisting all attempts to violate the rights of conscience—conscience properly instructed—the Christian is called on not to hinder but to help the State in its earnest efforts at remedying the various ills which a godless commercialism and a general abandonment of supernatural ideals have brought about, even if his so doing involves a certain sacrifice of liberty or wealth. Only by Christians throwing themselves heartily and in numbers into the life of the State can that life be brought back into healthy channels. Only by insisting that God should always have His due, can we secure that "Cæsar" shall really have his.

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TRADE UNIONISM

By Henry Somerville

The purpose of this pamphlet is twofold: first, to state the aims and describe the structure of Trade Unionism as it exists in England at the present day; second, to discuss the attitude and policy of Catholics in relation to the Trade Union movement.

A Trade Union is defined by Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb as a continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment. This definition must be noted carefully. A Trade Union is an association of wage-earners; it is an association of members of a particular class for the purpose of promoting their particular class interests. Trade Unionism by its very nature supposes a division between the class of wage-receivers and the class of wage-payers. Trade Unions exist because Capitalism exists, and, until the establishment of Capitalism, Trade Unions in the sense defined were unknown. Capitalism is the system wherein the means of production, the instruments for producing wealth, the land, factories, machinery, are owned by a small class of the community, whilst the mass of the people are without property and are dependent for subsistence upon the sale of their labour to the owners of capital.

It was in the eighteenth century that Capitalism finally established its domination in industry, and at this period the history of Trade Unionism commences. Modern Trade Unions are often compared to the Craft Guilds of the Middle Ages. The resemblances are only slight. The Craft Guilds were as widely dissimilar from Trade Unions as the economic system of which they formed part differed from the economic system which prevails to-day. The dominant

characteristic of the system to-day is the division between capitalists and labourers, between employers and employed, between the class which buys labour and the class which sells it. Practically and theoretically, labour is nowadays treated as a commodity to be bought and sold in the market like wheat and cotton and coal. A Trade Union is an association of sellers of labour formed for the purpose of getting the highest possible price for their commodity.

In the Middle Ages a very different system prevailed. The means of production were not owned by one small class but were distributed widely amongst the people. The majority of workers were independent producers, not as they are to-day, employees of large capitalists. The workman did pass through a period of wage-service, but this was as a preparation for mastership. The Craft Guilds were not composed of wage-earners only, as are Trade Unions, nor was it their chief business to get the maximum wage from the employer for the employed. On the contrary, the Guilds were composed of both employers and employed, and their chief function was the regulation of the relations between producer and consumer. Each Craft was composed of masters, journeymen and apprentices. Each master was himself a workman employing perhaps a couple of apprentices and a couple of journeymen. The master would make goods at the order of his customer and he would be paid by the piece, the price being generally fixed by custom. And as prices were fixed thus it was necessary that the wages of journeymen should be fixed accordingly. In short, the Craft Guilds were not organizations of a particular class for particular class interests; they were associations of workers in particular crafts formed to regulate prices and wages in accordance with current conceptions of justice; to enforce the

fulfilment of trade obligations; to protect workers against unfair competition and the consumers from adulteration of goods; and to perform spiritual and corporal works of mercy for members in need.

The working of the Guilds was not faultless. Consumers complained of excessive prices, journeymen complained of insufficient wages, and they formed fraternities of their own which were more akin to Trade Unions than the Guilds were. Another complaint against the Guilds was that, having a monopoly of their trade, they tried to prevent the entrance of newcomers to share their privileges. All these charges have their measure of truth; nevertheless, the Guilds were the best institutions possible for their times, and when they received their death-blow in the sixteenth century, the workers of this country suffered a grievous loss.

After the disappearance of the Guilds, Queen Elizabeth set up a system of State regulation of the conditions of industry, but this system speedily decayed. In the eighteenth century great changes took place. Improved methods of production in both agriculture and industry enhanced the economic value of capital and depressed the value of labour. Workmen found their skilled hand-labour superseded with the introduction of machinery tended by ill-paid women and children. Workmen combined to struggle against the forces that were beating them down. Parliament took the side of the masters and passed the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800, which made it a criminal offence for workmen to attempt by combination to raise their wages. Workmen then combined to secure the enforcement of the Elizabethan legislation, which had enacted that a living wage be paid and that none but duly apprenticed labour be employed in certain crafts. Parliament again took the side of the masters and repealed the Eliza-

bethan industrial code. Labour now appeared to be left helpless under the heel of capital, but strenuous struggles ended in the Combination Act of 1825, which gave a measure of freedom to organized labour. By the Acts of 1871 and 1876 this freedom was still further extended.

It is from the year 1825 that the history of modern Trade Unionism really begins. With the legalization of combinations, Trade Unions sprang up like mushrooms all over the country and an epidemic of strikes commenced. But in that same year came a financial crisis, followed by an industrial depression, and the strikes ended disastrously for the workers. The Trade Unions of those days were confined to men in particular trades of particular localities. The majority of these little societies which had sprung up after 1825 had disappeared before 1829.

After 1829 organizations among the workers began to revive, but this time on a new basis. The ideal this time was not Trade Unions but one great Trade Union. Instead of different unions for different trades there was to be a single national union comprising workers of all trades. In 1830 the "National Association for the Protection of Labour" was founded. This was a federal organization of unions representing about a dozen different trades. Owing to factional quarrels, the National Association broke up in 1832. It was succeeded in 1833 by the "Grand National Consolidated Trades Union" founded by Robert Owen. In its methods and aims the "Grand National" exhibited the chief characteristics of present-day Syndicalism. Robert Owen thus described the scheme of his organization:

"It is intended that national arrangements be formed to include all the working classes in the great organization, and that each department be kept acquainted with what is going on in other departments, that all individual competition is to cease, that all manufactures are to be carried on by national companies.

All trades shall first form associations of lodges to consist of a convenient number for carrying on the business. All individuals of the special crafts shall become members."

The growth of the "Grand National" was phenomenal. Within a few weeks of its formation it included half a million workers of both sexes and nearly every trade. It had a federal constitution, being made up of local trade lodges, each lodge being usually confined to members of one trade. Each lodge had its own funds, but levies throughout the whole union were made for strike purposes. Proposals were made for the setting up of co-operative workshops, and for the leasing of land to be cultivated by men on strike or locked out. We find a Labour leader, John Fielden, explaining in 1832 how the cotton spinners could establish an eight hours' day and a minimum wage by a general strike, without waiting for Parliament to legislate on the matter. The *Pioneer*, an organ of the Builders' Union at that time, thus describes the effects that were to follow the organization of the workers :

"A union founded on right and just principles is all that is now required to put poverty for ever out of society. The vaunted power of capital will now be put to the test ; we shall soon discover its worthlessness when deprived of our labour. Labour prolific of wealth will soon command purchase of the soil ; and at a very early period we shall find the idle possessor compelled to ask you to release him of his worthless holding."

The "Grand National" formed in January 1833 grew, as I have said, with phenomenal rapidity. It initiated a series of gigantic strikes, and the governing classes were filled with panic ; but, after a tumultuous existence lasting seven months, the "Grand National" collapsed. Strike after strike ended in the submission of the men, and it became impossible for the organization to raise any further funds. The dream of a general Trades Union of all the workers was shattered ; and every form of working-class organization suffered a set-back. It was ten

years later before Trade Unionism began to revive, and, when it did revive, it developed characteristics so different from those of the earlier type that the contrast is quite comical.

The Trade Union movement of Robert Owen's day had been idealistic, communistic and revolutionary. But after 1845 the movement was for a period utilitarian, individualistic and pacificist. Trade Unionism adopted as its own the political and economic creed of the Manchester School. The teaching of Ricardo and the other classical economists, that wages were inflexibly determined by the law of supply and demand, was accepted by the Trade Unions and made the basis of their policy. They inferred that the only way to increase the price of labour was to lessen supply in proportion to the demand. Hence we find Trade Union leaders preaching the folly of strikes and advocating such measures as the abolition of overtime, the limitation of apprentices, and the provision of an emigration fund as the only rational and scientific policy for Trade Unionism.

At this period, when the individualistic spirit was dominant, the Unions devoted a great deal of attention to the provision of friendly benefits for their members, who for a small weekly contribution were insured against sickness, death, old age and unemployment. At this period also, the Unions, though remaining sectional in the sense of being confined to members of the same trade, ceased to be local and became organized on a national scale with a centralized administration. The pacificist policy of the Unions at this period enabled them to accumulate large funds and to become very compact and well disciplined; also, with the extension of the franchise in 1867, they obtained considerable political power.

From 1875 to 1879 there was a serious depression

of trade and a consequent decline of wages, which the Unions struggled vainly to resist. Many Unions collapsed entirely and all were weakened. The comparative weakness of the Unions at this period led to acute internal disputes as to policy. A new school of Unionists arose and demanded that the help of the State should be sought by the legal limitation of hours of labour and other forms of industrial regulation. The old *laissez faire* policy was fiercely assailed, and there was a growing section of the younger Unionists imbued with collectivist ideas. The successful Dock Strike of 1889 led to a great extension of Trade Unionism amongst the unskilled labourers, and the conservative individualism of the skilled artizans was swamped by the incoming of hundreds of thousands of new recruits. For a time it seemed that Trade Unionism would revert to the communism and revolutionism of Owen's day; but soon it settled down to a mildly collectivist policy.

In the year 1900 a legal action, brought by the Taff Vale Railway Company against the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, led to a judicial decision which practically deprived Trade Unions of the power to strike. The desire to get the law changed induced the majority of Trade Unions to combine with Socialist organizations for the formation of a political Labour Party. At the General Election of 1906 thirty Labour candidates were returned to the House of Commons; and in the same year the Trade Disputes Act restored to the Unions the privileges that they had enjoyed before the Taff Vale decision.

In 1909 another judicial decision struck at Trade Unionism on a fresh point. In a test case brought by a nominal plaintiff, Mr. Osborne, against the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, the judges denied to Trade Unions the right of using

their funds for the payment of Members of Parliament or for any political purposes whatever. A great agitation for the amendment of the law followed this decision, and resulted in the Trade Union Act of 1913, which authorizes a Trade Union to establish a political fund, provided that a ballot be taken and a majority of the members voting declare in favour of such a fund, and provided also that any individual member shall be allowed to claim exemption from contributing to such a fund.

From this brief survey of Trade Union history the reader will see that the special problems which agitate the Trade Union movement to-day are not new problems. The question of direct as opposed to political action, the question of organization on the basis of industry instead of on the basis of craft, the question whether the Unions should aim at the improvement or at the destruction of the capitalistic system—these were the burning questions discussed by the Trade Unionists of the first half of the nineteenth century; they are still the burning questions to-day. A knowledge of the past history of Trade Unionism, its struggles, its triumphs and its failures, will make us more moderate both in our hopes and in our fears for the future of Trade Unionism.

Methods and Aims of Trade Unionism

It would be possible to enumerate a long list of functions performed by Trade Unions and a great variety of methods employed by them. But the primary object and the essential characteristic of Trade Union action may be summed up in the following words: a Trade Union seeks to increase the price of the labour of its members, and it does this by the substitution of collective bargaining for individual bargaining. No one will properly under-

stand Trade Unionism who does not recognize that the primary object of a Union is the good of its own members, not the good of the whole community; while the essential weapon of a Union is the power to cause a collective withdrawal of labour, that is, the power to strike. Notwithstanding this, the actual promotion of a strike is a comparatively rare occurrence in the working of a Union; and out of the total funds of a Union less than £20 out of every £100 is normally expended on disputes. The Trade Unions of England have developed a vast system of insurance against sickness, death, old age, accidents and unemployment. The greater part of the time of the Union officials and the bulk of the Union funds are devoted to the insurance business of the Union; none the less, the insurance business is rightly considered as of subordinate importance to Trade Unionism.

The phrase "collective bargaining," as expressing the most characteristic method of Trade Unionism, means that, instead of the employer making a series of separate bargains with each individual worker, common terms of employment applying to the whole body of workers are decided upon by agreement between the employer and representatives of the workers. The effect of the substitution of collective bargaining for individual bargaining is that the terms of employment which apply to all are such as are satisfactory to at least a majority of the workers. In this way the employer is prevented from taking advantage of any single worker, whose special necessities would have made him willing to accept lower conditions than those which the ordinary worker would have insisted upon.

The terms of any contract of employment, whether arrived at by collective or by individual bargaining, have reference chiefly to rates of wages and hours of

labour. Hence we find that the efforts of Trade Unions are directed chiefly to the maintenance of a certain rate of pay as the minimum, and of a certain number of working hours as the maximum. The minimum rate insisted upon by the Union is called the Standard Rate; the maximum hours of labour represent the Normal Day. Some Unions insist also on other regulations, such as the limitation of apprentices and the exclusion of non-Unionists from employment. The standard rate is the most important of all Union regulations, and it is the only regulation common to all the Unions. It is obvious that if the Union fails to maintain the standard rate it fails in its fundamental object. Accordingly, a Union will declare a strike against an employer who violates the standard rate in the slightest degree. It need hardly be said that though the standard rate is the minimum rate allowed, it is not the maximum. Workmen of exceptional ability may and do demand payment at a higher than the standard rate. A Union will frequently recognize varying standard rates for the same kind of work in different districts. But, in spite of all minor variations needed to suit the particular circumstances of different trades and different districts, it is the object of all the Unions to establish standard conditions of labour; though, of course, any employer is always at perfect liberty to improve upon the standard.

The relations of the Trade Unions to politics in England are peculiar and somewhat anomalous. In many continental countries workmen of different religious and political beliefs form separate Unions, as the Christian Unions and the Socialist Unions of Germany and Belgium. There are no such divisions in English Trade Unionism. An English (Trade) Union will count among its members men of the most opposed religious and political beliefs; and

these men will usually work harmoniously together for their common interests as workers.

Yet the English Unions do interest themselves actively in politics, and this in two ways—the first being a non-partizan way, the second, partizan. The non-party political activities of the Unions are directed by the Trade Union Congress in national affairs, and by Trades Councils in local affairs.

The Trade Union Congress meets annually, and is composed of delegates representing almost every Trade Union in England. At these annual meetings all sorts of political questions affecting the working classes are discussed; and the Executive Committee —called the Parliamentary Committee—of the Congress has as its chief business the lobbying of Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament in favour of legislation desired by Trade Unionists. The importance of the Trade Union Congress is generally overestimated by people outside the movement who are unacquainted with the actual working of Trade Unionism. The annual meeting of the Congress is an imposing display of Trade Union forces, and to some extent it is the mouthpiece of Trade Union opinion. But the Congress is in no sense a governing body; its resolutions in no way bind the affiliated Unions; it can neither initiate nor settle any strike; and it has no direct political influence.

A "Trades Council" is a sort of local Trade Union Congress. It is composed of representatives of the various Trade Unions in the locality, and its meetings are usually held once a month, when all local questions relating to the interests of labour are discussed. Trades Councils often take a leading part in promoting Labour candidatures at local elections; but the Councils suffer from the same disability as the Congress, inasmuch as they have no control over the policy of the constituent Unions.

A much more important form of Trade Union political action is to be seen in the Labour Party, which is a federation of Trade Unions and Socialist organizations. Co-operative societies are eligible for affiliation, but, at the end of the year 1912, only one small society of this kind had sought affiliation. The Labour Party is a purely political organization, both in its methods and in its aims. At the present time (1914) it has forty Members of Parliament, who speak and vote not only on labour questions but on every matter of public policy. The Labour Party is not a Socialist party, though it is often described as such by its opponents. The constitution of the Labour Party forbids its candidates to adopt the name Socialist when they appear before their constituencies. At the same time it is a fact that about half of the Labour members in Parliament are avowed Socialists, and the measures favoured by the Party tend to be of a socialistic character.

The bulk of the Labour Party funds are derived from the levy of one penny per member per annum from the affiliated Trade Unions and other societies. Now the membership of the affiliated Trade Unions in 1912 was 1,858,178; and the membership of affiliated Socialist societies was 31,237. These figures show that the Labour Party is dependent almost entirely upon the Trade Unions for its finances. Thus we find Trade Unionists of all political beliefs taxed for the financial support of a particular political party. The anomaly is apparent from the fact that, whilst Trade Unionists consent to pay the expenses of Labour candidates, they in very many cases vote against these candidates at elections.

The explanation of this paradoxical position is that the supporters of the Labour Party are the most active section within the Trade Unions; they have captured all the chief offices in the Unions and they

determine the Union policy. The majority of the members of a Union are too sluggish to protest against the spending of Union money for purposes of which they may not approve. Though the relations of the Trade Unions to the political Labour Party have been anomalous, they do not now involve any injustice. Every individual member of a Union is *able* to claim exemption from payment to the political fund; so that no man is under compulsion to pay for objects to which he is opposed. If he does pay, he has only his own carelessness to blame. The recent ballots of Trade Unions on the question of establishing a political fund has in every case resulted in favour of such a fund, but the opposing minorities have been unexpectedly large. No statistics are yet available to show what proportion of members will claim exemption from contribution to the political fund. The man who claims exemption will save his pocket only about a shilling a year, and he will incur incidentally a good deal of trouble and opprobrium; so that it is calculated that the number of claims for exemption will not be very large.

The Catholic View of Trade Unionism

So far we have confined ourselves to an examination of Trade Unionism from a general, social and economic point of view. We now come to consider Trade Unionism from a specifically Catholic standpoint. Trade Unions aim at the promotion of working-class interests by means of working-class combination. Does the Catholic Church approve of the general principle that particular groups of men may form combinations for the promotion of their common interests? With great emphasis the Catholic theologian answers: Yes. Catholic political theory is distinguished above that of all other schools by its

insistence on the value of voluntary associations and upon the immense importance of the right of association. A Catholic thinker regards the right to association as being far more vital to men than (as for example) the right to vote. Against the atomic theories of Individualist philosophers and the absolutist theories of the Socialists, the traditional Catholic conception of the ideal state has been, *communitas communitatum*, a community of communities. This is no mere truism. The question whether private associations derive the right of existence from the State or from Nature is one of the historic controversies in political philosophy. Many great thinkers have denied the natural right to association ; and the prohibition of all private associations was one of the chief principles of the French Revolution. This question is so important that I shall quote to some length a statement of the Catholic doctrine by Pope Leo XIII. :

"The consciousness of his own weakness urges man to call in aid from without. We read in the pages of Holy Writ : '*It is better that two should be together than one ; for they have the advantage of their society. If one falls he shall be supported by the other. Woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth he hath none to lift him up.*'[1] And further : '*A brother that is helped by his brother is like a strong city.*'[2] It is this natural impulse which binds men together in civil society ; and it is likewise this which leads them to join together in association of citizen with citizen ; associations which, it is true, cannot be called societies in the full sense of the word, but which, notwithstanding, *are* societies. These lesser societies and the society which constitutes the State differ in many respects, because their immediate purpose and aim is different. Civil society exists for the common good, and hence is concerned with the interests of all in general, albeit with individual interests also in their due place and degree. It is therefore called *public* society, because, by its agency, as St. Thomas of Aquin says, 'Men establish relations in common with one another in the setting up of a commonwealth.' But societies which are formed

[1] Eccles. iv. 9, 10.

[2] Prov. xviii. 19.

in the bosom of the State are styled *private*, and rightly so, since their immediate purpose is the private advantage of the associates. 'Now a private society,' says St. Thomas again, 'is one which is formed for the purpose of carrying out private objects; as when two or three enter into partnership for the purpose of trading in common.' Private societies then, though they exist within the State and are severally part of the State, cannot nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by the State. For to enter into a 'society' of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State is bound to protect natural rights, not to destroy them; and if it forbid its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence; for both they and it exist in virtue of the like principle, namely, the natural tendency of men to live in society. There are occasions, doubtless, when it is fitting that the law should intervene to prevent association; as when men join together for purposes which are evidently bad, unlawful, or dangerous to the State. In such cases public authority may justly forbid the formation of associations, and may dissolve them if they already exist. But every precaution should be taken not to violate the rights of individuals and not to impose unreasonable regulations under pretence of public benefit. For laws only bind when they are in accordance with right reason, and hence with the eternal law of God."[1]

At the present time the right of association, so strongly asserted by the Church, is threatened, not by the State, but by capitalistic employers, who extort from their employees a pledge that they will join no Trade Union. Whether the imposition of such a condition is ever justifiable we cannot stop to inquire. Our Catholic doctrine of association will predispose us to look favourably on working-class organization; but we have still to ask whether Trade Unions, *as they actually are in this country*, are organizations which Catholics should support. For it may be that, while association is a good thing in the abstract, particular forms of association may be bad things. It may be that Trade Unions produce more economic evil than economic good; or it may be that, though producing a balance of economic good, they cause spiritual and religious evil.

[1] *The Condition of the Working Classes.* C.T.S., 1d.

There can be no serious question as to the economic benefits that Trade Unions have conferred upon the working class. The whole of the industrial history of the nineteenth century goes to prove that Unionism has been the means by which working men have lifted themselves out of misery and degradation and oppression. Or, if anyone has read no history, let him look and compare the conditions of labour in the organized and the unorganized industries to-day ; or let him question any cotton-worker or miner past middle age as to the state of things that existed in their industries before effective Unions were formed. Twenty or thirty years ago we did find learned professors of Political Economy earnestly contending that Trade Unions were prevented by immutable economic laws from raising wages above the level that would naturally be attained by free supply and demand without combination. This argument is never used by economists to-day ; they now know better. Theorists now admit that Trade Unions may raise wages, and facts have proved that they do raise wages.

It is objected against Trade Unions that they cause strikes ; this is true, but well-directed strikes often produce good results, and, if Unions sometimes cause ill-directed strikes, such strikes are far more frequent where Unions do not exist. The machinery for collective bargaining, which Trade Unions set up, substitutes industrial diplomacy for industrial war, and by this means it is probable that Trade Unions prevent far more strikes than they have ever caused.

It is objected that Trade Unions interfere with the right of "free" labour. The principle underlying this objection seems to be that any man has a right to work at any job under whatever conditions he likes. No such right exists either in natural or civil law. No one objects that the chartered pro-

fessional Unions of doctors and solicitors are guilty of injustice, because they exclude from the practice of their profession unqualified men, and men who, even though qualified, refuse to conform to the regulations of the professional Union. In the Middle Ages a similar protection against "interlopers" was enjoyed by the chartered unions of artizans. The present-day Trade Unions in their attitude to non-Union labour do not violate the just freedom of labour. They merely lay down a condition under which the right to labour in a certain trade must be exercised. This condition is membership of the Union, and, only if it can be proved that compliance with this condition is unreasonable or oppressive, can it be said that the exclusion of non-Union labour is unjust. It is only in highly organized industries that the exclusion of non-Union labour is attempted, because only in such industries is exclusion possible. Now, in highly organized industries, the non-Unionist is quite literally what the workmen call him, a "scab," which is merely a synonym for what the scientist calls a parasite. The non-Unionist takes the benefit of the improved conditions of labour, which the Trade Unions have secured, without contributing his share to the upkeep of the organization by which those improved conditions are maintained. And the "scabs" know this and will often admit it. For example, in the cotton-weaving trade about 90 per cent. of the operatives are organized and about 10 per cent. are non-Unionists. When you ask these non-Unionists why they do not join the Union, they will often reply: "Because we get just as high wages without paying Union money." Under the circumstances, it is not unnatural that the presence of "scabs" is a constant exasperation to the Unionist workers in the cotton trade; although for practical purposes the Unions

are as strong with a 90 per cent. organization as they would be with a 100 per cent. During a strike the mills must be stopped altogether, for the non-Unionists are too few in numbers to be worth anything as "blacklegs."

Besides benefiting their own members, Trade Unions have been of advantage to the employers and to the State as a whole. For the Trade Union movement has been a great school of working-class education, of education in civics, in the mental and moral qualities necessary for responsible self-government. The discussions in the Union council rooms have sharpened the men's wits, taught them to debate, forced them to realize the many-sidedness of industrial questions and the consequent need for careful deliberation and cautious action. The friendly society work of Trade Unions has been a splendid example of self-help and mutual help. The system of collective bargaining has diminished strikes and facilitated intercourse between employers and workers. The enforcement of the Standard Wage, besides protecting the workers, has protected also the conscientious employer against the undercutting of the unscrupulous sweater, who can lower prices because he can lower wages.

State regulation is no substitute for Trade Union action. It is notorious that the Factory Acts are very imperfectly enforced, for the visits of the official inspectors to a factory are few and far between; and it is easy to hide things from the sight of the inspectors when they do appear. Except in the few instances where the Trade Boards Act operates, the State makes no attempt to determine wages, which is the main business of the Unions; and as for the Trade Boards Act itself, it has not the slightest chance of proving efficacious without the constant backing of a Trade Union.

Trade Unions, then, must be judged as economically beneficial to the State ; whilst, for the adequate maintenance of the special interests of the wage-earning class, they are of absolutely vital importance. If Unions confined themselves to their purely economic activities, Catholics would never have had any scruple about supporting them. But Unions have developed a political as well as an economic character. This has been to some extent inevitable, owing to the close connection between economics and politics. The interests of the Trade Unions and of the working classes generally are so constantly and profoundly affected by legislation and other forms of State action that the Unions are compelled to attempt to influence the State. But, necessary as it has been that the Unions should be in some measure political, the circumstance has given rise to grave problems. For the Unions, in embarking upon politics, have found themselves involved in questions where the interests of their members have been not common, but divided. For instance, the Unions have taken up the question of education. No one can claim that this is a question with which Unions should have no concern. Obviously, they must be concerned with the question of technical instruction, and the question of half-time, and the question of the provision of scholarships for working-class children. But some of the Unions have gone further and have thrown the weight of their influence in favour of Secular Education, *i.e.* the State repression or penalization of schools where religion is taught.

The case where a Union commits itself to the support of Secular Education is only one actual instance of many possible situations that might arise, wherein a Catholic member of the Union would be placed in great difficulty. The ordinary non-Catholic Trade Unionist regards Secular Education merely as

a simple and equitable settlement of a ridiculous sectarian squabble. It is not our business here to discuss either the equity or other merits of Secular Education. The point is that the Catholic fears and hates Secular Education as something hideously evil. He does not merely object to it because it interferes with the exercise of his personal rights; he loathes it because it interferes with the performance of his holiest duties to God and to his children.

The Catholic Trade Unionist has much in common with his non-Catholic fellows. He desires less labour and better wages, and he is keenly in sympathy with his class in its struggles for more humane conditions of life. Nevertheless, sooner than sacrifice religious education, the Catholic Trade Unionist would see the organization of labour shattered and he and his fellow-workers bereft of all the material advantages which organization brings. The sweating of labour is a bad thing; it is, as the Catechism tells us, like sodomy and murder, a sin that cries to Heaven for vengeance; yet the secularization of education would be a worse thing. This is the view of Catholic Trade Unionists. It will not be shared, nor even comprehended, by men who do not share our Faith; but men who do not share our views might at least respect them, and refrain from forcing us to act as their accomplices in a purpose we detest.

Now, when a Trade Union pledges itself to the propaganda of Secular Education, or when it subsidizes a politician who supports Secular Education, the Catholic members of that Union are forced into partnership with what they consider a crime. The same applies when Unions join, as some of them have recently done, in the campaign for cheap and easy Divorce. Of course, when Unions merely pass academic resolutions in favour of remote and impossible objects, even though the objects be undesir-

able, the Catholic need do no more than shrug his shoulders. We must be ready to face real difficulties that arise; we need not cantankerously search for difficulties. A sense of humour is better than excess of zeal.

The Secular Education business has, however, been sufficient by itself to prove that the danger of an anti-Catholic policy by the Unions may be very real. How shall we meet the danger? In some continental countries circumstances are such that the formation of separate Catholic Unions has been necessary. Whatever may be best for the Continent, the attempt to form separate Unions in England would be folly; first, because they are undesirable; secondly, because they are impossible. A separatist policy would be undesirable from the Trade Unionist point of view, because religious divisions would gravely weaken the effectiveness of the movement. The solidarity of labour would be broken. A separatist policy is undesirable from a Catholic point of view, because it would turn all non-Catholic Trade Unionists into bitter anti-Catholics. Moreover, the separatist scheme is impossible. For separation must mean not one Catholic Trade Union, but upwards of a thousand different Unions. We would want a Union in every trade in which Catholics were employed. In the majority of trades the Catholic workers would be so scattered and few in numbers that no organization could be formed. In some of the cotton centres of Lancashire and in some of the mining districts of the North and perhaps in the ports of Liverpool and London, Catholic Unions are not impossible; but Catholic engineers, carpenters, printers, iron-workers, builders, railwaymen, clothiers, etc., etc., must remain in the ordinary Unions, or not be organized at all.

Happily Catholics can most effectively safeguard

their consciences, not by separation from the Unions, but by heartier working in and with the Unions. I will not assert that it is the religious duty of Catholic workers to join Trade Unions, but I would venture to say that it is in their economic interest and is almost their economic duty to join the Unions. Catholics who are members of a Union should take an interest in its affairs and a share in its work. They should attend the meetings of the Union, when its policy is being discussed and its officials are being elected. They should be willing to offer themselves for election and help to perform the somewhat thankless tasks of Trade Union government and administration.

If Catholic members thus put themselves in evidence, an anti-Catholic policy will never have the slightest chance of adoption. This is not the mere assurance of optimism. Every experienced Trade Unionist knows that it is strictly true. Catholics are almost invariably a small minority in a Union, who could always be out-voted if the non-Catholic members were equally united and active. But the bulk of Trade Unionists never are so united and active. Trade Union policy is always determined by the very small number who take a constant interest in the affairs of the Union. It might be suggested that, admitting this to be the case at the present time, any marked increase in organization and activity amongst Catholics would provoke a counter-movement amongst the non-Catholic members. This fear has little foundation, for non-Catholics will never have as strong a motive as Catholics for united action. Catholic action *as such* will be, or ought to be, limited to defence against plain violations of Catholic rights. And when such violations take place, it is infallible evidence that the Unions are trespassing beyond their own province. As long as Trade Unions confine themselves to

Trade Union business, they cannot possibly come into conflict with the religious interests of their Catholic members. It is therefore in the highest degree unlikely that any question can ever arise when the mass of non-Catholics will be roused from their usual apathy and will sink all their own differences in order to force upon the whole Union an immoral or irreligious policy.

There would, however, be a very real danger of arousing antagonism to Catholics among Trade Unionists if Catholic action within the Unions became factionist action. It would be most mischievous if Catholics adopted the tactics pursued by certain other sections who aim at "capturing" the Unions. A Catholic who takes part in a Trade Union ballot, whether as candidate or voter, should always remember that, whilst he must defend Catholic rights if they are threatened, it is also his duty to advance the general interests of his Union. A Catholic candidate has no right to expect Catholic votes merely because he is a good Catholic, he should be a good Trade Unionist also.

In short, Catholics will perform the greatest service to their religion if they aim at being of the utmost possible service to their Union. Unless one section or another has been acting with needless aggressiveness, the occasions when questions of Trade Union policy will have a religious bearing will be very infrequent. It may well be a healthy sign when, instead of seeing the Catholics in a Union always voting for each other, we find them frequently voting against each other. This may show, not that they are divided about religious questions, but that the Union is steering clear of any policy that would produce religious discord.

Catholic Trade Unionists will enormously improve their capacities of service to the cause of the Faith

and the cause of labour if they will train themselves by a course of social study. We should equip ourselves with a knowledge of the main principles of Catholic social philosophy and economic science. Such knowledge is not beyond the reach of working men. A great deal of knowledge can be gained merely by reading the penny pamphlets published by the Catholic Truth Society and the Catholic Social Guild. Men who are willing to do even more than this should join social study clubs and follow a systematic course of study. Clubs of this kind already exist in the principal industrial towns. Where they do not at present exist, it is a very simple matter to get them started. No expert teacher is needed, nor any costly books. A study club can be started by any two men (or women) who will meet at regular intervals to read and discuss together a penny pamphlet. Of course, if a priest can be persuaded to act as director, if there are more than two members, and if a small number of cheap books can be collected, so much the better. Any further particulars about the formation of study clubs, what to study, and how to study, can be obtained on application to the Catholic Social Guild, 1 Victoria Street, London, S.W.

[NOTE ON BOOKS:—The standard books on English Trade Unionism are *The History of Trade Unionism*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb (7s. 6d.), and *Industrial Democracy*, by the same (12s.). *The World of Labour*, by G. D. H. Cole (5s.), discusses present-day problems of Trade Unions from the "rebel" standpoint; it gives a good account of Socialist Trade Unions on the Continent, but ignores the powerful Catholic Unions. Mr. Joseph Clayton's *Trade Unionism* (6d.), in Jack's "People's Library," is cheap and useful. To those who read French the publications of the *Action Populaire* (5 Rue des Trois Raisinets, Rheims) are recommended. See especially the section on Trade Unionism in the *Année Sociale*, 1914.]

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